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Abstract 
Reasoning from all knowledge and belief is an adaptive approach to thinking about the 
world. It has been robusdy shown that conditional 'if then' reasoning with ever}'day 
content is influenced by the background knowledge an individual has available. If we are 
presented with the statement 'if it rains, then ]ohn mil get wet' then we are told that it is 
raining and asked if John will get wet, we may consider a number of possibilities before 
answering the question; perhaps John has an umbrella or is sheltered from the rain. 
Hence, when engaged in conditional reasoning of this sort people typically draw on 
background knowledge to arrive at an informed response. 
People with autism tend not to process information in context. There is a wealth of 
evidence indicating that these individuals have a piecemeal rather than an integrative 
processing st}de. It was therefore h\^othesised that adolescents with autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD) would be less influenced by background knowledge when engaged in 
conditional reasoning with ever}'day content. 
Adolescents with ASD showed a weak or absent effect of available background 
knowledge on reasoning outcomes compared to a typically developing control group. This 
finding was demonstrated in two separate conditional reasoning tasks. These results were 
not explained by a failure to generate background knowledge or by differences in the 
beliefs held by the two groups regarding problem content. Within the tj'pical population a 
lack of contextualised reasoning was also found among participants with high scores on 
one particular autistic trait, attention to detail. The abilit}^ to integrate aU relevant 
information during conditional reasoning was also found to be dependent on available 
working memory resources. 
These results extend the known domains which demonstrate a lack of contextualised 
processing in autism. They also show that for individuals with autism reasoning without 
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regard for background knowledge stems from a failure to integrate information. The 
findings suggest that this failure is related to the cognitive demands of the task and the 
processing style of the individual. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The studies presented in this thesis explore thinking and reasoning among individuals with 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD). This work brings together two extensive literatures. Studies 
relating to information processing abilities and styles in ASD, which demonstrate tendencies 
for decontexmaUsed problem solving across a number of domains, and studies from the 
reasoning literamre, specifically exploring ever}'day contextualised reasoning and the nature of 
the influence of knowledge and belief on conditional reasoning. Participants recruited for 
experiments include adolescents with high functioning autism or Asperger syndrome and 
typically developing adolescents and adults. 
In this chapter I will outline major theories relating to autism including those relating to 
Theor}' of Mind and executive dysfunction. I will focus on other accounts which propose a 
tendency in ASD not to contextualise, or integrate information in order to arrive at higher 
meaning. This wiU include discussion of Weak Central Coherence Theory, Underconnectivit)' 
Theor}'^ , and the complex processing deficit account of autism. I will discuss evidence for a 
lack of contexmalised thinking in studies of text comprehension. I will also examine possible 
preferences for visual as opposed to verbal thinking st)'les, and how this may relate to the 
integration of information in individuals with ASD. 
Autism is a developmental disorder characterized predominandy by a triad of impairments 
in social interaction, communication and behavioural flexibUit)' (World Health Organization, 
1993). 10% of the autistic population also displays some form of savant skills or islet of special 
abilit}'. These islets of abilit}' may be in a number of given areas including intellecmal, musical, 
artistic and visual. The symptoms falling under the social interaction category include 
impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviours; failure to develop peer relationships; 
lack of spontaneous seeking to share interests and achievements with others, and a lack of 
social or emotional reciprocity. The symptoms falling under the communication categor}' 
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include delay in or lack of spoken language development (with no compensation through 
other modes of communication). In individuals who do have speech, symptoms include a 
marked impairment in conversational skills, stereot)^ed and repetitive use of language, and 
lack of spontaneous age-appropriate social or imaginative play. The symptoms falling under 
the behavioural flexibility' categor}' include a preoccupation with stereot}'ped and restricted 
patterns of interest to an abnormal degree; inflexible adherence to non-functional routines or 
rituals; stereotj'ped and repetitive motor movements and a preoccupation with parts of objects 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental disorders (APA, 1994) defines Asperger 
syndrome as a separate disorder from autism. There is recognition, however, that those who 
are now diagnosed as having Asperger syndrome would previously have been labeled as 
having high functioning autism. Definitions of distinction between the two conditions differ 
but it is generally accepted that Asperger syndrome shares the social and behavioural 
symptoms of autism but development of spoken language follows a t)'pical pattern. Since 
autism has been presented as a continuous spectrum there is some controversy as to whether 
Asperger syndrome should be diagnosed as a distinct disorder (See Matson & Boisjoli, 2008 
for a review). For the purposes of our studies we consider Asperger syndrome to fall within 
the autistic spectrum and to be comparable to high functioning autism. This choice was made 
predominantiy because some of the older participants had early diagnoses of high functioning 
autism, if they were diagnosed now, however, they may be diagnosed as having Asperger 
syndrome. As a result of these diagnostic changes those with an early diagnosis of high 
functioning autism and those with a more recent diagnosis of Asperger syndrome presented 
similar symptom profiles, especially in terms of language abilities. Whether Asperger 
syndrome and autism are distinct or not, there is a general consensus that widely used 
diagnostic measures such as DSM-IV and ICD-10 do not clearly outline differences or 
provide sufficient detail to make reliable and valid distinctions between the two disorders at 
the present time (Matson & Wilkins, 2008). 
A series of studies will be presented in this thesis exploring contextualised reasoning in 
individuals with ASD. Many current theories of autism focus on the tendency for individuals 
with ASD not to process information in context and to exhibit a piecemeal rather than an 
integrative processing st)'le (e.g. Frith, 1989; Happe & Frith, 2006; Mottron & Burack, 2001; 
O'Riordan, Plaisted, Driver & Baron-Cohen, 2001). This tendency has been demonstrated by 
multiple tasks across a number of domains including visual and auditor}^ perception, the 
processing of facial features and aspects of text comprehension such as homograph reading. 
Most information processing accounts of autism acknowledge both enhanced local 
processing and reduced integration of information in ASD but differ in the centraUt}' which 
they afford local or global processing. Studies of global processing in particular have presented 
some conflicting and complex findings, and some accounts claim that individuals with ASD 
are able to see the bigger picture in some cases, reflecting a tendency not to draw information 
together rather than an inabilit}' to do so (e.g. Happe & Frith, 2006). Other accounts claim 
that people with ASD are fundamentally impaired in their abilit)' to integrate information (e.g. 
Just, Cherkassky, Keller & Minshew, 2004). There are also differences in the degree to which 
information processing st)'le is thought to explain the symptoms associated with autism, 
although all accounts accept that processing implications are not domain specific and have far 
reaching effects on thinking and behaviour in ASD. Some explanations of autism, including 
current accounts of weak central coherence, see at)pical information processing as running 
alongside other accounts of autism which seek to explain social deficits. Other accounts, such 
as those associated with underconnectivity, claim, however, that a tendency not to integrate 
information can explain all of the symptoms associated with ASD. 
Whether the information processing style of individuals with ASD reflects a tendency, or 
whether they are incapable of integrating information, most accounts would agree that 
individuals with ASD tend not to draw information together in order to process stimuli in 
context. Such a tendency raises questions regarding how people with ASD make use of 
background knowledge in thinking and reasoning in their daily Uves. There has been ver\' littie 
work exploring ever}fday reasoning in ASD, and the studies presented here seek to address 
these questions. 
A wealth of research into deductive reasoning among tjpical populations has shown that 
people are highly influenced by content and context when reasoning about the world (Evans, 
2002). Such effects are t)rpically referred to in the reasoning literature as a cause of 'cognitive 
bias', but the abilit}' to take account of background knowledge and belief in ever)'day 
reasoning is highly adaptive and instrumental in achieving our personal goals (Evans, 2007). 
The experiments presented here use everjrday conditional reasoning problems, with 'if-then' 
arguments. These problems have familiar content and have been extensively explored in terms 
of the influence of background knowledge and belief on reasoning outcomes (Evans, 2007; 
Evans & Over, 2004). T}pically people integrate information presented with knowledge and 
beliefs about the world to place conditional reasoning problems in context. >Xniere 
contextualized reasoning of this t^pe occurs consistent changes in response patterns can be 
identified. 
This kind of contextualized reasoning is subject to development. Ver}f young children 
show litde effect of background knowledge, and contextualized reasoning among tj^pically 
developing youngsters develops through late childhood into adolescence (Markovits & 
Barrouillet, 2002; Markovits & Thompson, 2008). As adolescents move towards adulthood, 
the development of inhibitor}'^ and meta-cognitive processes allows for more control over 
reasoning and a more selective use of background knowledge (Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002; 
2004; Muller et al., 2001). Tj'picaUy developing adolescents, therefore, present a population 
which is arguably more influenced by background knowledge compared to younger children 
and adults. 
Current knowledge about the integration of information in reasoning among individuals 
with ASD is limited. Available studies have tended to focus on counterfactual and rule-based 
reasoning relating to the social deficits in ASD. Such existing studies of reasoning suggest, 
however, that individuals with ASD may have difficulties with integrating perspectives, or 
drawing inferences on the basis of a given context. Information processing accounts of 
autism, such as Weak Central Coherence Theory' and Complex processing Deficit Theor}' also 
predict that individuals with ASD will tend not to integrate background knowledge with 
presented material, in order to reason in context. 
We surmised that a tendency not to integrate information in order to process information 
in context would result in atypical conditional reasoning performance, with regard to the 
influence of available background knowledge, among adolescents with ASD. We predicted 
that individuals with ASD would show less effect of background knowledge on reasoning 
outcomes; this was explored in Experiment 1. Subsequent experiments explored possible 
explanations for reasoning performance. 
The rest of this chapter focuses on theories and accounts of autism. I wiU begin by 
outlining a domain specific account of autism relating to Theor}' of Mind, and more domain 
general deficits proposed under the umbrella of executive dysfunction. 1 will then go on to 
discuss a number of information processing accounts of autism which highlight detail based 
processing st}de in autism, and the tendency not to integrate information and process 
information in context among people with ASD. Chapter 2 will discuss relevant studies and 
theoretical accounts in the psychology' of reasoning, which relate to the influence of 
knowledge and belief on thinking and reasoning, within t}'pical populations. 
Theory of mind 
The vast majority' of research into autism in the last four decades has involved an exploration 
of issues surrounding Theory of Mind (ToM) in some form or another. Theor}' of Mind is the 
abilit)' to understand that oneself and others have mental states including beliefs and 
intentions, and that behaviour can be predicted from knowledge of mental states (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978). Children and adults with ASD have repeatedly been shown to have 
difficulties with Theor)' of Mind (see Baron-Cohen, 1993; 1995 for reviews). Theon' of Mind 
is t}'pically assessed using false belief tasks such as The Sally Anne Task. The child is shown a 
character 'Sally' who leaves an object (a toy or chocolate) in a basket before going out to play. 
In her absence another character 'Anne' moves the object to a new location (a box). Children 
are asked to say where Sally will look for the object when she returns to the room (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). Tjpically developing four year olds tend to succeed at this task 
sajdng Sally will falsely believe the object to be in the basket. Younger children and individuals 
with ASD tend to fail this task. There are numerous studies which demonstrate that children 
with ASD have a problem with carr}dng out false belief tasks such as the Sally Anne task. (See 
Baron-Cohen, 2000 for a review). This is tjpicaUy taken to mean that they have difficulties in 
understanding the beliefs and desires of others. Children with ASD also have difficulties in 
inferring meaning from language outside of the literal, and t}'pically, do not spontaneously 
exhibit imaginar}'^  pl^ Y- These symptoms have all been taken as evidence for a lack of ToM. 
Leslie is one of the major proponents of the ToM deficit account. Amongst others Leslie 
and Baron-Cohen have argued that autism is characterised by a kind of mind-blindness, 
involving a domain specific impairment to an innate module, leading to an inabiUt}? to 
understand the mental states of other people (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith, 1985; Leslie, 
1987, 1988,1991; LesUe and Roth, 1993; Baron-Cohen, 1991, 1993). Leslie claims tiiat around 
the age of two years children's representational skills move on from primary, literal 
representations of what exists in the world, and this is evident in imaginative play. Play 
involves simultaneous representations, one of the literal world and one of the play or fictional 
state. Leslie claims that this second state is in effect a manipulated representation of the first, 
so imaginative play is a form of metarepresentation. According to Leslie's account this early 
abilit}' is the precursor to understanding pretence in others. Understanding the beliefs and 
intentions of others (including pretence in self) constitutes a Theor}' of Mind. In order to 
quarantine the representations necessar)' for the understanding of belief or pretence these 
representations must be decoupled from the literal. The site for such decoupling is claimed to 
be an innate domain specific processor- the Theor)' of Mind Mechanism (ToMM). According 
to Leslie it is this mechanism that is damaged in some way in autistic individuals, leading to the 
social and communicative deficits individuals with ASD exhibit. 
The ToMM account has been useful in explaining the social and language impairments 
associated with autism. Children with ASD show delays and deficits in their acquisition of 
language which range from a complete lack of language, to adequate use of language, but 
impairment in understanding the nuances of conversation associated with social meaning and 
intention. These pragmatic impairments in language have tended to be interpreted with regard 
to a lack of ToM (e.g. Lord & Paul, 1997; Wilkinson, 1998). The model presented is one 
where an innate mechanism fails to come online and has far reaching effects on social and 
linguistic development. A lack of ToM is, therefore, presented as the core dysfunction in 
autism. Language development, which relies upon joint attention and shared attention, is 
impoverished in autism and the tj'pical understanding of pretense, beliefs and intentions, first 
in self then in others, fails to occur due to impaired metarepresentational performance of the 
ToMM. Where children with autism do have language it is Linked to basic function and simple 
labeling (Tager-Flusberg, 1996). As the autistic child develops they exhibit a range of 
difficulties in conversational and social contexts due to the central Theor)' of Mind deficit. 
The mind-blindness account of autism has been criticised on a number of counts. Most 
significandy perhaps, despite the claim that ToM impairment is a core deficit in autism, all 
children with ASD do not fail tasks taken to measure ToM; in fact in the initial testing session 
20 % of participants were able to pass the Sally Anne Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). This 
difficult)' was addressed by investigating whether the ToM problem was a delay rather than a 
deficit. Baron-Cohen (1989) claimed that although some individuals with autism could pass 
false belief tasks, none could pass a more difficult second order false belief task. This was 
subsequendy found not to be the case (Bowler, 1992). The developmental delay account was 
supported, however, by the finding that performance on false belief tasks was related to verbal 
mental age. Individuals with ASD were found to be unlikely to pass such tasks until their 
verbal mental age was 12 or above (Happe 1995). A number of further tests such as the 
Strange Stories test (Happe, 1994) and the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen, JoUffe, Mortimore & 
Robertson, 1997) were developed in order to measure theor}^ of mind among high functioning 
individuals with ASD. Individuals with ASD tend to do less well than controls on all of these 
tasks, they do not, however, show universal failure. This makes the idea of a domain specific 
impairment in a particular mechanism untenable. 
Research into Theor}^ of Mind among autistic groups has relied heavily on different 
versions of the false belief task. There is a wealth of evidence that people with ASD do not 
show t}'pical ToM development, several studies have questioned, however, whether this 
particular task necessarily demonstrates a lack of understanding of belief. Other accounts of 
autism stress the underlying counterfactual nature of false belief tasks, the executive demands 
of such tasks and the failure of children with ASD on similar tasks, which do not rely on the 
understanding of belief. 
Leslie's use of the term 'metarepresentation' may also be misleading to some extent (for a 
summar\f of the usage in autism research see Scott, 2001.) According to Leslie, basic 
metarepresentation, as shown in imaginative play, involves holding in mind a literal 
representation of the state of the world alongside a fictional representation which is derived 
from the first. The ToMM deals specifically with such metarepresentations, and ensures that 
fictional metarepresentations are insulated from the real world state. Criticism of Leslie's 
influential work has stemmed from the question of whether what he describes really 
constitutes metarepresentation, whether ToM necessarily involves domain specific 
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representational processes, and whether this kind of representational capacit)' is sufficient to 
explain performance on the false belief task (Perner, 1991; Whiten, 1996). Whiten and others 
for example, have disputed Leslies claim that play involves metarepresentational abilities, 
whilst accepting that pretence involves: 
'A cognitive manipulation of already existing primary? representations' 
(Whiten in Sperber, 2000, p. 156) 
This leads to the discussion of what kinds of representations are involved in the false belief 
task. Whilst passing the false belief task necessarily involves representing differing perspectives 
there is some question as to whether performance relies on fundamental metarepresentational 
abilities which underlie the understanding of belief. Scott has argued that it is not necessar}^ to 
metarepresent in order to solve false belief tasks at aU (Scott, 2001). His definition of 
metarepresentation can be stated as a higher order representation of a representation. Scott 
claims it is not necessar}' to represent the fact that we have a belief in order to hold it. This 
implies that we can represent the belief of another without recourse to higher order 
representation, since higher order representation implies some representation of the content 
of the mental state. According to Scott what is necessar)' to solve the false belief task is to 
hold a representation of a belief as a proposition with two arguments, and recognise that belief 
may be true or false. 
The ToMM impairment account was also called into question by the discover)' that 
children with ASD do have problems with manipulating representations but this is unrelated 
to their abilit)' to understand belief in others. Children with ASD were found to be able to 
solve simple false belief tasks that did not require representation of differing beliefs. Grant, 
Riggs and Boucher (2004), for example, found that children with ASD were able to solve non-
standard false belief tasks which did not involve simultaneous consideration of differing 
perspectives. The same children were found to perform poorly on physical state problems 
which did not involve the understanding of belief, but required holding differing possibilities 
in mind. This work is inconsistent with the claim that children with ASD fail false belief tasks 
due to an inabilit}' to understand the beliefs and intentions of others. Instead Grant et al. 
suggest that failure to pass false belief tasks is related to an inabilit}' to engage in complex 
reasoning about differing possibilities which requires the manipulation and integration of 
simultaneous representations. A number of accounts have also proposed that 
metarepresentation is a domain-general capacit}' of which Theor)' of Mind is just one example 
(Corballis, 2003; Perner, 1991; Stone & Gerrans, 2006). 
Alternative accounts of ToM deficits in autism have also focused on a lack of innate early 
social processing (e.g. Stone & Gerrans, 2006). According to this account 
metarepresentational abilities are intact in autism but early social competencies such as joint 
attention and face and emotion recognition are impaired. ToM is thus impaired due to the 
impoverished development of precursor inputs. Related to this account is the Enactive Mind 
h)fpothesis (Klin, Jones, Schulz & Volkmar, 2003) which claims that the autistic mind lacks the 
innate drive to focus on the social world. This results in a tendenc)' among individuals with 
ASD not to look for social meaning and consequentiy the development of social processing is 
impoverished. 
Although people with ASD undoubtedly do have problems with Theor}' of Mind it is 
unlikely that this is the result of a domain specific metarepresentational impairment. Use of 
the false belief task has been confusing, as passing the task relies not only on understanding 
belief, but also on manipulating representations of differing perspectives. Work such as that of 
Grant et al. (2004) suggests that these abilities are distinct, and children with ASD may have 
domain general difficulties with tasks requiring high levels of representational complexit}'. 
Other accounts suggest that difficulties may stem from impoverished inputs to ToM processes 
due to the tendency not to attend to the social world during early development. Leslie's 
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domain specific account has proved inadequate, in explaining not only the social but also the 
range of non-social symptoms in autism, such as repetitive behaviour, obsessive interest and 
unusual islets of abtlit)' (Frith, 2001). New accounts tended to focus on more domain general 
explanations of the disorder. In some cases explanations strove to explain other aspects of 
autism, and in others domain general executive dysfunctions were presented as underlying 
social as well as other symptoms of autism. 
Executive dysfunction 
Whilst early studies of autism were concerned mostiy with theor)' of mind, subsequent 
research focused on the possibilit)' that autism could best be explained in terms of domain-
general executive function. To some extent the social aspects of autism were left aside in these 
accounts. Executive functions can be conceived of as higher order processes that allow 
people to plan, sequence, initiate and sustain behaviour. Some accounts were presented 
alongside the ToM modular dysfunction account (Happe and Frith, 1995; Roth and Leslie, 
1998), whilst others claimed that a TOM deficit among children with ASD was the result of 
domain general executive impairments (e.g. Harris, 1993; Hughes and Russell, 1993). Children 
and adults with ASD were found to have a number of executive impairments but findings 
were contradictor}? and inconsistent. For example, a variety of studies have explored specific 
executive abiliries including planning, inhibition and set shifting. Individuals with ASD have 
been found to have deficits in planning, as shown by performance on The Towers of Hanoi 
or similar tasks (e.g. Ozonoff and Jenson, 1999). There are conflicting and problematic results 
in this area. Hughes, Russell and Robbins (1994) found that children with ASD were only 
impaired on more complex planning tasks. Other studies found that children with ASD who 
had low IQ performed poorly on planning tasks, but those with average levels of IQ did not 
(Mari, CastieUo, Marks, Marraffa & Prior, 2003). In a comprehensive series of experiments 
(Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997) Ozonoff and colleagues investigated 
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the inhibitor)' abilities of children with ASD, compared to normally developing children, 
matched for age IQ and gender. Children with ASD showed normal performance on a 
Go /No Go task, a Stop-Signal task and two negative priming tasks. Other studies have shown 
that autistic individuals have a problem with inhibiting prepotent responses. Individuals with 
ASD perform poorly on the windows task, for example, which requires the participant to 
point or reach for an object (Hughes and Russell 1993). 
Children and adolescents with ASD are also repeatedly found to be highly perseverative on 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, taken to be a measure of set shifting, compared to normally 
developing participants (e.g. Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999), and other clinical groups (e.g. 
(Bennetto Pennington & Rogers, 1996). There have been few, if any, other set shifting tasks 
conducted with children with ASD, however, and some significant differences on the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task do not appear when the effects of verbal IQ or full-scale IQ are 
removed (Hill 2004). This task is also known to have an inhibitor)' component, so it is difficult 
to isolate specific executive impairments (Konishi, Nakajima, Uchida, Kikyo, Kameyama, & 
Miyashita, 1999). 
Studies focusing on the general working memor)' abilities of participants with ASD also 
show conflicting and problematic results. Bennetto et al. (1996) found that participants with 
ASD performed poorly, compared to matched controls, in temporal order memor)', source 
memory, sentence and digit span. Children and adults with ASD also show poor performance 
on spatial working memor)' tasks (Luna, Minshew, Garver, Lazar, Thulborn, Eddy & Sweeney, 
2002). Ozonoff and Strayer (2001) looked at a number of executive tasks, however, and found 
mixed results on working memor)' tasks amongst children with ASD. They concluded that 
conflicting results reflected task administration factors, and children with ASD did not suffer 
from working memor)' deficits. 
Overall, the executive deficit account of autism suffers from a confusing array of results. 
Task use has tended to be repetitive in that there is not a wide range of tasks used to measure 
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different functions. The specific executive functions implicated in certain tasks are also not 
always well defined. Executive functions may not be completely unitar}' with varjdng 
combinations of executive functions involved in solving executive tasks (Mij^ake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki & Howeter, 2000). Commonly used tasks such as the Towers of Hanoi or 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task are likely to draw on more than one executive function. The 
inconsistent results on executive tasks by individuals with ASD may also reflect differences in 
IQ or unusual compensator)^ processes. Individuals with ASD have been shown to have 
different large scale brain networks (Koshino, Carpenter, Minshew, Cherkassky, Keller & Just, 
2005), for example, with working memor}' shifted towards regions topically associated with 
lower levels of cognitive processing, including the left inferior temporal, left temporal, right 
temporal, and left inferior extrastriate. 
Like The ToM account the executive deficit h)'potheses cannot account for the full range 
of autistic symptoms, and the combination of the two approaches seems less than fruitful. It is 
possible that inconsistent executive dysfunction is a sjTuptom of other causes of the core 
features of autism. Recent neuroimaging data suggests tiiat the problem may more specifically 
lie in a communication problem between frontal and other brain regions, rather than executive 
dysfunction per se. Recentiy, information processing accounts of autism have also explained 
the range of abilities and impairments in autism with reference to processing st}de rather than 
executive deficits. 
Weak central coherence and related theories 
A number of current theories about the nature of autism focus on an inabilit}' to contextuaUse 
or integrate information. Weak Central Coherence Theor}' (Frith, 1989) stems from the 
observation that individuals with ASD tend to focus on parts of objects, rather than the 
whole, and show an unusual sensitivity to small changes in the environment. Frith found that 
individuals with ASD showed good or superior performance, compared to controls, in the 
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Embedded Figures Task (Shah & Frith 1983). In this task participants have to identify a shape 
from a wider whole. T}'picall3' people find this task difficult, as the}^ tend to process the shapes 
presented globally, rather than as a series of parts. Frith claims that usual performance on the 
Embedded Figures Task stems from the fundamental drive to process information in context 
in order to arrive at higher meaning or central coherence. TjpicaUy people tend to create an 
impression of a whole from which details can be reconstructed, rather than deal with 
information in a piecemeal fashion. Frith claims that people with ASD exhibit weak central 
coherence. This processing bias leads to a failure to process information in context in order to 
extract the gist of a given simation and an over-reliance on piecemeal or detail-based 
processing where abilities may be enhanced compared to the tj^ Dical population. 
In the original incarnation of Weak Central Coherence Theory a lack of global processing 
was presented as the core deficit, with enhanced attention to detail being a consequence of a 
lack of global interference. Further studies identified examples of enhanced identification of 
localized visuo-spatial details in ASD, such as a reduced effect of inversion compared to the 
tjfpical population in face processing (Langdell, 1978, Hobson, Ousten, & Lee, 1988) and 
good performance on the Block Design Test (Shah & Frith, 1993). At the same rime evidence 
for a lack of contextualized processing was identified by poor performance on tasks which 
require the integration of details, such as the disambiguation of homographs (Frith & 
SnowUng, 1983; JoUffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999a), and the interpretation of words in ambiguous 
sentences Qoliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999b). Both these types of evidence were taken as support 
for a global processing deficit. Weak central coherence was originally conceived as pro\nding a 
general explanator}' framework for the symptoms associated with autism. Problems with 
integrating information in order to create new meaning were taken to underlie patterns of 
abilities and impairments associated with autism, including deficits in social understanding. 
There have been a vast number of studies related to weak central coherence across a 
number of widely differing cognitive and perceptual tasks (see Happe & Frith, 2006 for a 
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review). These studies have identified both relatively robust findings in some areas and 
conflicting evidence in others, and have led to revisions in the initial conception of the 
account. There is a large and reliable body of evidence that people with ASD show good or 
enhanced performance on tasks which require local or detail based processing. Evidence for a 
deficit in global processing is more complex, however. It is now recognized that people can 
have good attention to detail without necessarily having poor global processing, this has led to 
reassessments of findings. 
Other contemporar}' accounts recognize at)'pical processing at both local and global levels 
but also tend to emphasize enhanced local processing. The enhanced perceptual functioning 
account proposed by Mottron and colleagues (e.g. Mottron & Burack, 2001) claims that 
individuals with ASD show over-developed low-level processing of sensor}' material which is 
linked to localized brain areas dealing with specific perceptual material. An inabilit}' to draw 
together information from disparate areas of the brain leads to an over dependence on 
domain specific perceptual processing, where abilities may be enhanced. Compensator)'^ 
pathways for higher level perceptual processing are tj^ picaUy domain general and are associated 
with distributed networks across the brain. Enhanced low level perceptual processing is taken 
to explain for example, superior recognition of visual patterns, obsessive and restricted 
interests and identification of small changes in the known environment. 
Plaisted and colleague's (O'Riordan, Plaisted, Driver, & Baron-Cohen, 2001) work on 
feature discrimination in ASD also identifies superior processing of the features unique to an 
object, but poor processing of the features held in common between objects. Key research 
focuses on enhanced processing of local features, but evidence of reduced integration in 
feature processing across domains is less clearly defined (Plaisted, O'Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 
1998a ; Plaisted, O'Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 1998b). 
There is growing evidence from studies with typical individuals that global and local 
processes are distinct with separate developmental trajectories (e.g. Reyna and Kiernan, 1994; 
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Burack, Enns, larocci & Randolph, 2000; Porporino, Shore, larocci & Burack, 2004). The 
difficult}' with many tasks taken to measure weak central coherence is that outcomes can be 
interpreted as implying poor global processing, enhanced local processing or both (Happe & 
Booth, 2008). There are ver}' few tasks which measure local and global processing separately 
and recent examples still show mixed results. Mottron, Burack, larocci, Belleville and Enns 
(2003) used a batter}' of tasks in an attempt to assess local and global processing separately in 
ASD and concluded that global processing was intact but individuals with ASD were better 
able to ignore global influence where it was irrelevant to the task in hand. Booth's (2006) 
batter}' of tests included tasks designed to specifically measure global integration, as distinct 
from local processing. In this case evidence was found for poor integrative processing among 
individuals with ASD. People with ASD seem to be able to integrate information to achieve 
meaning in specific cases. They are able to integrate information about a given object (Ameli, 
Courchesne, Lincoln, Kaufman, & GriUon, 1988; Pring & Hermelin, 1993) or routine in their 
daily life, for example. Connecting information in these tasks may depend upon item to item 
associations or chaining. Integrating information within a single domain may also be intact, 
where integrating information across domains may not (Happe & Frith, 2006). There is also 
evidence that people with ASD are able to attend to global features, for example in a 
hierarchical figures task, when instructed to do so (Plaisted, Swettenham & Rees, 1999). For 
these reasons weak coherence has recentiy been conceptualised as a detail focused processing 
st}'le with a tendency not (rather than an incapacit}') to process information in context. 
Investigations of the link between social deficits and weak central coherence have been 
mixed. The latest incarnation of Weak Central Coherence Theory acknowledges that social 
and non-social aspects of the disorder may be independent, and weak central coherence may 
not provide a causal role underl}'ing patterns of social behaviour. Weak central coherence and 
ToM performance, for example, have been found to be unrelated in a number of studies 
(Happe, 1997; Joliffe and Baron-Cohen 1997; Morgan, Maybur}' and Durkin, 2003). These 
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findings may reflect the confound between local and global processing on weak central 
coherence measures, however, and Happe and Booth (2008) suggest that poor integrative 
processing may be related to social deficits, but enhanced local processing may not. 
Weak central Coherence Theor}' has been refined over the years on the basis of the vast 
body of related experimental findings. In recent accounts, for example, it is recognized that 
weak central coherence may not play a causal role in the social impairments associated with 
autism. A piecemeal processing st}'le, manifest in attention to details or parts, seems 
experimentally robust, and this has replaced global coherence as the focus of the account. It is 
now generally recognized that detail-based processing and poor global processing do not 
necessarily go hand in hand. The fact that this was previously thought to be the case has 
influenced task design, and made interpretation of performance difficult in some cases. There 
is evidence that individuals with ASD may be able to integrate information to arrive at higher 
meaning in response to some tasks, or under explicit instruction. For these reasons weak 
central coherence is presented as a tendency not to draw information together for higher 
meaning, rather than incapacit}' to do so. 
The mechanisms underlpng weak central coherence are not currentiy clearly defined. 
Accounts tend to focus on atjpical brain function including abnormalities in specific pathwaj^s 
(e.g. Spencer et al., 2000) or brain regions (Waiter, Williams, Murray, Gilchrist, Perrett & 
Whiten, 2005) and reduced connecti\at)' across brain regions (Brock, Brown, Boucher & 
Rippon, 2002; Just et al., 2004). The underconnectivit}' account proposes that autism is a 
cognitive and neurobiological disorder resulting in a problem with integrating information and 
a reliance on lower level processing. Function of individual brain areas are preserved and may 
even be enhanced, but the integration necessar}' for higher levels of cognitive processing is 
impaired. 
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Underconnectivity and Complex Processing Deficit Theory 
Reduced connectivit)' between brain regions in autism has been proposed as the mechanism 
underlying weak central coherence, but the underconnectivit}' account has also been put 
forward as a theor);^  of autism in its own right (Just et al., 2004). Weak Central Coherence 
Theor}', Underconnectivit}' Theor}' and other related accounts, such as Complex Processing 
Deficit Theor}', are all relevant to the studies presented in this thesis, as they are all concerned 
with integrating or contextualising information. There are, however, differences in emphasis 
between these accounts in terms of how information processing is conceptualised. Other 
differences include methodological approach and the degree to which the range of symptoms 
associated with autism are included in explanator}' frameworks. This section will seek to 
outline underconnectivit}' and complex processing deficit accounts and how these accounts 
interrelate with aspects of weak central coherence. 
The model of the mind presented by Underconnectivit}' Theor}' is one of interrelated 
specialised cortical centres, with coherence emerging from coordination of brain regions. 
Higher level controlled forms of thought may be facilitated by integrative frontal regions, and 
any process which requires high levels of contribution from frontal executive regions is likely 
to be disrupted. This is not to say that all integration that emerges is imposed by central areas, 
however. Neuroimaging studies such as that of Just et al. (2004) examine levels of 
collaboration between brain areas (functional connectivit}'), based on correlations between 
activation of voxels using Pet or more recentiy FMRl scanning. The implication is that 
patterns of activation which match each other, in differing brain regions, reflect 
communication between those regions. Such studies show that participants with ASD display 
lower levels of connectivit}' than controls, when engaging on a number of tasks including 
ToM tasks (Castelli, Frith, Happe & Frith, 2002), sentence comprehension tasks, and 
performance on the Tower of London problem solving task (Just et al., 2004). There is also 
some evidence that impairment in connectivit}' may be uneven, and associated specifically with 
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cortical-cortical connections, whilst subcortical-cortical connections show hjperconnectivit)' 
(Mizuno, Villalobos, Davies, Dahl & MiiUer, 2006). This tendency is reflected in specific under 
activation in areas associated with complex processing and integration of information. For 
example. Just et al. found that in the sentence comprehension task, in addition to general 
underconnectivit)', individuals with ASD showed more activation in an area associated with 
lexical meaning of individual words, and less in areas associated with semantic and working 
memor)' processes. 
Explanations for the underconnected brain rely upon a model of development such as 
that presented by Karmiloff-Smith (1998), where the infant brain is relatively unspecialised 
apart from a few hardwired areas. Development involves a balance between specialisation and 
integration. Brock et al. (2002), For example, claim that underconnectivit}' stems from 
abnormal development of integration between disparate brain regions. In the infant with 
ASD, specialisation occurs but integration between brain areas is impaired. Levels of 
impairment reflect levels of autistic functionalit}^ In explaining how brain regions 
communicate. Brock et al. refer to current debates concerning temporal binding which suggest 
that communication may involve combination coding or temporal coding, depending on the 
complexity of the task. Combination coding deals with lower level processing such as the 
representation of object features, whilst temporal binding is necessary for higher level 
information processing. Brock et al. claim that it is the capacit)' for temporal binding that is 
lacking in individuals with ASD. 
Underconnectivit}' Theor}', as presented by Just et al. (2004), differs from current Weak 
Central Coherence Theory in that underconnectivit}' is presented as explaining all symptoms 
of autism, including social impairments. Underconnectivit}' Theory accounts for the ToM 
deficit (and many other deficits such as those involving language comprehension) in terms of 
an inability to meet the large demands of information integration that would be needed to 
understand complex social situations, involving a high level of representational manipulation. 
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This difficult)' would hold for any domain, not just the social, explaining apparent executive 
function impairments. Set shifting, for example, where processing has to move from one 
coordinated network to another, would be problematic. Hence autism is characterised by 
impaired performance on complex cognitive tasks that rely on high levels of integration, and 
preser\'ed or enhanced performance on lower level tasks with a dependence on local 
processing. Lack of brain connectivit}' has several implications related to how people with 
ASD think and behave. An}' task requiring the integration of informadon, to arrive at higher 
meaning, is likely to be impaired. Both Underconnectivit}' Theor)' and Weak Central 
Coherence Theor)' imply, however, that individuals with ASD will tend not to integrate 
information in order to process stimuli in context in any domain; either due to an inabilit}' to 
do so, or due to a particular processing style. 
Other accounts related to underconnectivit)' and resulting integrative difficulties include 
Complex Processing Deficit Theor}' (Minshew, Goldstein & Siegel, 1997; Minshew and 
Goldstein, 2001; WiUiams, Goldstein & Minshew, 2006a) which proposes that adults and 
children with ASD have a general impairment in processing complex information. A difficulty 
in drawing information together in order to create concepts and schemas means that incoming 
information cannot be processed with the support of a contextual framework. This 
impairment is only apparent in tasks which draw on limited cognitive resources. Less complex 
tasks or those which generally make fewer demands on cognitive resources wiU be unimpaired. 
The claim is not that individuals with ASD have a problem with cognitive capacity per se, just 
that their more piecemeal processing approach, without top down supportive mechanisms, 
makes overwhelming cognitive demands when engaged in effortful, complex tasks. According 
to Minshew and colleagues, higher level tasks can, therefore, be defined as those which rely 
upon employment of limited cognitive resources. A difficult}' in processing complex 
information results in a late information processing disorder. Early processing performance 
may be intact, or may be enhanced compared to the typical population, but more complex 
20 
processing demands cannot be met due to an inabilit}' to integrate information, necessary for 
higher levels of thinking. 
Minshew et al. (1997) addressed the question of what constitutes complex processing 
direcdy in an early empirical study of performance on simple and complex tasks within a 
number of domains. A large batter)' of tests was presented including tasks in memor)', motor 
skills, language and reasoning. In each domain tasks were presented with var)'ing levels of 
complexit)'. Participants with ASD demonstrated impairment in complex or late processing, 
but intact or superior function at lower level or early processing. This pattern was 
demonstrated across domains with the exception of visual-spatial processing. Poor 
performance was most pronounced in those domains that placed the highest demands on 
cognitive capacit)' and integration of information: the social, communication, and reasoning 
areas. A similar study was later repeated with children with ASD (Williams, Goldstein & 
Minshew, 2006a) with similar findings. Children with ASD showed unusually poor 
performance compared to matched controls in tasks tapping complex processing in sensor)' 
perception, motor, language, and memory. As with the adults in the previous study, the 
children with ASD had most difficult)' on tasks that placed the highest demands on 
integration of information such as memor)' recall for large amounts of complex material and 
text comprehension. 
Minshew and colleagues' account has strong parallels with Weak Central Coherence 
Theor)'; both accounts would agree that individuals with ASD have a reliance on piecemeal 
processing, and a tendency not to integrate information for higher meaning. The complex 
processing deficit account shows how this processing st)'le is Ukely to interact with cognitive 
capacit)' and memor)' functions, resulting in a lack of supportive models and schemas. Not 
only do individuals with ASD tend not to process stimuli in presented contexts they also fail 
to create internal contextual frameworks which can alleviate processing demands of complex 
tasks. Whilst an over-reliance on detail-based processing can afford some benefits, according 
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to this account the general outcome of such a processing st}de is rapid working memor)' 
overload. This account implies a distinction between tasks rel)'ing upon associative and 
implicit levels of processing, which should be intact in autism, and tasks which rely on 
working memor}'. Working memor\f dependent tasks tend to require high levels of integration 
of information and consequendy will not lend themselves to a piecemeal processing style. 
Minshew, Goldstein and Siegel (1997) found impairment in a range of complex language tests 
including the Reading Comprehension subtest from the Kaufman-Test of Educational 
Achievement, the Verbal Absurdities subtest from the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale and 
the Token Test. These tests explore complex higher order features of language likely to 
involve working memor)', such as text comprehension, verbal problem solving, and the 
comprehension of complex grammatical constructions. At the same time intact simple 
language processing is demonstrated by performance on WAIS—R Vocabular}' test, K-TEA 
Reading Decoding task and the Controlled Oral Word Association (FAS) task. All of which 
largely rely on implicit associative processes. 
In later studies specifically exploring memor}' function in adults, adolescents (Williams, 
Goldstein, & Minshew, 2005) and children with ASD (Williams et al., 2006b) it was found that 
basic associative memor}' abilities were intact, but the use of cognitive frameworks to support 
memor}' was impaired. These impairments were progressively worse as the complexit}' of the 
material increased for both auditor}' and visual material. 
Previous studies focusing on memor}' impairments of individuals with ASD have been 
explained with reference to executive deficits (e.g. Bennetto et al., 1996; Russell et al., 1996). 
Findings are t}'pically conflicting and problematic. The complex processing deficit account 
may provide a more useful framework for understanding memor}' abilities in ASD. Children 
with ASD do not appear to spontaneously use context to support memor}', for example, and 
organisational strategies such as the use of semantic categories appears to be lacking, unless 
prompted by external cues (e.g. Frith 1970a 1970b Fyffe & Prior, 1978; Tager-Flusberg, 1991). 
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Failure to spontaneously use contextualised processing means that memor}^ for complex 
configural material such as conversations, social events or stories ma}' be poor whereas 
memor}' for Usts of items or digits may be good (e.g. Fein et al. 1996; Boucher, 1981). 
Underconnectivit)' theor}' and the complex deficit account may also shed some light on 
the mixed findings for global processing in ASD. Both would predict that individuals with 
ASD are capable of integrating information in some circumstances where communication 
between brain regions is minimal or where cognitive demands are not high. For example, 
integrating information about the features of a given object may not require high levels of 
communication between disparate brain regions. Integration of information which relies on 
chains of simple implicit associations such as picture sequencing may also place only minimal 
demands on the cognitive system. Where cognitive demands are high, individuals with ASD 
may quickly become overwhelmed by the effort required to process information without 
supportive contextual frameworks. Nevertheless, individuals with ASD may be able to engage 
in some demanding tasks where they are motivated to employ additional effort to do so. 
Further evidence for integrative difficulties, specifically relating to the cognitive demands of 
the task at hand, come from other areas of research into autism such as text comprehension 
and the formation of complex situation models. 
Text comprehension and verbal processing 
Further information about the ability of individuals with ASD to integrate information comes 
from studies of text comprehension. Aspects of reading in autism appear to be intact, but 
individuals with ASD have difficulty using context in reading, and generally appreciating the 
meaning of texts (e.g. Frith and SnowUng 1983; Happe', 1997). This difficult}' is t}'picaUy 
related to central coherence and difficulties with integrating information. Studies exploring 
text comprehension amongst individuals with ASD demonstrate a specific processing problem 
relating to the integration of background information with online presented material. As 
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predicted by complex processing and underconnectivity accounts of autism individuals with 
ASD are able to integrate information in some cases, in order to make simple inferences and 
judgments, for example, with regard to a given text. Saldana and Frith (2007) found that 
individuals with ASD were able to draw on associative processes in order to activate relevant 
world knowledge and make implicit inferences which influenced subsequent responses. 
Saldana and Frith, therefore, conclude that the problems in text comprehension exhibited by 
individuals with ASD must reflect higher level processing. 
Other studies on text comprehension among individuals with ASD focus on these higher 
level processes. The work of Joliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999a; 2000) suggests that individuals 
with autism have impairment in integrating presented information with background 
knowledge in order to arrive at ongoing deep text comprehension. This deficit is 
demonstrated in a number of tasks including the use of context to interpret ambiguous 
sentences (Joliffe and Baron-Cohen 1999a), and the ability to integrate stoty information to 
arrive at global inferences which allow for the accurate interpretation of character actions 
0oliffe and Baron-Cohen, 2000). Participants with ASD were able to answer questions about 
the text, however, requiring basic bridging inferences. They were also able to use temporal 
cues to arrange sentences. 
Joliffe and Baron-Cohen describe this impairment in terms of the weak central coherence 
account. A difficulty in achieving global coherence, means making causal connections between 
disparate information in order to arrive at local then higher level meaning does not occur. 
Complex comprehension necessitates integration of information at several levels (Zwaan and 
Radvansky, 1998), including explicit and implicit processes. Whilst it seems that some level of 
activation of knowledge and text comprehension is intact in autism, reflected in the ability to 
form simple implicit bridging inferences, the kind of fluid, explicit, effortful integration of 
information needed for deep on-going text comprehension is evidendy impaired. 
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Individuals with ASD may not only exhibit an at}'pical processing style, compared to 
t)'pical controls, but this may be related to a reliance on less demanding representational 
modalities. In the tjpical population, the integration of information across domains may rely 
upon verbal as opposed to visual processing of information. There is evidence, however, that 
people with ASD prefer visual rather than verbal processing. 
Individuals with ASD tend to show particularly good performance on visual search tasks 
and tasks requiring the analysis of visuo-spatial details, such as the block design and object 
assembly subtests of the Wechsler intelligence test. Neuroimaging studies (e.g. Koshino et al., 
2005) also show activation during executive tasks in areas associated with visual processing 
among participants with ASD, whereas controls show activation in areas associated with 
verbal processing. Individuals with ASD, more generally, show greater activation in posterior 
regions of the brain and the right hemisphere across a number of tasks (e.g. Koshino et al., 
2004; Muller et al., 1999). This supports a tendency to rely on non-verbal processing. These 
findings are in line with firsthand accounts of the syndrome by high functioning individuals 
with ASD. Temple Grandin (1995), for example, claims that she thinks in pictures. She can 
think through problems in visual form and uses visualisation to aid understanding of concepts. 
As well as a tendency for a visual processing bias there is some supporting evidence that 
individuals with ASD have impairment in their use of inner speech (Whitehouse, Mayber}' & 
Durkin, 2006). This is of interest, since inner speech has been proposed as the medium 
through which information is integrated in the brain. 
Carruthers (2002; 2009) claims that inner speech, in the form of natural language, 
constitutes the medium of conscious propositional thought and is, in itself, responsible for 
modular integration in thinking and reasoning. Thoughts may take the form of natural 
language or of models or imagery, but it is language which specifically serves to integrate 
relevant information. Carruthers claims that language is the medium of integrative non 
domain specific thought and inference. This integrative capability is possible as language is an 
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input and an output system. Briefly stated, language needs access to a vast array of 
information, housed, according to Carruthers in separate domain specific modules, in order to 
comprehend, compose and output speech. It is this that makes it possible for language to 
access implicit modules, integrate information and broadcast complex representations, in an 
internal variant of speech itself, back to central modules. 
If Carruthers is right then a lack of inner speech among individuals with ASD is likely to 
go hand in hand with a lack of modular integration. The question here becomes one of 
chicken and egg, however. Lack of brain connectivit}' is likely to affect the development of 
complex language, where comprehension relies upon contextualisation and inference of 
meaning. Complex linguistic processing would necessarily go beyond simple lexical encoding 
and involve integration of disparate brain networks. Resulting impoverished inner speech, 
according to Carruthers, would also lead to further difficulties in contextuaUsed thinking and 
drawing together information in relevant ways. Compensatory mechanisms and 
h}'perconnectivit}r in some brain regions may lead to superior visual processing abilities and 
enhanced early processing where low levels of integration are required. 
Carruthers (2009) stresses the importance of central broadcast and exchange of 
information. Of particular importance is the inter-relationship between language and one 
central module, Theor}' of Mind. So, in a sense, we return to where we started from. This 
relationship is crucial, since the comprehension of language relies heavily on ToM inputs, and 
also because one of the primary inputs in ToM processing is language. Carruthers also claims 
that mind reading faculties are crucial to the kind of complex internal integrative processes 
involved in metarepresentational conscious thinking. There is a large literamre concerned with 
the relationship between Theory of Mind and communication (e.g. Happe & Loth 2002; 
Papafragou, 2002) and the link between Theor}' of Mind and language is well established. 
According to this account, ToM would necessarily be impoverished in a system with low level 
atypical connectivity and a lack of inner speech; where the reciprocal links of broadcast and 
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exchange between central brain regions were not supported. This idea is quite different to 
Leslie's ToMM account. Here the core deficit is one of connectivity' between modules, not 
dysfunction of any particular module. Lack of connectivit}' is implicated in the social and 
communicative deficits associated with autism, as well as contextualised thinking and complex 
processing across many domains. At the same time compensator}' mechanisms, such as a 
reliance on visual processing strategies and atypical brain development, may account for 
unusual islets of abilit}' and superior or good performance on tasks which require, for 
example, visuo-spatial processing or the identification of details regardless of the global 
picture. 
Conclusion 
Current theories of autism tend to focus on the effects of a domain general information 
processing stj'le on thinking and behaviour. Whilst there is some disagreement about whether 
such an approach can account for all of the symptoms associated with ASD, there is much 
consensus about the nature of information processing in autism. Most accounts would accept 
that individuals with ASD tend to see the world in terms of details or parts, and show good or 
enhanced local processing as a result. A 'persistent preoccupation with parts of objects' is one 
of the current diagnostic criteria for ASD (DSM-IV, APA, 1994). There is also agreement that 
individuals with ASD tend not to integrate information in order to process stimuli in context. 
There is evidence, however, that people with ASD can integrate information in some 
circumstances. The ability to draw information together for higher meaning may be related to 
the degree of integration required, the cognitive demands of the task at hand, or alternative 
compensatory processes available to the individual. The mechanisms underlying this 
processing style are likely to be related to atypical brain development. Several studies s u r e s t 
that individuals with ASD have reduced connectivity between brain regions. 
27 
Accounts such as Underconnectivity Theory and the complex processing deficit account 
have been presented as an explanation for all of the symptoms associated with autism, 
resulting in difficulties performing complex tasks in any domain which rely upon integrative 
processing. Any area of thinking or behaviour is likely to be disrupted especially where the 
cognitive demands of the coordination of brain regions is high. Although studies of reasoning 
among autistic populations are limited, those that exist, along with Weak Central Coherence 
Theor}', would predict that the drawing together of information necessar)' for reasoning on 
the basis of knowledge and belief is likely to be impaired in this population. Chapter 2 will 
examine the deductive paradigm in the psycholog}' of reasoning relevant to the development 
of tasks which demonstrate the influence of content and context on reasoning performance. 
Dominant theories seeking to explain these influences, including, logicism. Mental Model 
Theor)' and Dual Process Theor)', will be outlined. Evidence for the effects of background 
knowledge and belief on syllogistic and conditional reasoning will be explored and the 
development of conditional reasoning will also be discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will examine the deductive paradigm in reasoning, and the development of 
psj^chological interest in the role of background knowledge and belief in reasoning. I will 
discuss relevant theories concerned with explaining reasoning performance, and evidence for 
the influence of content and context on that performance. 1 will explore the influence of 
available knowledge on everyda.)' conditional reasoning, and the development of conditional 
reasoning. 1 will begin by describing some basic concepts involved in reasoning research. 
The psycholog)' of reasoning is involved with understanding how people form 
conclusions, inferences, or judgments. Reasoning can be either deductive or inductive. 
Inductive inference involves adding new information to what is presented whereas deductive 
inference is based only on material presented and what is implicit in it. The psycholog}' of 
reasoning has largely been concerned with deductive reasoning and tends to use a 
methodolog}' known as the deduction paradigm. T)'pically, participants are presented with 
verbal statements, told to assume that they are true and asked to produce a conclusion or 
evaluate whether a conclusion necessarily follows. The content of reasoning problems may be 
abstract (all As are B), factual (if the ignition key is turned, then the car will start), contrary to 
fact (if it is raining, then the road will be dry) or counterfactual (if I had caught the train, then 
I would have got there on time). Reasoning problems can be presented in a number of 
different ways and take several forms. In the studies presented here we are mainly concerned 
with conditional reasoning. Conditional reasoning is common in a range of contexts including 
everyday thinking as well as abstract or scientific problem solving. 
Conditional reasoning involves inference with a major premise of the form 'if p then q' 
and four possible minor premises; Modus Ponens (MP), Modus ToUens (MT), Affirmation of 
the Consequent (AC) and Denial of the Antecedent (DA). Both MP and MT are valid 
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inferences, as there is a single logically correct response. AC and D A are invalid inferences, as 
the correct logical response is one of uncertaint)'. In the case of the invalid inferences AC and 
DA, however, there is a tendency for people to respond with certaint)' by giving the 
pragmadcaDy implied conclusion 'p is true' for AC and 'q is false' for D A (See Table 1). The 
implied responses are not logically correct. 
Table 1 Examples of valid and invalid conditional inference forms 
Validit}' Argument form 
Valid Modus Ponens (MP) 
IfP then O: If it is sunny, then Joe goes 
out 
P.- It is sunny 
Modus Tol lens (MT) 
IfP then O: If it is sunny, then Joe 
goes out 
Not^:]oe does not go out 
^ . •Joe goes out Not P: I t is not sunny 
Invalid Affirmation of the Consequent (AC) 
IfP then O: If it is sunny, then Joe goes 
out 
^ . •Joe goes out 
Denial of the Antecedent (DA) 
IjP then Q: If it is sunny, then Joe 
goes out 
Not P: It is not sunny 
P: It is sunny ^ . - Joe does not go out 
An example of an AC argument with abstract content would be; 
If there is a 3, then there is a W 
There is a W 
In this case it logically follows that there may or may not be a 3, although most people 
conclude that it follows that there is a 3. (We will talk more about this in the section on 
conditional reasoning.) 
30 
The study of the effect of background knowledge and beliefs on reasoning has also tended 
to focus on syllogistic reasoning. Categorical syllogisms include two premises and a 
conclusion. The first premise and the conclusion are linked together by the second premise. 
An example of an abstract syllogism would be; 
All A are B 
All B are C 
Therefore, all A are C 
Generally people are asked to engage in deductive reasoning in order to assess logical 
arguments, or derive logical conclusions from the statements they are presented with. The use 
of the deductive paradigm in reasoning research stems from philosophical traditions which 
present logic as underlying rational thought (Henle, 1962). A wealth of studies, particularly in 
syllogistic reasoning, have demonstrated, however, that even when people are instructed to 
reason according to logic they find it difficult to ignore their knowledge and beliefs about the 
world (Evans, 2002; Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Oaksford, Chater & Larkin, 2000; Gigerenzer, 
1996). The influence of belief on reasoning has been conceptualized in different ways but 
generally belief based responding is thought to be the result of cognitive biases. Such belief 
bias has been taken as evidence for error in logical performance or as demonstration of 
irrational thought patterns. More recendy, however, it has been recognized that reasoning on 
the basis of logic may be a rarified form of reasoning which, rather than forming a blueprint 
for human thought, is effortful and error prone, even for highly educated adults. Recent 
accounts of everj'day reasoning suggest that it is, by default, contextualized, and is 
characterized by the integration of all relevant knowledge and belief. Contextualized 
reasoning of this sort has been presented as being highly adaptive and helpful in achieving 
personal aims (Evans, 2007). Nevertheless, most reasoning tasks still rely on the deductive 
paradigm, the origins of which can be traced back to logicist principles. 
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Logicism and mental models 
The standard deductive form of reasoning research originated with the philosophical tradition 
of logicism; this can be traced back as far as Aristotie who presented human beings as rational 
animals. The tradition associated with this view concerns reasoning according to rules of logic. 
According to logicism, thinking is by nature rational, and rationalit)^ is characterized by logic. 
The idea that human thought is governed by logic was embraced by Piaget (e.g. Inhelder & 
Piaget, 1958). Piaget's ideas were ver}' influential in the psycholog}' of reasoning in the 1960s 
and 70s, and reinforced the conception of reasoning as intrinsically logical in nature (Henle, 
1962; Smedslund, 1970). Piaget claimed that knowledge and cognition develop through a 
number of stages with formal operational thought being the final stage. Thinking moves from 
being tied to concrete objects towards abstract logical thought. At the formal operational 
stage, people can take thoughts about objetits and events, and abstract from them propositions 
and statements about their logical relationships. Within the field of reasoning the deductive 
paradigm developed in order to investigate people's logical competence, influenced by the 
work of Piaget, and based on standard logics developed by mathematicians such as Frege 
(1952). 
Problems devised on the basis of standard logics began to be used regularly by 
psychologists studying reasoning, but the results showed that people often performed poorly 
on these tasks. So much so that it was questioned whether most adolescents, or even adults, 
had achieved the formal operational stage of logical thought. These findings led to a backlash 
in the field resulting in claims that people were intrinsically irrational and did not reason 
according to logic at all. The most notable example of work at this time was that of Peter 
Wason. Wason developed two important tasks, the 2-4-6 task (1960) and the four card 
selection task (1966), which demonstrated that people were prone to systematic biases in 
reasoning. A large number of studies have explored performance on variants of the selection 
task (See Evans & Over, 2004, Chapter 5, for a review). Participants are asked to choose 
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which of four cards they need to turn over to decide whether a statement holds or not. Four 
cards are shown with only one side exposed. In the original version participants are told that 
all the cards have a number on one side and a letter on the other. The following numbers and 
letters can be seen: 
A D 3 7 
They are then told the following rule about the information on the cards: 
If there is an A on one side of the card, then there is a 3 on the other side of the card. 
Participants are asked which cards they need to turn over in order to discover whether the rule 
is true or false. Logically the statement is proved to be false by finding a card which has an A 
on one side and a number which is not 3 on the other. The correct logical response is, 
therefore, to turn over the cards showing A and 7. The vast majorit}' of adults fail this version 
of the task, and resort to simply choosing the cards that are mentioned in the rule (Evans, 
1998). T}'pically, therefore, people turn over the A card alone or the A and the 3 cards. Wason 
claimed this was due to the fact that people were tr)dng to prove the rule true rather than false, 
hence they exhibited an erroneous confirmation bias by turning over the cards which could 
confirm the rule. There have been other accounts of the selection task since, but at this time 
what was deemed to be of importance was that people were not reasoning according to logic. 
These findings were taken to show^ that irrarionalit}' was the norm in human reasoning. At the 
time, psychological debate revolved around the question of whether people were logical or 
not. Logic remained the normative standard against which to assess how rational people were 
when engaged in reasoning. This led to a paradigm-bound perspective with regard to 
reasoning on the basis of background knowledge and belief. Where such reasoning was 
illogical it tended to be conceptualised as either due to error or bias. 
Wason's work influenced both theories based on logicism, which were forced to 
accommodate the actual performance of people on logical tasks, and new accounts of 
reasoning which highlighted the role of context in reasoning. The growing empirical evidence 
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in the field of reasoning led to the development of two theories which seemed to be in 
opposition. On the one hand theorists in the tradition of logicism (e.g. Braine & O' Brien 
1998; Rips, 1994) claimed that human thought was based upon application of a set of 
inference rules held in the brain, and reasoning involved identifying the basic structure of a 
problem and appl)'ing logical rules or schema. An example of an abstract inference rule for 
MP would be: 
If p then q 
P 
Therefore q 
This kind of rule could be applied to any MP problem regardless of content. Hence given the 
premises: 
If the key is turned, then the engine will start 
The key is turned 
P is translated as 'the key is turned' and q is read off as being equivalent to 'the engine will 
start.' In response to the evidence that people often had difficult}^ with deductive reasoning, 
such theories also acknowledged that this process was often error prone. Belief based 
responses to reasoning problems were, therefore, defined as bad reasoning, or errors in the 
underlying logical nature of the reasoning process. 
An alternative and concurrent account, mental model theor)' (Johnson-Laird 1983; 
Johnson-Laird and Bara, 1984; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), proposed that the errors that 
people made on logic based problems should form the basis of further study. Johnson-Laird 
and colleagues claimed that reasoning was influenced by the content of the problems 
presented. Mental model theory put forward the idea that people created models or mental 
structures of given problems in order to solve reasoning problems. This account implies that 
people have some intrinsic understanding of the validity of arguments and suppose that an 
inference cannot be valid if the premises are true but the conclusion is false. People, therefore, 
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set up a model where the premises are true and search for counterexamples where the 
conclusion does not hold. Inferences are made by examining models about possible real world 
states. A conclusion will be accepted if it is represented in a model and not contradicted by 
other models. The manipulation of models involves working memor}'^ , which mediates 
reasoning performance. 
One of the major differences between mental model theor}' and the accounts that 
preceded it was the recognition that people would draw upon what they knew to be true about 
the world, in order to derive models of reasoning problems, without recourse to logical rules. 
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that mental model theor}' and theories based on logicism 
have fundamental underlying similarities (e.g. Oaksford and Chater, 1995; Evans and Over, 
2004). Both theories rely on the same deductive paradigm and employ logical reasoning 
instructions, but, more importantiy, mental model theor}' strives to explain the mechanisms 
underlying logically valid deductive inference, and assumes that this is the primar}' form of 
reasoning. The mental model account, therefore, implies that reasoning is involved with the 
search for validit}' and as such is potentially logical, although in practice it is error prone. The 
limits of cognitive capacit}' may mean that insufficient models lead to defective reasoning 
outcomes, or beliefs may interfere with the effective search for counterexamples Qohnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1991). Evans and Over (2004) further stress the lack of consideration of 
assessments of probability, belief and confidence in given conditional statements, and the 
conclusions that might be drawn. 
Mental models can only represent possible world states, not attitudes or beliefs about 
those states. Where mental model theory has been applied to conditional reasoning, in 
explaining the influence of belief on thought for example, the outcome is somewhat 
problematic. According to mental model theor}', models represent states of the world and are 
truth verifiable. Such models do not, therefore, include assessments of probability or belief. 
The idea that people form a number of mental models in response to a given problem has also 
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been criticised. Evidence from research into belief biases on syllogistic reasoning (Evans, 
Handley & Harper, 2001) suggests that people tend to form just one model, but may draw an 
illogical conclusion if that model is based on what is possible but not necessar}'. 
Alternative dual process accounts of the mechanisms underlying reasoning performance 
suggest that there are two systems or t^'pes of processes in the brain. The interplay between 
these systems results in contextualised reasoning in most cases. This is not to say that 
reasoning on the basis of logic is not possible. Thought is not based on sets of inference rules, 
however, and logical thought is subject to cognitive capacit)', thinking disposition and the 
abilit}f to suppress interference from background knowledge. 
Dual Process Theory 
Dual process accounts have been applied to many areas of psychological enquir}' including 
reasoning (Evans, 2003, 2006a; Stanovich, 1999, 2004, Klaczynski, 2000, 2001; Sloman, 1996). 
Dual process theories are based on the claim that there are two distinct systems for cognition 
(Evans, 2003). These two systems interact in complex ways to control thinking and behaviour. 
Early ideas that reasoning may involve two types of thinking are reflected in work on the 
selection task. Wason and Evans (1975) found that although choices made on the selection 
task often reflected simple bias, the justifications given by participants showed no awareness 
of these causes. People attempted to relate choices to rational decision making in line with the 
instructions given. Evans (1984, 1989) developed the heuristic-analytic theor}' of reasoning. 
This theor}^ predominandy grew out of the need to account for the growing evidence for 
cognitive biases in reasoning tasks. Heuristic processes provided representations of aspects of 
problem content along with associated knowledge and beliefs. These processes took place pre-
consciously and automatically presented relevant material to the analjTdc system. The analytic 
system then generated inferences from the available information. Biases were thought to occur 
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where information relevant to a logical outcome was omitted, or information which was 
irrelevant to a logical outcome was included in activated material. 
Evans and Over (1996) developed the heuristic-analytic account into dual process theor}' 
which proposed two cognitive systems in the brain. These two systems were later described by 
Stanovich (1999) as System 1 and System 2. At around the same time Sloman (1996) 
developed a dual process account identifying distinct systems for associative and rule based 
cognition. According to Evans and Over, System 1 is unconscious, associative and of ancient 
origin. This sj'^ stem involves fast parallel processing which is automatic and deals with 
pragmatic material. In contrast. System 2 is presented as slow, sequential, under conscious 
control and more recendy evolved. This system is uniquely human and capable of logical or 
abstract thought. 
System 1 cues pragmatic responses which are not informed by logic but are driven by 
innate modules or past learning. System 2 has the abibt}' to override such responses in some 
cases. In terms of deductive reasoning tasks, this means that System 2 is able to derive 
logically correct responses if it can resist conflicting belief based responses cued by System 1. 
According to this theor}^ responding cued by System 1 is not irrational, since in ever}'day life it 
is a good idea to make decisions on the basis of all available information. Importantly, 
therefore, this theory suggests that it is adaptive to contextualise thinking and to reason on the 
basis of knowledge and belief ContexmaUsed reasoning was presented as rational in the sense 
that it is generally effective in achieving personal goals. Where rationaUt)' is equated with logic, 
however, reasoning on the basis of all relevant knowledge can lead to responses categorised as 
errors or biases. 
In real life, decisions are often made on the basis of automatic or habimal responses. 
Evans and Over claimed that System 2 provided a different kind of thinking, one which is 
unique to human beings and allows us to think hj'potheticaUy about a range of possibilities. 
Such possibilities can be divorced from belief about real states in the world. Dual process 
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theory could thus account for both the ability' to reason according to logical standards, but 
also reasoning on the basis of background knowledge and belief. This movement away from 
the idea that thought was intrinsically logical was mirrored by other theories, some of which 
had a more pronounced focus on issues relating to adaption and the evolution of reasoning 
(e.g. Fiddick, Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Such theories reject the idea that reasoning is 
essentially logical in favour of rationalit}' based on evolved adaptations. Such views have been 
controversial. Stanovich (2004) has pointed out, for example, that the current technological 
environment bears Httie resemblance to the environment we are primarily adapted for. System 
1 may reflect evolutionarjr rationaUt}', but the nature of System 2 means that it can serv^e 
current goals of the individual, and in some cases override System 1 where responses are in 
conflict. 
Topically research into dual processes has focused on competition or conflict between 
System 1 and System 2 processes resulting in responses which, in terms of the deductive 
paradigm, are categorised as errors or biases. The belief bias literature identifies a range of 
factors which affect people's abilities to reason logically and suppress System 1 processes 
based on prior belief Dual process theor}' was further developed by Stanovich (1999) in 
identif}ing cognitive capacity, temperament and thinking style as important factors in an 
individual's abilit}' to override System 1 influences. Stanovich (1999) refers to such influences 
as 'the fundamental computational bias of human cognition.' Some individuals were better 
able to resist the fundamental computational bias. Those with high cognitive abiUt}^ were 
found to use prior knowledge and belief flexibly, according to its efficacy in a given situation. 
Stanovich and West (1998b) found that when told that a cue which is normally diagnostic, (in 
this case the relationship between gender and height) would not be helpful in the task given, 
those with higher cognitive capability were more effective in resisting belief. However, they 
also found that when the same cue was not presented as unhelpful, cognitive abilit}' correlated 
with belief bias. 
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Stanovich and West (1997) demonstrate a relationship between cognitive capacity, 
measured via standard IQ tests, and a variety of reasoning tasks. IQ tests were significandy 
correlated with logical performance on all reasoning tasks. Further tests measuring the ability 
to override cognitive biases revealed modesdy significant correlations with tests of cognitive 
ability. Stanovich and West concluded that the tendency to override prior belief and give 
logical responses when required could be predicted, to some extent, b}'^  the cognitive capacity 
of the individual. 
In terms of dual process accounts, cognitive ability or 'g' is associated with the sequential 
nature of System 2, and can be described as the limiting capacity of that system. Stanovich 
(1999) also found, however, that once cognitive capacity is accounted for there is still a degree 
of variability in performance remaining. He claimed that any explanation of this additional 
variance should include consideration of will and disposition. Thinking dispositions are 
described as relatively stable mechanisms which tend to support repeated behavioural 
responses and strategies. Thinking style can be seen as being more malleable than cognitive 
ability in that it is not constrained by limited capacity. Disposition may, for example, influence 
the tendency to weigh evidence against a particular belief heavil}', or the tendency to spend a 
long time considering a problem before giving up. Stanovich draws on the work of Baron 
(1988) in criticising the IQ concept for ignoring the influence of disposition on how people 
think. Baron claims that any true understanding, of thinking, must include motivational and 
dispositional elements, as well as cognitive capacity, in order to arrive at a full picture of the 
factors which lead to particular reasoning outcomes. 
Stanovich and West (1998a) examined the associations between cognitive capacity, 
thinking dispositions and performance on a range of tasks, tj^ picaUy taken to demonstrate 
belief biases. Measures of disposition included questionnaires, designed to show levels of 
epistemic self-regulation. These included willingness to decontextualise, willingness to 
consider alternative opinions and willingness to spend more or less time on a given problem. 
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They found that thinking disposition scores showed significant correlations with performance 
on belief bias tasks after cognitive capacit}' had been accounted for. These findings are borne 
out by further work such as that of Klaczynski, Gordon and Fauth (1997) suggesting that 
reasoning biases which interfere with the abiUt}' to identify experimental flaws were associated 
with thinking st}de. In line with Stanovich and West, Klaczynzki and Daniel (2005) found that 
thinking disposition predicts reasoning performance independendy of verbal abilit}'. 
Although Stanovich accepts that most System 1 responses are evolutionarily adaptive, 
reasoners are able to arrive at outcomes which reflect either personal or rule based rationalit}'. 
Reasoning which is effective in a given situation will be dependent on the cognitive resources 
and disposition of the individual. In everyday life, rationality reflects the goals of the individual 
whereas in certain situations, such as the laborator)', rationaUt}' may refer to performance on 
the basis of logical rules. 
Recentiy there has been some agreement that System 1 is actually a collection of systems. 
(Stanovich, 2004; Evans, 2006b). What they have in common is that they all operate in 
response to stimuli without recourse to the cognitive capacit}' of System 2. Stanovich (2009) 
has also argued that System 2 can be divided into what he refers to as the algorithmic and the 
reflective minds. Higher level goal states which initiate override of System 1 reside in the 
reflective mind. This aspect of System 2 is related to measures of thinking st}'le and 
disposition rather than measures of IQ which relate to the algorithmic mind. Crucially the 
algorithmic mind is concerned with h)'pothetical thinking and simulations which require the 
separation of possibilities under consideration from actual states of affairs. Such processes are 
effortful and depend upon the limited cognitive capacit}' of the system. Hence thinking style 
interacts with a given situation, and may cause the algorithmic mind to be initiated. This is 
likely to lead to an attempt to override System 1 responses. The success of override and 
sustained consideration of possibilities will depend on the cognitive capacity of the individual. 
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System 2 is generally conceptualised as concerned with explicit conscious processes which 
are dependent on cognitive capacit)'. Evans (2009) claims that a defining feature of System 2 is 
that it is constrained by working memory capacit}'. This is not to say that System 2 simpty runs 
h)fpothetical simulations. Such simulations depend upon content provided by System 1. This 
content includes knowledge and belief about the world which are relevant to a given situation. 
System 2 can be seen as being characterised by a type of processing, rather than a system per 
se. System 2 type, processes differ from System 1 t)pe processes in that they necessarily draw 
upon the working memor}^ of the individual. 
Current ideas about dual process theor)' move away from the previous distinctions which 
sought to explain apparent conflict between belief and logic based responding. Previously 
System 1 was equated with belief based responding and System 2 was concerned with logical 
rule based reasoning. Recent work shows, however, that System 1 based responding can lead 
to logically correct outcomes and System 2 based responses can be error prone (Evans, 2007; 
Stanovich, 2009). If we accept Evans' definition of System 2 there is no reason why reasoning 
which is dependent on working memor)^ should be decontextualised or based on rules of 
logic. Hence belief based reasoning can be attributed to both System 1 and System 2 (e.g. 
Verschueren, Schaeken & d'YdewaUe, 2005a; Weidenfield, Oberauer & Hornig, 2005). 
Implicit knowledge can influence behaviour directiy, but knowledge and beliefs can also feed 
into System 2 in order to contextualise effortful reasoning processes. This is not to say that 
System 2 is not capable of logic based reasoning. As previously stated, in daily life the 
automatic contextualisation of our thoughts is adaptive and instrumental in arriving at 
informed decisions. In cases where decontextualised reasoning is required, however, such as 
mathematical study or laboratory experiments, then the inputs of System 1 may be irrelevant 
or unhelpful. In these cases successful performance will depend on the abilit}' of the individual 
to suppress unwanted information and reason effectively. 
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Based on the methodolog)' provided by Evans, Barston and Pollard (1983) a number of 
experimental studies have found extensive and robust evidence for the influence of 
background knowledge and belief on reasoning processes. Evans et al's. original experiment 
presented syllogisms where the conclusions were either believable or unbelievable. Results, 
which have subsequendy been shown to be vet)' reliable, show that people's responses are 
influenced by the validit)' of the arguments set before them, but also by how believable the 
conclusions are. Evidence from studies exploring the effect of content and context on 
reasoning performance are discussed in the next section. 
Evidence for the role of knowledge and belief in reasoning: syllogistic 
reasoning and the selection task 
The effect of both problem content and context on reasoning outcomes has been widely 
explored, and there is a wealth of evidence that people are highly influenced by context in a 
range of reasoning problems. This is the case even when participants are instructed to 
disregard what they know about the world and reason only on the basis of the material 
presented. Evidence includes belief bias in syllogistic reasoning and the facilitation of 
performance on Wason's selection task with content-rich, rather than abstract materials. 
In terms of the deductive paradigm, belief bias is demonstrated when people respond 
according to belief rather than logic, even when instructed to take no account of background 
knowledge. The standard methodolog}' for investigating belief bias was introduced by Evans 
et al. (1983). Four categories of syllogisms were presented allowing for comparisons of 
situations where belief and logic were either in concert, or in conflict. Syllogisms were either 
valid or invalid and had conclusions which were either believable or not believable. Hence the 
four categories were vaUd/believable, invalid/believable valid/unbeUevable, 
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invalid/unbelievable. For example, participants were presented with the following 
valid/unbelievable syllogism, where belief and logic were in conflict: 
No nutritional things are inexpensive 
Some vitamin tablets are inexpensive 
Therefore, some vitamin tablets are not nutritional 
The form of this argument is logically valid but the conclusion is contrar)^ to what most 
people believe about vitamins. Evans et al. (1983) instructed participants to reason according 
to logic on the basis only of the premises presented. The results showed, however, that 
participants were consistendy influenced by the believabilit}' of the conclusion, as well as the 
vaUdit}' of the arguments. Evans et al. concluded that people attempt to follow the 
instructions and reason logically, but find it ver}' difficult to suppress contextual information 
about what they believe to be true. 
Experimental evidence of belief bias has been instrumental in undermining logicist 
accounts of reasoning. The effect has been demonstrated in a wide number of studies (e.g. 
Klauer, Musch & Naumer, 2000; Morley, Evans & Handley, 2004; Newstead, Pollard, Evans 
& Allen, 1992) and repeatedly shows that people are highly influenced by content and context 
when engaged in reasoning. It is important to recognise that the influence of knowledge and 
belief can both impede and facilitate logical performance. Belief bias in syllogistic reasoning 
demonstrates that where logic and belief are in conflict, responding in line with logic is less 
likely. Other evidence from Wason's selection task has focused on the ways in which context 
can facilitate logical outcomes. 
There have been a large number of studies demonstrating context effects on Wason's 
selection task (See Manktelow, 1999; Evans & Over, 2004, Chapter 5, for reviews). As we 
have seen, the abstract version of this task is very difficult even for educated adults. Wason's 
confirmation bias account of performance on the abstract version of the task has since been 
superseded by explanations based on a simple matching bias (Evans & Lynch, 1973). Some 
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studies s u r e s t that people with vevf high intelligence are able to avoid matching bias and 
identif}' the correct cards (Stanovich and West 1998a). Most people are unable to reason 
logically on the task, and base their analysis of the problem only on the cards which match 
those named in the rule. Early manipulations of the problem showed, however, that the 
problem was much easier to solve when it was presented in a realistic context (Wason & 
Shapiro, 1971). A standard abstract version was compared with a version with familiar 
content. In this case the rule 'Every time I go to Manchester I travel by train' was presented 
along with the following four card selection: 
Manchester Leeds Train Car 
As in the standard task participants were asked to decide those cards, and only those cards, 
that need to be turned over in order to discover whether the rule is true or false. Significantiy 
more correct card choices were made in the realistic, compared to the abstract version. 
Subsequent studies found that facilitative versions of the task with realistic content 
differed from standard abstract versions, as they tended to express permission rules or 
obligations (See Evans & Over, 2004, Chapter 5, for a review). This deontic version of the 
selection task generally required participants to identify where a rule had been violated. 
Participants are likely to choose the correct cards if they are familiar with the content, or the 
rationale behind it as a rule governing people's actions. Facilitation is also improved by the 
inclusion of a minimal contextual scenario. One particularly well used example is the drinking 
age problem (Griggs «& Cox, 1982). Participants are told to imagine they are poUce officers 
observing people's drinking behaviour in a bar, to check if the following rule is being obej'ed: 
If a person is drinking beer, then that person must be over 19 years of age 
The four cards presented are as follows: 
Drinking beer Drinking coke 21 years of age 16 years of age 
Griggs and Cox found that around 75% of participants chose the logically correct 'Drinking 
beer' and '16 years of age' cards. A later study (Pollard & Evans, 1987) found that removal of 
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the provided context (the police officer role) reduced correct card choices to a similar level to 
a control task with abstract content. 
There are many different theoretical accounts of the facilitation pro^dded by context in the 
deontic selection task (e.g. Cosmides, 1989; Pollard, 1982; Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Sperber, 
Cara & Girotto, 1995). \X^at is of importance in relation to the studies presented here is that 
reasoning outcomes are influenced by the presentation of realistic content and contextual 
framing. In this case context enhances logical performance. This is not to imply that context 
encourages logical reasoning processes, however. Unlike the abstract version of the task there 
is evidence that performance is not highly related to IQ (Stanovich & West 1998c), suggesting 
it may rely to a greater extent on heuristic processes. Evans and Over (2004) suggest that the 
deontic task is easy simply because the context cues automatic attention to relevant cases. 
The studies presented in this thesis are concerned with conditional reasoning with everj^day 
content. Most of the work on belief in reasoning has focused on the influence of background 
knowledge in terms of biases, as we have seen with syllogistic reasoning and the selection task. 
It is not a bias, however, to reason on the basis of what we know to be true in ever}fday 
situations. In fact the kind of contextualised reasoning we t}'pically employ in our daily lives is 
adaptive, and helps us to achieve goals and think flexibly. Nevertheless, investigations of the 
role of knowledge in conditional reasoning have tended to rely on the deductive paradigm. 
Conditional reasoning with everyday content and its development 
Studies of conditional reasoning have tended to focus on the conditional inference task 
involving presentation of a major premise of the form 'if p then q' and the four possible 
minor premises described in section 1. (MP, MT, AC and DA). In the valid arguments, MP 
and MT, the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. In the case of the invalid 
inferences, AC and DA, the conclusion does not necessarily follow given the premises. 
Instructions in standard conditional inference tasks generally ask the participant to assume the 
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premises are true and decide if a conclusion necessarily follows from the premises given. 
There have been a number of studies exploring conditional inference with abstract materials 
(See Evans & Over, 2004, for a review). Although findings are somewhat mixed, in relation to 
the invalid inferences in particular, for our purposes it is important to know that MP tends to 
be ver)' readily drawn compared to other inferences and there is a tendency for people to 
respond with certaint}' to the invalid inferences. For example, in response to the following 
premises of an AC argument: 
If there is a 3, then there is an A 
There is an A 
People tend to conclude that there is a 3 even though it does not logically follow that this is 
necessarily the case. 
Studies of conditional reasoning with ever}'day content have also tended to use the 
deduction paradigm. As with abstract content participants are often instructed to assume the 
premises are true and say whether conclusions necessarily follow. As we have seen this 
paradigm defines contextual effects as biases and errors which is arguably inappropriate when 
investigating the influence of relevant knowledge on the kind of reasoning we emplo}^ in our 
daily lives. Some studies of conditional reasoning have used pragmatic instructions where 
participants are not asked to assume the truth of the premises but just invited to say what they 
think win follow. Some tasks also ask participants to express how likely or probable a 
conclusion might be. 
Ever}'day conditional reasoning performance has been repeatedly shown to be influenced 
by background knowledge in both older children (Janveau- Brennan & Markovits, 1999) and 
adults (e.g., Cummins, 1995; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & Rist, 1991; Thompson, 1994). 
Context in the form of disabling conditions and alternative antecedents, collectively known as 
counterexamples, have been shown to influence the tendency to endorse both valid and 
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invalid conclusions (e.g. Cummins, 1995; Cummins et al., 1991; Quinn & Markovits, 1998; 
Thompson, 1994). 
In standard logic, MP is considered to be a valid inference, in that there is only a single 
logically correct conclusion. Consider the following example: 
If Mary goes shopping, then she buys some fruit. 
Mar}' goes shopping 
Therefore, it follows that Mar)' buys some fruit. 
AC, on the other hand, is considered to be invalid, the logically correct answer being one of 
uncertaint}'. However, research suggests that people tend to respond with certaint}' to invalid 
inferences and consequendy commonly endorse AC. Consider the following example: 
If Mary goes shopping, then she buys some fruit. 
Mary buys some fruit 
The logically correct conclusion here is one of uncertainty', hence logically we should conclude 
that Mar}' may or may not have gone shopping. People t}'picaUy endorse AC however, in 
which case they conclude: 
Therefore, it follows that Mary went shopping. 
Importandy, the tendency to make each inference is related to any prior knowledge and 
belief the participant holds about the content. In particular, such inferences may be blocked 
by prior knowledge of counterexamples which are of two kinds. A disabling condition is a case 
where the antecedent clause may not lead to the consequent. For example, if we imagine that 
there is no fruit available in the market where Mar}' goes shopping, then she will not be able to 
buy any. If people consider such disabling conditions they are less likely to draw the valid 
inferences, MP and MT. An alternative antecedent is a case which allows the consequent to occur 
without the antecedent. For example. Mar}' may have fruit delivered to her house, so that she 
does not need to go shopping. Considering alternative antecedents or causes leads to fewer 
endorsements of the invalid inferences AC and DA. 
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Background knowledge and belief can, therefore, influence the responses people give to 
conditional reasoning problems in a systematic way. Where disabling conditions are available 
people tend to withhold the logically correct response to valid inferences. On the other hand, 
where alternative antecedents are available logical performance on invalid inferences is 
enhanced. The influence of context on conditional reasoning is, therefore, distinct from 
logical reasoning abilit}', since the impact of knowledge on valid and invalid inferences acts 
both to suppress and facilitate logical reasoning. 
The influence of background knowledge on conditional reasoning is subject to 
development (Janveau- Brennan & Markovits, 1999; Klaczynski, Schuneman & Daniel, 2004; 
Markovits & Thompson, 2008; Muller, Overton & Reene, 2001) and in children, at least, 
involves effortful processes (Morsanyi & Handley, 2008). Although children as young as 4 
years of age can draw valid inferences (Dias & Harris, 1990; Markovits, 2000), ver}^ young 
children show littie effect of background knowledge (Markovits & BarrouiUet, 2002). 
ContextuaUsed reasoning, among tjfpically developing youngsters, develops through late 
childhood into adolescence. There are a number of reasons why this is the case (Markovits & 
BarrouiUet, 2002; Markovits, Fleur}', Quinn & Venet, 1998; Markovits & Thompson, 2008). 
Young children simply have less background knowledge available in long term memor\'. 
Retrieval of information is less efficient in younger children, compared to adolescents. The 
strength of association between the presented material and available knowledge is also likely to 
affect performance. Critically, children's contextuaUzed reasoning performance is related to 
the cognitive demands of representational processes. Reasoning on the basis of all relevant 
information involves the creation of complex relational schemas which integrate information 
about the presented material with background knowledge in the form of counterexamples. 
Young children are limited in the complexit)' of such schemas they are capable of forming, 
and for verjr young children reasoning relies predominandy on the consideration of the major 
premise presented (Markovits and Barrouillet, 2002). 
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Children tend to interpret inferences biconditionaUy (if and only if p then q) and 
consequendy tend to respond with certainty to AC (Marko\ats, 2000; Markovits, Venet, 
Janveau-Brennan, Malfait, Pion, & Vadeboncoeur, 1996). The abilit}^ to respond with 
uncertaint}' to invalid inferences does not reliably appear until adolescence (MuUer et al., 
2001). At around age 8 children are beginning to produce uncertaint)^ responses to AC (but 
not DA). At around this point children also begin explicitiy to state disabling conditions as 
justifications and some children begin to show evidence of denial of MP. Not until around 11 
years are children able to respond with uncertaint}^ to DA, this is accompanied by relatively 
high reference to counterexamples as justifications and denial of MP in some cases. Once 
children can respond with uncertaint}' to AC and DA their responses var\'^  according to 
whether there are few or many available alternatives (Janveau- Brennan & Markovits, 1999). 
Developmental factors seem to specifically impact on the cognitively demanding 
consideration of counterexamples in conditional reasoning. T}'pically developing 6 year olds 
appear able, for example, to make probabilistic judgments about conditional statements, as 
they can state how believable a statement is. They find it difficult, however, to draw on 
background knowledge when engaged in conditional inference tasks, even when such 
information is actively presented (Markovits and Thompson, 2008). As adolescents move 
towards adulthood the development of inhibitor)' and meta-cognitive processes allows for 
more control over reasoning, and a more selective use of background knowledge (Markovits 
& BarrouiUet, 2002; 2004; MuUer et al., 2001). T}^ically developing adolescents, therefore, 
present a population which is arguably more influenced by background knowledge compared 
to younger children and adults. 
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Conclusion 
Fort)f years of research into deductive reasoning has clearly demonstrated that people are 
highly influenced by the content and context of the problems presented (Evans, 2002). In 
deductive reasoning tasks people are usually required to assess the logical nature of arguments 
or arrive at logical conclusions. The evidence shows, however, that people find it very hard to 
ignore what they know about the world. This is particularly true of children. Tj^pically 
developing adolescents, may also lack inhibitor)' and metacognitive skills necessary' to 
selectively ignore their own beliefs, compared to adults. These effects are tj'pically referred to 
as a cause of 'cognitive bias', since participants are routinely instructed to draw only necessary' 
conclusions based on the information given, rather than background knowledge. This 
perspective reflects the logicist origins of the deductive paradigm not the nature of the kind of 
reasoning we use in our daily lives. The abilit)' to take account of background knowledge and 
belief in ever}'day reasoning is highly adaptive, and contextualised reasoning is rational in the 
sense that it is generally effective in achieving personal goals (Evans, 2007). Where rationality 
is equated with logic, however, reasoning on the basis of all relevant knowledge can lead to 
responses categorised as errors or biases. 
Implicit and explicit processes can be informed by prior knowledge and belief hence belief 
based reasoning can be attributed to both System 1 and System 2. Implicit knowledge can 
influence behaviour direcdy, but knowledge and beliefs can also act to contextualise System 2 
reasoning processes. Effortful reasoning performance is constrained by individual differences, 
specifically cognitive capacity. The abilit)' to override prior belief is predicted, to some extent, 
by differences in IQ. Further variance is also explained by individual thinking dispositions 
which direct, for example, the willingness to consider options or spend time considering a 
problem. 
The impact of content and context on reasoning has been demonstrated on a range of 
tasks including syllogistic and conditional reasoning. In the case of everj'day conditional 
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reasoning background knowledge can influence the conclusions people draw through the 
activation of specific exceptions available in long term memor}', and the integration of such 
counterexamples with presented stimuli. In the next chapter we will explore the influence of 
knowledge and belief on ever\'day conditional reasoning among adolescents with ASD 
compared with a t}^icall3' developing control group. 
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Chapter 3 
Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, four decades of research into deductive reasoning has 
shown that participants are highly influenced by the context and content of given problems 
(Evans, 2002). This has been demonstrated with a range of reasoning tasks including those 
involving syllogistic reasoning, variants of Wason's selection task and conditional reasoning 
problems. Such effects are t}'picaUy referred to as cognitive biases, as participants are usually 
instructed to draw conclusions based only on the information provided. This perspective is 
derived from the deductive paradigm, however, and is arguably inappropriate when 
considering conditional reasoning with ever)'day content, where the integration of background 
is highly adaptive and helpful in negotiating through life (Evans, 2007). vMthough much is 
known about contextuaUzed reasoning among t)'pical populations, ver}' litde is known about 
the effects of content and context on the reasoning of individuals with autism spectrum 
disorders (ASD). 
In this chapter I wiU discuss available evidence about the reasoning abilities of individuals 
with ASD and explore what might be expected in terms of contextualized reasoning within 
this population. I will then present the findings of a study exploring the influence of 
background knowledge and belief on ever)'day conditional reasoning among adolescents with 
ASD and a t}rpicaUy developing control group. 
Adolescents were chosen as fitting participants for this study as the effect of background 
knowledge on reasoning outcomes is particularly marked in typically developing adolescents 
compared to younger children and adults. There are a number of reasons for this. Younger 
children, for example, do not have the same knowledge available as older children and adults 
and their retrieval skills are less well developed (e.g. Markovits, Fleur)', Quinn & Venet, 1998; 
Markovits & Thompson, 2008). As children move into adolescence their reasoning becomes 
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highly influenced by the background knowledge available. This is partiy due to a more 
extensive knowledge base and effective retrieval of information but also because they lack the 
inhibitor}' and meta-cognitive processes available to adults, which allow for more control over 
reasoning and a more selective use of contextual information (Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002; 
2004; MuUer et al. 2001). 
Current knowledge about contextual effects and the integration of information in 
reasoning among individuals with ASD is limited. Studies that exist tend to focus on reasoning 
with contrar)'-to-fact or counterfactual material and reasoning with embedded rules. 
Two conflicting studies have explored the ability' of children with ASD to solve contrar}'-
to-fact reasoning problems. Scott, Baron-Cohen and Leslie (1999) presented children with 
ASD, children with mild learning difficulties (MLD), and tjpical controls with contrar)'-to-fact 
reasoning problems, either with or without direct prompts to consider an imaginary' context. 
In the imaginar}' condition, children were prompted, through a number of questions to 
imagine aspects of the scenario. For example, all participants were told to assume the premises 
were true and were presented with contrary-to-fact problems as follows: 
Allpigs can fly 
John is a pig 
Can John fly? 
In the imaginary condition participants were also given seven questions to prompt 
consideration of the imaginar}' context. For example: 
Can you make a picture of the pig in your head? 
Can you make the pig do something different or funny? 
Scott et al. found the children with ASD performed well on contrar}'-to-fact tasks with no 
prompts to consider the context, but poorly where cues to use imagination were provided. 
This was in contrast to both tj'pically developing controls and children with moderate learning 
difficulties. Both of these groups showed improved performance when prompted to use 
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imagination. One explanation given was that the participants with ASD were not hindered by 
the drive to integrate presented material with background knowledge in the contrary-to-fact 
only task. Where they were required to take account of the imaginary context this lack of 
integration meant that the tj'pical facilitation of context was not demonstrated. These findings 
have been called into question, however, by a subsequent study (Leevers & Harris, 2000) 
which found children with ASD performed at around chance levels on contrar}'-to-fact 
reasoning tasks and showed a strong positive response bias. 
Further relevant studies have tended to focus on counterfactual and rule-based reasoning 
relating to Theory^ of Mind tasks. Impairments on Theor)^ of Mind tasks have been explained 
in terms of reasoning abilit}^ Cognitive Complexit}' and Control Theor}' (Zelazo & Frj'e, 1997; 
1998; Zelazo, J aques, Burack & Frj'e, 2002) suggests that performance on false belief tasks 
relies on using higher order, 'if—if—then' rules which have the form 'if setting 1, then if x then 
y'. In Theory of Mind tasks, setting conditions refer to the viewpoint of either self or other 
character. In the Sponge—rock task (Flavell, Flavell & Green, 1983), for example, the child 
knows an object resembling a rock is actually a sponge. They are asked what their friend will 
think the object is. This involves reasoning with the following if-if-then rule (Fr\'e, Zelazo & 
Burack, 1998): 
If Friend, then if this object, then rock. 
Setting conditions allow the integration of two perspectives into a single system of inferences 
through the creation of complex relational representations. Ver}f young tj^pically developing 
children and individuals with ASD have difficulties reasoning with embedded rules (Frj^ e, 
Zelazo & Palfai, 1995; Zelazo et al., 2002). 
Reassessments of false belief tasks have also led to the suggestion that children with ASD 
fail false belief tasks because of their inabilit)^ to reason counterfactually. The implication is 
that the ability to reason about a state of affairs taking account of one's own beliefs and those 
of another person requires counterfactual reasoning with embedded 'If-if-then' rules. These 
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difficulties are particularly apparent in tasks such as the standard false belief task where 
inferences must be drawn but critical information is not made explicit and has to be gleaned 
from a given context (Peterson & Riggs, 1999; Riggs & Peterson, 2000). Grant, Riggs and 
Boucher (2004) found that children with ASD were able to solve non-standard false belief 
tasks which did not involve counterfactual reasoning but performed poorly on physical state 
counterfactual reasoning problems which did not involve the understanding of belief. 
Information about conditional reasoning among individuals with ASD is minimal but one 
recent study (Pijnacker et al., 2009) explored the abilit}' of high functioning adults with autism 
to revise conditional reasoning conclusions on the basis of new contextual information. This 
study is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. Findings suggest that the presentation of extra 
contextual information influences reasoning outcomes for typical controls to a greater extent 
than for adults with ASD. This study in conjunction with the studies exploring counterfactual 
reasoning and reasoning with embedded rules do indicate, therefore, that individuals with 
ASD may have difficulties with integrating perspectives, or drawing inferences on the basis of 
a given context. 
In addition to what is suggested by existing studies of reasoning among individuals with 
ASD, the information processing style associated with autism implies that their reasoning may 
differ from that of t}fpical groups in significant ways. A number of current theories about 
autism including Weak Central Coherence Theory, Underconnectivity Theor}'^, and the 
Complex Processing Deficit account explore the difficulties people with ASD may have with 
contextualizing or integrating information. Weak Central Coherence Theory (Frith, 1989; 
2003; Happe & Booth, 2008; Happe & Frith, 2006) proposes that human beings have an 
inherent drive towards central coherence, the formation of coherent wholes through the 
integration of pieces of relevant information. Incoming stimuli tend to be processed in 
context to derive a meaningful gist of the situation, often at the expense of surface details. 
Frith claims that individuals with ASD differ from the typical population in exhibiting a 
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tendency towards weak central coherence which results in an over reliance on local or 
piecemeal processing, and a tendencj' not to integrate information in order to process stimuli 
in context. 
The tendency towards weak central coherence in populations with ASD has been 
demonstrated across a number of domains. This processing st}'le has been shown to result in 
poor performance on tasks which require the integration of presented material with 
background information to arrive at higher meaning. Evidence includes poor performance in 
the disambiguation of homographs (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999a) 
and the interpretation of words in ambiguous sentences (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999b). 
On the basis of what is known about reasoning and information processing among 
individuals with autism it is reasonable to predict that individuals with ASD may be less 
influenced by background knowledge in everj'day conditional reasoning compared to a t}'pical 
control group. 
Much is already known about the influence of prior knowledge on everj'day conditional 
reasoning tasks among the tjfpical population (Evans, 2007; Evans & Over, 2004). Conditional 
reasoning performance is influenced by background knowledge in both older children 
(Markovits & Janveau-Brennan, 1999) and adults (e.g., Cummins, 1995; Cummins, Lubart, 
Alksnis, & Rist, 1991; Thompson, 1994). Knowledge can impact on conditional reasoning in 
different ways (Verschueren, Schaeken & d'Ydewalle, 2005), through the automatic activation 
of associations reflecting belief in the conclusion presented, or through the activation of 
specific exceptions available in long term memor}', and the integration of this information 
with presented stimuli. 
The study presented here is based on that of Cummins et al. (1991) we will, therefore, 
consider this work in some detail. Cummins et al. were interested in the effect of two specific 
t)'pes of background knowledge on conditional reasoning outcomes, alternative antecedents 
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and disabling conditions. Alternative antecedents are alternative causes which can lead to a 
stated effect. For example if we consider the following statement: 
If Marie eats sweets often, then she will have fillings 
If we are then told that Marie does have fillings and asked if it follows that she eats sweets 
often, we may bring to mind alternative reasons why Marie may have fillings. We may consider 
the possibilit}', for example, that Marie often eats cakes or drinks sugar);^  drinks. Disabling 
conditions are conditions where the effect does not follow from the cause. Hence if we are 
told that Marie does eat sweets often, and asked if it follows that she has fillings, we may bring 
to mind situations where eating sweets may not lead to fillings. We may consider, for example, 
that Marie might have strong enamel or be w&ry careful about dental h3'giene. 
Alternative antecedents and disabling conditions are collectively known as 
counterexamples. In the Cummins et al. (1991) study a number of conditionals were pretested 
in order to establish whether they had high or low numbers of available counterexamples. 
They did this by presenting participants with rules and facts and asking them to generate either 
alternatives or disablers as in the following example for the generation of alternative 
antecedents: 
Rule: If Marie eats sweets often, then she will have fillings 
Fact: Marie has fillings, but she doesn 't eat sweets often 
Please write down as many circumstances as you can that could make this situation possible 
The conditionals were then classified as having either high or low numbers of available 
counterexamples and presented to a new group of participants in a conditional inference task. 
What Cummins et al. and many subsequent studies found was that for conditionals where 
many disabling conditions were available the endorsement of conclusions for valid inferences 
was significandy lower than where there were few disabling conditions available. Where high 
numbers of available antecedents were available participants also drew fewer invalid 
inferences. 
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The task used here wiU focus on two main conditional inference patterns. Modus Ponens 
(MP) and Affirmation of the Consequent (AC). Conditional reasoning involves inference with 
a major premise of the form 'if p then q' In the case of MP this involves reasoning from the 
premises 'if p then q, p is true,' this leads logically to the response 'p is true.' MP is a valid 
inference in that there is a single logically correct response. AC requires reasoning with the 
premises 'if p then q, q is true. AC is an invalid inference in the sense that the correct logical 
response is one of uncertaint)'. Here the implied response is not logically correct, although 
there is a tendency for people to respond with certaint)' by giving the pragmatically implied 
conclusion 'p is true.' 
It has been claimed that willingness to endorse arguments is influenced by the extent to 
which knowledge about counterexamples is activated and integrated with presented material. 
Consider the following example of a MP argument (Markovits & Potvan, 2001). 
If a chair is thrown at a window, then the window will break 
Suppose a chair is thrown at the window, does it follow that the window is broken? 
Whilst the conclusion follows logically in this case, many participants will withhold the 
inference because there are many available disabling conditions. They may think of specific 
situations where the effect does not follow from the cause (e.g. the window is made of 
toughened glass or the chair is made of plastic etc.). The activation and integration of such 
disablers increases the tendency for people to withhold the inference. 
Similarly if we consider the invalid AC form: 
Suppose the window is broken, does it follow that a chair was thrown at the window? 
Whilst reasoners often endorse the AC conclusion, in this example there are many 
counterexamples in the form of alternative antecedents or causes which would lead to the 
same effect (such as throwing a rock or a cricket ball at the window). In the case of invalid 
inferences, where alternatives are available, people are more likely to give the correct logical 
'uncertainty' response to this argument form. The influence of context on conditional 
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reasoning is, therefore, distinct from logical reasoning ability, since the impact of knowledge 
on valid and invalid inferences acts both to suppress and facilitate logical reasoning. 
This account assumes that specific counterexamples are activated and integrated with 
premise information. Background knowledge can either act to discourage the endorsement of 
logically valid inferences or, in the case of invalid inferences, act to support logical responses 
based on uncertainty. This finding has been shown to be robust in tj'pical adolescent and adult 
populations and has been demonstrated in a number of studies (e.g. Markovits & Janveau-
Brennan, 1999; Cummins, 1995; Thompson, 1994). 
It was predicted that difficulties with integrating information and impairment in 
contextualized thinking would result in at)'pical conditional reasoning performance, with 
regard to the influence of available counterexamples, among adolescents with ASD. In 
Experiment 1 the availability of disablers and alternative antecedents was manipulated on 
conditional reasoning problems. It was predicted that the t}^ically developing adolescents 
would be influenced by the availability of disabling conditions in their responses to MP 
inferences, and by the availability of alternative causes in their responses to AC inferences. In 
the case of the adolescents with ASD, however, they would be less influenced by the 
availability of counterexamples in their responses to MP and AC. Since counterexamples have 
been shown to suppress and facilitate logical reasoning performance for valid and invalid 
inferences respectively, we presented both t)pes of inference. The inclusion of both valid and 
invalid inferences allowed us to examine the effect of context on reasoning ability controlling 
for any group differences in logical reasoning ability. In addition, a probability judgment task 
was included, which allowed us to measure the relevant associative beliefs, concerning the 
relation expressed in each conditional statement, in order to ensure that any differential effects 
of counterexamples between the two groups could not be attributed to differences in 
underlying beliefs. 
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Pretest 
Fort)' questions were largely drawn from Cummins et al. (1991). In this study conditional 
statements were used that described causal relationships. These statements varied in the 
number of alternative antecedents and disabling conditions available, relating to the causal 
relationship. Since this study used t}'pical adult participants, for the purposes of the pretest 
some additional questions were adapted for a younger audience. The children included in the 
pretest were all recruited from a mainstream school in the Plymouth area of Southern England 
with a lower middle class catchment profile. This school was also used to recruit adolescents 
with ASD in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. As such, the pretest group was deemed to be from 
similar educational and socioeconomic backgrounds as subsequent participants. The pretest 
group included t3'pically developing adolescents with a range of educational abilities. Any child 
with a diagnosis for autism or Asperger syndrome or a statement of special educational needs 
was excluded from the pretest group. The children were recruited from the youngest age range 
included in subsequent experiments, and were between 11 and 12 years of age. This age group 
was chosen as the developmental literature suggests that children of around 11 years are only 
just beginning to reliably demonstrate the influence of disabling conditions and alternative 
causes on reasoning performance. A number of factors relate to contextualized reasoning 
abilit}' in t}'pically developing youngsters, particularly in the younger age brackets. These 
include the strength of association between background knowledge and associated material, 
and the knowledge that is available for retrieval in long term memor)' (Markovits & Janveau-
Brennan, 1999). The purpose of the pretest was to categorise materials for use in later 
experiments as having either low or high available counterexamples. It was necessary, 
therefore, to ensure that the youngest children in the subsequent experiments would be 
sensitive to differences in avaUabiUt)' of counterexamples. 
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The questions were piloted with forty t)'pically developing adolescents in four groups of 
ten in order to establish four groups of statements with: 
• High numbers of disabling conditions and high numbers of alternative antecedents, 
for example: 
If a mug is dropped, then it will break. 
• High numbers of disabling conditions and low numbers of alternative antecedents, for 
example: 
If the trigger is pulled, then the gun will fire. 
• Low numbers of disabling conditions and high numbers of alternative antecedents, for 
example: 
If a balloon is pricked, then it will burst. 
• Low numbers of disabling conditions and low numbers of alternative antecedents, for 
example: 
If butter is heated, then it will melt. 
Each group of 10 children was presented with 10 MP and 10 AC conditionals. The 
children were asked to generate as many counterexamples as possible, for each question, in 
one and a half minutes. Mean numbers of alternatives and disablers were calculated for each 
conditional. These means were split into quartiles, and 4 groups of 4 conditionals chosen, 
which best fitted the required high-low categories. Mean numbers of alternatives and disablers 
for each of the 4 cateeories listed above are shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1. Mean numbers of alternative antecedents and disabling conditions generated in the 
pretest for each high-low categor)'. 
High - low categories Mean counterexamples generated 
Lx)w alternatives — low disablers 
Low alternatives — high disablers 
High alternatives — low disablers 
High alternatives — high disablers 
Alternatives Disablers 
0.30 
0.55 
2.73 
0.55 
2.15 
0.98 
2.35 2.35 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 examined conditional reasoning and probabilistic judgments in relation to 
available counterexamples. In this experiment adolescents with ASD and a control group of 
t}'picall3' developing adolescents were tested. Both groups performed a conditional reasoning 
task, where statements had varjnng available disabling conditions and alternative antecedents, 
foUowed by a likelihood judgment task. In the second task participants were asked to rate the 
believability of the statements presented. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants included 26 adolescents with ASD and 38 typically developing adolescents. The 
adolescents with ASD were between the ages of 11 and 16 years. The typically developing 
adolescents were between the ages of 11 and 15. None of the participants had previously 
taken part in the pretest. Participants were recruited by approaching mainstream schools 
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known to have special units supporting pupils on the autistic spectrum. In the group with 
ASD only those adolescents were included who had a definitive clinical diagnosis of autism 
spectrum disorder meeting criteria from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) or International Classification of 
Diseases (10th ed; ICD-10; World Health Organization, 1993). Diagnoses were carried out by 
either a paediatrician or child and adolescent psychiatrist following multidisciplinar)^ 
assessment. Adolescents with ASD with either a medical diagnosis such as epilepsy or a 
neurodevelopmental diagnosis other than autism such as attention deficit hj'peractivit}' 
disorder, or who were taking medication, were excluded from the study. There were 21 boys 
and 5 girls in the group with ASD. There were 23 boys and 15 girls in the typically developing 
group. There were 22 high functioning adolescents diagnosed as having ASD or autism and 4 
adolescents diagnosed with Asperger syndrome. Within the t}fpically developing group 
children were excluded if they had a diagnosis of ASD, Asperger syndrome or were 
documented as having autistic traits. Children who had a statement of special educational 
needs were also excluded. 
T}'pically developing and autistic participants were recruited from the same mainstream 
schools in lower middle class urban areas within Plymouth and West Devon. All of the 
teenagers who took part in the study were white, predominandy lived in urban areas and 
English was the first language for all of the participants. 
All participants were given a range of tests measuring participant characteristics, including 
a non verbal working memor}' task (adapted from Wilson, Bettger, Niculae & Klima, 1997). 
Our task differed from that of Wilson et al. in that it included processing and storage 
elements. Participants had to recall, in sequence, the location of a series of blocks. In addition 
to the span task, participants were also required to recall the final location of the previous trial 
sequences. Scores represent, therefore, a measure of the ability to process and store given 
information. Working memor}' was measured as it has been shown to be highly correlated 
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with general intelligence (Colom, ReboUo, Palacios, Juan-Espinosa & Kyllonen, 2004) and 
reasoning abilit)' (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). 
Participants were also given The Stop-Signal Task (Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 1997), 
taken to measure inhibition. A measure of inhibition was included since inhibitor)' processes 
are proposed to mediate reasoning performance through individual differences in the selective 
suppression of competing responses (De Neys et al. 2005). The Stop-Signal Task requires 
participants to suppress a prepotent response (pressing a button in response to a tone). Scores 
represent the overall number of correct responses to stop signal trials across a number of 
different time delays between the presentation of the tone and the stimuli. 
The expressive vocabulary test of The Wechsler Intelligence Test for Children (WISC—III, 
Wechsler, 1991) was also given to all participants. The WISC expressive vocabular)' test was 
chosen as it was felt to be of importance that the two groups were comparable on their abilit)' 
to understand the terms used within the given problems. This subtest measures verbal concept 
formation, fund of knowledge and degree of language development. 
Adolescents were excluded from both t)'pical and autistic participation groups if they 
scored either two standard deviations above or below the mean scaled score for their age 
group on the WISC expressive vocabulary measure. Scores above or below these points were 
deemed unacceptable as they reflected unusually high or low abilit)' for any given age range. 
Excluded individuals had scores which were the same as, higher than 2% of a given age range 
or lower than 2% of a given age range. Participants were also excluded if they failed to score 
on either the storage or processing elements of the working memor)' task. 
Adolescents with ASD were matched as closely as possible with the t)'picaUy developing 
adolescents on the basis of the individual differences measures and chronological age (See 
Table 3.2). No significant differences between the two groups were found for chronological 
age (/(62) = 1.07^= .29), age corrected standard vocabulary scores(/(62) = -1.02 p= .31), 
working memory span (/(62) = -0.44 p- .66), or inhibition (/(62) = -0.81 p-= AT). 
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Table 3.2. Measures of participant characteristics for the tjfpical group and the group with 
ASD in Experiment 1 
Differences 
Autistic T)'pical between groups 
Range Mean SD Range Mean SD P 
Chronological Age 
(Months) 
Standardised 
Vocabular}' scores 
Working Memor)' 
Span 
Inhibition 
133-203 
4-13 
0.5-4.5 
6-62 
168.08 
8.65 
2.19 
38.55 
19.43 
2.98 
1.13 
13.03 
143-188 
4-16 
0.5-4.0 
10-57 
163.61 
9.42 
2.08 
41.21 
14.90 
2.96 
0.91 
10.28 
.29 
.31 
.66 
.42 
Materials and procedure 
Conditional reasoning task 
There were 32 questions in the reasoning task, 16 MP and 16 AC statements, four from each 
of the pretest high-low categories (See Appendix Al). Hence for half of the questions the 
correct logical response was 'Yes, definitely' and for the other half, 'No, not necessarily.' The 
task was presented by an animated robot on a computer screen. As the purpose of the study 
was to explore the effect of background knowledge on reasoning processes, participants were 
presented with brief pragmatic instructions as follows: 
In this task you wUl be shown some statements. After each statement there wiU be a 
fact and a conclusion. Given the statement and the fact, you need to make a decision 
about whether the conclusion follows. 
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The Participants were then presented with two practice questions, one of each inference t}^e. 
Feedback was given to ensure that participants understood the task. The experimental 
statements were then presented in a random order. Questions remained on the screen until 
the participant responded. AH questions were presented as a statement, an invitation to 
suppose a fact, and a question about what follows: 
If the ignition key is turned, then the car will start 
Suppose that the ignition key is turned. 
Does it follow that the car will start? 
Participants were required to respond by pressing one of two buttons, labelled 'YES, 
definitely* and 'NO, not necessarily.' The correct logical responses for MP questions being 
'yes, definitely' and for AC being 'No, not necessarily. 
Probabilit}' judgment task 
Participants were presented with the 16 conditionals used in the inference part of the study 
and asked to rate the likeMhood of the consequent in the light of the antecedent. The 
conditionals either expressed forward causality (if cause then effect, P(q | p) or backward 
causalit}' (if effect then cause, P(p | q), the probability judgments relevant to the MP and AC 
inferences respectively, giving a total of 32 questions. The task was presented on a computer 
screen by the same animated robot used in the conditional reasoning task. Participants were 
given the following instructions: 
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On thefollomng screens jou will see some statements. You will be asked how likely each statement is. You 
will have to rate how likely the event is by clicking a number from 1 to 5. 
Participants were then shown an example question and the scale was explained to them. The}?^  
were told that clicking on number one meant 'not ver}' likely' and five meant 'very likely' The 
statements were then presented in a random order. Questions remained on the screen until 
the participant responded. The participants were given two practice questions where the scale 
was explained by the robot character again and visual reminders of the values represented by 
the scale were shown. All questions were presented in the following format: 
How likely is it that 
If a towel is dropped in the bath, then it will get wet? 
Not likely 1 2 3 4 5 Verj^Ukely 
Results 
Conditional reasoning task 
A 2 (group) by 2 (low vs high disablers) repeated measures Anova was performed on the MP. 
inference data from the conditional reasoning task. Mean endorsement responses for MP 
questions, comparing autistic and typical groups are shown in Figure 1. The analysis revealed a 
main effect of disablers (F(l,62) = S.%2, MSE = 1.16, jO = .02, T I \ = .09) and a significant 
two-way interaction between disablers and group (F (1,62) = 6.81, MSE = 1.16, /) = .01, r| p 
= .10), such that disablers affected the reasoning of the typical adolescents more than the 
adolescents with ASD (See Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1. Mean number of endorsement responses as a percentage for MP questions 
with low and high available disablers by the autistic and t^ ^pical groups. 
In order to provide further information about the interaction between group and 
disablers, we performed paired sample t tests to test for an effect of disablers in each group. 
These showed a significant difference in endorsement rates on MP between high and low 
disabler questions among the t)'pically developing group (^37) — -3.35 p = .002) but no 
significant difference in endorsement rates among the group with ASD (/(25) = -0.20p = .85). 
A second Anova was performed to examine the effect of alternatives (high vs. low) on AC 
inferences, with autism as a between subjects factor. Mean endorsement responses for AC 
questions, comparing autistic and t}fpical groups are shown in Figure 2. The analysis revealed a 
main effect of alternatives (F(l,62) = 34.31, MSE = 2.74,p = < .001 TI'P = -36). Again, the 
predicted significant two-way interaction was found between alternatives and group (F(l ,62) = 
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8.34, MSE = 2.74,p = .01 ri'p = .12), reflecting greater use of alternatives in the tjjpicaUy 
developing group (see Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2. Mean number of endorsement responses as a percentage for AC questions 
with high and low available alternatives by autistic and t}^ical groups. 
Once again, follow-up t tests were performed to check for an effect of alternatives in the 
two groups separately. In this case, paired sample t tests showed a significant difference in 
endorsement rates on AC between high and low alternative questions for both groups. 
Consistent with the significant interaction, this trend was considerably more marked in the 
topical group (/(37) = -6.48p = <.001), than in the group with autism (/(25) = 2.03^ = .04). 
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Probabilit}' judgment task 
The probabilit}' judgment task was included to measure the relevant associative beliefs 
concerning the relation expressed in each conditional statement. The purpose of the task was 
to ensure that an}' differential effects of counterexamples between the two groups could not 
be attributed to differences in underlying beliefs. 
Responses for P(q | p) and P(p | q) statements, comparing autistic and t}'pical groups are 
shown in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3. Mean likelihood ratings given by both groups to statements with high or low 
available counterexamples in Experiment 1. 
Autistic 
Mean SD 
T}'pical 
Mean SD 
High available 
alternatives (p(p | q)) 
3.69 0.87 3.54 0.62 
Low available 
alternatives (p(p | q)) 
4.32 0.78 4.41 0.48 
High available 
disablers (p(q | p)) 
4.23 0.68 4.17 0.47 
Low available 
disablers (p(q | p)) 
4.22 0.62 4.35 0.53 
A 2 (group) by 2 (low vs high disablers) repeated measures Anova was performed on the 
P(q| p) data from the probabilit}' judgment task. The main effect of disablers was not found to 
be significant (F(l,62) = 1.66, MSE = 0.49, p = .20 r\\ = .03). The two-way interaction 
between disablers and autism was also not found to be significant (F(l ,62) = 2.07, MSE — 
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0.49^ = .16 T|"p =.03), such that disablers did not affect likelihood judgments for either group 
(See Table 3.3). 
Follow-up t tests revealed that there were no significant differences beuveen autistic and 
t)pical groups on P(q|p) questions with low available disablers (/(62) = -0.S9 p = .38) or 
P(q I p) questions with high available disablers (/(62) = 0.36^ = .74). 
A 2 (group) by 2 (low vs high alternatives) repeated measures Anova was also performed 
on the P(p I q) data from the probabilit}' judgment task. The main effect of alternatives was 
found to be significant (F(l,62) = 81.79, MSB = 0.85, p = < .001 ^\ = .57). The two-way 
interaction between alternatives and autism was, however, not found to be significant (F (1,62) 
= 1.93, MSB = 0.85, p= .\7 ri"p =.03), such that available alternatives affected likelihood . 
judgments for both groups (See Table 3.3). 
Follow-up t tests once again revealed that there were no significant differences between 
autistic and tj^ pical groups on P(p | q) questions with low available alternatives (/(62) = -0.54p 
= .62) or P(p I q) questions with high available alternatives (/(62) = 0.78p = .44). 
Discussion 
In line with previous research, tjrpically developing adolescents showed a significant effect of 
available counterexamples on conditional reasoning. The typical group were more likely to 
withhold MP, where there were higher numbers of available disabling conditions, and similarly 
more likely to give uncertaint}' responses to AC, where there were high numbers of alternative 
antecedents. Our hypothesis that this pattern of responding would not be mirrored by the 
group with ASD was confirmed. For both inferences we observed significant interactions, 
indicating that background knowledge had less influence on the reasoning of the adolescents 
with ASD. The adolescents with ASD showed no significant effect of background knowledge, 
in the form of disabling conditions, on the valid MP inference. The same group showed a 
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small effect of background knowledge, in the form of alternatives, on AC but significantly less 
contextual influence than the tj^pically developing group. Hence, the results strongly support 
our prior hj'pothesis that spontaneous contextuaUzation of reasoning would be reduced in 
adolescents with ASD. 
Our findings support Frith's (1989; see also Happe & Frith, 2006) claim that individuals 
with ASD have a tendency not to process information in context. Other information 
processing accounts of autism such as Underconnectivit)' Theor}' similarly predict that 
individuals with ASD will not integrate information in order to arrive at contextualized 
reasoning outcomes. The Complex Processing Deficit account (Minshew et al. 1997; Williams, 
Goldstein & Minshew, 2006) proposes that individuals with ASD have a general impairment 
in processing complex information. A difficult}' in drawing information together, in order to 
create concepts and schemas, means that incoming information cannot be processed with the 
support of a contextual framework. This impairment is only apparent in tasks which draw on 
Umited cognitive resources. Less complex tasks, or those which generally make fewer demands 
on cognitive resources, will be unimpaired. This account may explain why the conditional 
reasoning task, which has been shown to be related to cognitive abilit)' (Verschueren et al. 
2004), presents difficulties for the group with ASD, whilst the likelihood task does not. The 
groups did not significantiy differ on measures of working memor)', however, and Minshew is 
not claiming that individuals with ASD have a problem with cognitive capacity as such, just 
that their more piecemeal processing approach without top down supportive mechanisms 
makes overwhelming cognitive demands when engaged in effortful, complex tasks. 
An important feature of the research design is that the results cannot be interpreted in 
terms of good and bad reasoning, from a normative viewpoint, as is known to relate generally 
to cognitive ability (Stanovich, 1999). MP is a valid inference, which logically should be drawn. 
The fact that the typically developing adolescents were strongly influenced by prior beliefs in 
their tendency to endorse MP is, therefore, technically evidence of a cognitive bias - a bias 
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which was whoUy absent in the group with ASD. However, since AC is an invalid inference, it 
is a logical error to endorse it. Any suppression of AC inferences due to availabilit)' of 
counterexamples is hence a debiasing effect. Examination of Figure 3.2 shows that for low 
counterexample cases endorsement rates of AC were similarly high in both groups. However, 
the availabiUt}' of counterexamples debiased reasoning in the tjfpical group much more 
strongly than in the group with ASD. So the effect of context is to decrease logical accuracy 
for MP but to increase logical accuracy for AC. The fact that the reasoning of the t5'pical 
group was more belief-based in both cases hence shows that the difference between groups 
has nothing to do with logical reasoning abilit)^ as such. 
If we take a broader view of rationality' in reasoning than that provided by logic, however, 
it becomes apparent that the lack of spontaneous contextualization of reasoning will be a 
major handicap for adolescents with ASD in everj'day thinking and reasoning. As Evans and 
Over (1996) have pointed out, in real life (as opposed to the psychological laborator)') it is 
adaptive to reason from all relevant belief. In this sense, it is perfecdy rational for us to question 
arguments whose conclusions we disbelieve, or to fail to draw inferences from premises that 
seem to us to be untrue. 
Contextualised thinking allows us to deal flexibly with a myriad of complex novel 
situations, seemingly without effort, and is known to be a powerful and primar)' effect which 
is difficult to override (e.g. see Evans & Over, 2004 for a review). The belief bias literature 
shows, even when instructed to do so, most people find it very hard to reason deductively 
based only on the material presented (e.g. Evans, Handley & Neilens, in press). In general, 
under such instructions, only those individuals with high cognitive capacit)' are able to reason 
logically where logic and belief are in conflict (e.g. Capon, Handley & Dennis, 2003; De Neys, 
2006; Klaczynski, 2000). In normal adults this requires a strong effort to inhibit prior belief, as 
indicated by the fact that executive control areas of the pre-frontal cortex are activated when 
belief-logic conflict is successfully resolved in favour of logic (Goel & Dolan, 2003). It was not 
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the case that the group with ASD showed better developed inhibitory abilities, the Stop-Signal 
Task revealed no significant differences in inhibition performance between the two groups. In 
the case of the participants with ASD, therefore, it seems that no such effort at 
decontextualisation was involved to explain the lesser influence of belief on their reasoning. 
Rather, it appears that the usual contextualisation which normal reasoners struggle to 
suppress, does not occur with the adolescents with ASD to start with. 
The possibilit}' that the difference in performance between the two groups was driven 
by group differences in the believabilit}' of the conditional statements was also eliminated. The 
group with ASD did not significantiy differ in the responses the}' gave in the likelihood 
judgment task compared to the t)'pical group. Automatic associative belief based processes 
appear to be intact. As a consequence the group with ASD was able to arrive at a degree of 
belief in the conditional. This suggests that individuals with ASD may be able to contextuaUse 
inputs when contextualisation relies on implicit associative processes. Such processes have 
been shown to have a distinct influence on reasoning apart from the explicit influence of 
specific counterexamples (Verschueren, et al. 2005; Weidenfield, et al. 2005). 
The adolescents with ASD did not show the kind of contextualised reasoning typically 
found in an adolescent population. In some ways the reasoning performance of the group 
with ASD had more in common with reasoning patterns found amongst younger children. 
Young children show less influence of background knowledge compared to adolescents 
(Markovits & Janveau-Brennan, 1999). The explicit consideration of counterexamples is 
subject to development. Background knowledge takes time to accrue in long term memor)', 
and retrieval processes also develop over time. Not only must children be able to retrieve such 
knowledge, however, they also need to understand conditional relationships. This involves the 
formation of complex schemas representing the relations between presented material and 
counterexamples (Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002). Ver}' young children are limited in their 
ability to create such schemas. Information processing accounts of autism also predict that 
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reasoners on the autistic spectrum will tend not to form complex representational models, 
where it is necessar}' to integrate presented material with other relevant knowledge. 
Implicit probabilistic influences on reasoning are less cognitively demanding and are not 
subject to development to the same extent. Children as young as 6 years of age, for example, 
are able to make probabilistic judgments about conditional statements (Markovits & 
Thompson, 2008). This was also found to be the case with the adolescents with ASD. They 
showed no impairment in their abUit)' to arrive at probabilistic judgments of presented 
material. 
There are a number of possible reasons why the adolescents with ASD are less influenced 
by background knowledge in conditional reasoning. Firsdy, it may be that, as for much 
younger children, they simply do not have the same kind of available knowledge in long term 
memor)' compared to t}'pical adolescents. It may also be the case that, regardless of 
availabiUt}', they fail to generate counterexamples during the reasoning process. There is prior 
evidence, for example, that individuals with ASD show impairment in the generation of novel 
thoughts and ideas (e.g. Bishop & Norburv', 2005; Turner, 1999). Additional explanations stem 
from information processing accounts of autism which suggest that a tendency not to 
integrate information results in a failure to contextuaUze stimuli. Finally, our findings may 
reflect evidence that children with ASD show a positive response bias when engaged in 
reasoning (Leevers & Harris, 2000). The experiments presented in Chapter 4 seek to 
distinguish between these possibilities. 
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Chapter 4 
Introduction 
Experiment 1 found that adolescents with ASD were less influenced by background 
knowledge compared to typically developing adolescents, when engaged in conditional 
reasoning. This finding was not related to differences in working memor)', inhibition or 
expressive vocabular}'. In addition, it was found that the group with ASD and the t}'pical 
control group did not differ in judgments concerning the believabilit}' of the relations 
described in the premises. Patterns of performance in the conditional reasoning task, 
therefore, did not reflect differences in participant's underlying beliefs in the conditional 
statements. These findings reflect research in other domains showing that individuals with 
ASD do not process stimuli in context, due to a tendency not to integrate information for 
higher meaning (See Happe & Frith, 2006 for a review). In addition to the h}'pothesis that 
individuals with autism tend not to integrate background knowledge during reasoning, there 
are a number of alternative explanations which will be explored in this chapter. Such 
explanations include the possibilit}' that the adolescents with autism exhibited an affirmative 
response bias, that they had different amounts or kinds of information available in long term 
memor}' compared to controls, or that they did not generate counterexample cases. 
One possible explanation for the results of the conditional reasoning task relates to the 
pattern of responses given by the adolescents with ASD. Although the correct logical 
response for the invalid inference AC is one of uncertaint}', there is a tendenc)' for people to 
endorse invalid inferences where litde background knowledge is available. This is reflected in 
the high numbers of endorsements by both groups in response to AC questions with few 
alternative antecedents. Since the correct logical response for MP is also to endorse the 
inference, there is a tendency among t}'pical populations for affirmative responses to be given 
to both MP and AC, when reasoning outside of empirical knowledge. This pattern of 
76 
responding is also shown by the participants with ASD, where available counterexamples are 
low. Where background knowledge is available, t)fpical groups are less Likely to endorse MP 
and AC, and give less affirmative responses for both inferences. Hence, it is possible that the 
adolescents with ASD do not show this drop in affirmative responding because they simply 
have a stronger tendency to respond by saying yes. There is some previous evidence that 
younger children with autism may exhibit a yes bias when engaged in contrar}'-to fact 
reasoning tasks which require the participant to reason on the basis of material that is 
empirically false. Leevers and Harris (2000) found that children with autism showed a positive 
response bias when answering contrar}'-to-fact questions such as: 
All swans are red. 
Slink}' is a swan. 
Is Slinky white? 
Contrar}r-to-fact reasoning is very different from the kind of everyday conditional reasoning 
presented here. It is possible, nevertheless, that a 3'es response bias could explain the findings 
of Experiment 1. Experiment 2 examines this possibilit)'. 
A further possible explanation for the results of Experiment 1 derives from the availabiUt}' 
of knowledge in long term memor}' and the generation of that knowledge. Individuals with 
ASD have been shown to have restricted and obsessive areas of interests (Murray, Lesser & 
Lawson, 2005) and to show impairment in the generation of novel thoughts and ideas (e.g. 
Bishop & Norbur)', 2005; Turner, 1999). For the group with ASD, relevant background 
information may not be available, either because they did not generate available 
counterexamples or because they did not have the relevant information in long term memor}'. 
The pretest in Experiment 1 that allowed the classification of materials into low vs high 
disablers and alternatives was carried out on a group of tj'picaUy developing children. It is 
possible that the adolescents with ASD did not have access to the same number or type of 
counterexamples for these materials. Experiment 3 explores, therefore, whether the pattern of 
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reasoning performance found among the adolescents with ASD was related to the availabHit}' 
of knowledge in memor)'. Adolescents with ASD and tj'pical controls were compared on their 
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abilit)' to generate the counterexample cases involved in the reasoning problems of 
Experiment 1. 
In considering the abilit}' of individuals with ASD to generate counterexamples it is 
important to distinguish between the abilit}' to generate cases when prompted to do so, and 
the abilit}' to generate counterexamples when engaged in online reasoning. Experiment 1 
explored the spontaneous activation and integration of contextual information during 
reasoning, amongst individuals with ASD. In seeking to explain the lack of contexmal 
influence found in the group with ASD, one possibilit}' is that counterexamples do not 
spontaneously come to mind for these participants during reasoning. Another is that, while 
available, counterexample cases are not integrated with the reasoning process, hence failing to 
affect it. In Experiment 4 the conditional suppression paradigm (Byrne, 1989) is adopted, a 
method which actively prompts counterexample cases within the reasoning task itself With 
this method, some participants are presented with an extra premise: a second conditional 
statement which direcdy prompts consideration of a counterexample. Counterexamples are 
actively prompted by the suppression task, so participants do not need to spontaneously 
generate them. A lack of contexmaUzed reasoning, in this case, would strongly suggest that 
counterexample information is not being integrated with the premises. This in turn might 
indicate that it is not the spontaneous activation of counterexamples that presents a problem, 
but the integration of those counterexamples into the reasoning process. 
Experiment 2 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to explore the possibiUt}' that the pattern of responding 
shown by the adolescents with ASD, in Experiment 1, was related to a generalised yes 
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response bias. Adolescents with ASD and t5'pically developing adolescents were given a 
reasoning task with equal numbers of affirmative and negative correct responses. 
Method 
Participants 
As far as possible the participants reflected the same populations as in Experiment 1. The 
adolescents were recruited from the same schools and within the same age range. 20 
adolescents with ASD, 14 of which had taken part in Experiment 1 and 38 topically 
developing adolescents were included in the study. The adolescents in both groups were 
between the ages of 11 and 16. There were 16 boys and 4 girls in the group with ASD and 21 
boys and 17 girls in the t}'pical group. All of the adolescents with ASD had a clinical diagnosis 
of autism spectrum disorder meeting either DSM-IV (APA, 1994) or ICD-10 (WHO, 1993) 
criteria. Diagnoses were performed by either a paediatrician or child and adolescent 
psychiatrist following multidisciplinar)^ assessment. Adolescents with ASD with an additional 
medical diagnosis, such as attention deficit hyperactivit}' disorder, or who were taking 
medication, were excluded. There were 17 high functioning adolescents diagnosed as having 
ASD or autism and 3 adolescents diagnosed with asperger syndrome. Within the typically 
developing group, children were excluded if they had a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder, 
asperger syndrome or were documented as having autistic traits. Children who had a 
statement of special educational needs were also excluded. Recruitment was from mainstream 
schools in lower middle class urban areas within Pl)TTiouth and West Devon. English was the 
first language for all of the participants. 
AH participants were given a working memor}' measure based on that developed by Case, 
Kurland and Goldberg (1982) including both a processing and storage component. Working 
memorjf was measured as it has been shown to be highly correlated with general intelligence 
(Colom, ReboUo, Palacios, Juan-Espinosa & Kyllonen, 2004) and reasoning ability (Kyllonen 
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& Christal, 1990). All participants were also given a subtest of The Wechsler Intelligence Test 
for Children (WISC—III, Wechsler, 1991) measuring expressive vocabular}^ No significant 
differences between groups were found (See Table 4.1) for chronological age (/(56) = 0.69 p= 
.49), age corrected standard vocabulary' scores (/(56) = -1.55 p= .13) or working memor}' span 
(/(56) = -1.75 ;>=.09). 
Table 4.1. Measures of participant characteristics for the t)fpical group and the group with 
ASD in Experiment 2. 
Autistic Tj'pical 
Differences 
between groups 
Range Mean SD Range Mean SD 
Chronological Age 
(Months) 
Standardised 
Vocabular)' scores 
Working Memor)' 
Span 
141-195 
4-11 
1.0-5.0 
166.45 
6.50 
3.15 
15.79 
2.14 
1.03 
137-194 
4-13 
1.0-5.0 
163.29 
7.37 
3.66 
16.90 
1.96 
1.06 
.49 
.13 
.09 
Materials and procedure 
The participants were presented with simple arguments based on a universally quantified 
major premise (shown in Appendix A2). The structure of the questions was taken from the 
Leevers and Harris (2000) study which found evidence for a yes response bias in children with 
ASD. The children in this study were younger than the participants in the current study and 
Experiment 1, ranging between 7 and 15 years. The materials used also differed from those in 
the Leevers and Harris study, in that the questions were not contrar}'-to-fact. The questions 
used here were similar in content to the problems in Experiment 1, in so far as they referred 
to familiar everyday information which did not conflict with empirical knowledge. 
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Sixteen questions were presented, four of each type of inference (MP, MT, AC and DA). 
All participants were presented with the following instructions: 
/ am going to read some statements and some questions out tojou. You need to listen carefully and think 
about what follows based on the statements. You need to answer the questions by circling either YES or 
NO. 
For each inference there were two questions with standard affirmative conclusions, where 
drawing the inference involves responding 'yes', as in the following example: 
All birds have feathers. 
Robins are birds. 
Does it follow that robins have feathers? 
There were also two questions with opposite conclusions, where drawing the inference 
involves responding 'no', for example: 
All fires are hot. 
A bonfire is a fire. 
Does it follow that a bonfire is cold? 
If the participants with ASD show a bias to say 'yes' then this will be manifested in reduced 
rate of drawing the inference on problems with opposite conclusions. The questions were 
presented in a booklet. All materials were read out loud by the experimenter and participants 
were required to circle either a 'yes' or 'no' response. Participants were tested in small groups 
of up to 5 individuals. 
Results 
Table 4.2 shows rates of inference for the four argument forms under standard and opposite 
conclusions for the two groups. The presence of a bias to respond 'yes' would be indicated by 
lower inference rates amongst the ASD participants on problems with opposite conclusions. 
A 4 X question type (MP, MT, AC and DA) by 2 x conclusion type (standard or opposite) 
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repeated measures Anova on inference rates, with autism as a between subjects factor, 
revealed a significant main effect of question t)fpe (F(3,168) = 3.30, AdSE = 0.13, p= .02 rfj, = 
.06 and a significant two way interaction between question tjpe and conclusion t}'pe F(3,168) 
= 3.47, MSE = 0.14, p= .02 ri'p = .06, showing higher rates of inference for standard than 
opposite conclusions on the denial inferences, MT and DA. Crucially, however, the two way 
interaction between conclusion type and group was not significant F(l,56) = 1.04, AiSE = 
0.11, p= .31 Ti^ p = .02. This shows that there was no significant tendency amongst the 
participants with ASD to generate 'yes' responses more often than the t)'pical participants. 
The three-way interaction between question t}'pe, expected response and group was also non-
significant F(3,168) ^ 0.34, MSE = 0.05, p= .80 Ti'p = .01. 
Table 4.2 Mean number of inferences drawn for standard and opposite conclusions for each 
argument form comparing groups in Experiment 2. 
Inference 
MP 
^^^ 
AC 
DA 
Response type 
Standard 
Opposite 
Standard 
Opposite 
Standard 
Opposite 
Standard 
Opposite 
ASD 
1.85 
2.00 
1.85 
1.75 
1.90 
1.90 
1.90 
1.75 
Typical 
1.89 
1.97 
1.89 
1.79 
1.97 
2.00 
1.92 
1.71 
Follow up t tests revealed no significant differences between groups in inference rates for 
standard or opposite conclusions on any of the argument forms. For MP questions with 
standard conclusions (/(56) = 0.49 p= .63), MP questions with opposite conclusions (/(56) = 
-0.72 p= .47), MT opposite questions (/(56) = 0.34 p= .74), MT standard questions (/(56) = 
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0.43 p— .67), AC standard questions (/(56) = 1.20 p- .33), AC opposite questions (/(56) = 
1.39 p- .33), DA opposite questions (/(56) = -0.29 p- .11), DA standard questions (/(56) = 
0.22 p = .83). 
Discuss ion 
Experiment 2 shows that the adolescents with ASD do not differ significantiy from t^ fpicaUy 
developing adolescents in the number of yes responses given to the reasoning problems. The 
pattern of findings shown in Table 4.2 also demonstrates that the adolescents with ASD are 
engaged in reasoning, and do not significandy differ from the typical group in the responses 
given, regardless of whether the standard response is affirmative or not. The adolescents with 
ASD, do not, therefore, show a yes-saying response bias, compared with t)'pical controls. 
Pre^^ous studies of contrar^'-to-fact reasoning among children with autism present 
conflicting findings (Leevers & Harris, 2000; Scott, Baron-Cohen & Leslie, 1999). These 
differences have been explained by reference to a yes response bias (Leevers & Harris, 2000). 
One important difference between the Leevers and Harris study and work reported here is 
that the current study used questions with familiar information, which was in line with 
empirical knowledge about the world. 
It is also the case that no significant differences were found between the two groups in 
their ability to reason logically. This was not so in the Leevers and Harris study where 
responses for the group with autism were not found to be characterised by an empirical or 
logical approach, but rather reflected random responses, or a strong bias to answer all 
questions by saying 'yes'. The fact that participants with ASD were able to engage in logical 
reasoning in the current task, and did not show a yes response bias, suggests that the pattern 
of responding among children with ASD seen in previous studies may be particular to 
reasoning with content that is not empirically true. The tendency for children with ASD not to 
engage in imaginar)' play (see Jarrold, 2003 for a review), and to have difficulties understanding 
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pretence (Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2001), and non-Uteral aspects of language (Tager-Flusberg, 
2000) would also suggest that this might be the case. 
Experiment 3 
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to explore the possibilit}' that a lack of contextualized 
reasoning among adolescents with ASD was related to the availabiUt)' of counterexamples in 
long term memor)', and the abilit}' to generate such counterexamples. The abilit}' of t}fpically 
developing adolescents and adolescents with ASD to generate disabling conditions and 
alternative antecedents was measured by performance on a generation task, based on that of 
Cummins et al. (1991). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants for the generation task included 32 t)'pically developing adolescents and 20 
adolescents with ASD. All of the participants had previously taken part in Experiment 1. 
Once again no significant differences were found on measures of chronological age (/(50) = 
0.46 p~ .65), age corrected standard vocabular)' scores (/(50) = -1.22 p— 23), inhibition (/(50) 
= 2.04 p= .08) or working memory (/(50) = 0.95 p= .35). 
Materials and procedure 
The participants were presented with a booklet containing eight conditionals, four AC and 
four MP statements, taken from each of the four high-low categories identified by the pretest 
in Experiment 1 (See Appendix A3). Participants were given the following instructions: 
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In this taskjou will be given some riddles. You will be told a rule. You will then be told a fact about an 
event You have one and a half minutes to think, of as many reasons as you can that make the event 
possible. 
All materials were read aloud by the experimenter. Participants were presented with a practice 
example, then 8 statements in the form of rules and facts. The questions referred to either AC 
as in the following practice example: 
Rule: If Marvin wears wellies, then his feet will stay dr)'. 
Fact: Marvin's feet stay dr}', but he is not wearing wellies. 
Give as many reasons as you can that could make this possible. 
Or MP: 
Rule: If butter is heated, then it wiU melt. 
Fact: Butter is heated, but it does not melt. 
Give as many reasons as you can that could make this possible. 
Results 
The responses given were categorized into four tj'pes based on Verschueren et al. (2002). 
T f^pes ranged from those which are strongly related to the content of the premises to those 
which represent more remote situations. The examples given here refer to the following rule 
and fact: 
Rule: If the ignition key is turned, then the car will start. 
Fact: The car started, but the ignition key was not turned 
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T)'pe 1 constituted 'real' counterexamples where either an alternative cause which would lead 
to the same effect is generated, or an event which would stop the effect from occurring as in 
the following example: 
The car was hotwired' 
Type. 2 referred to answers which state that there are possible exceptions, although they are 
not expUcidy stated: 
Trie was a mechanic and knew something else to make the car start' 
T}'pe 3 referred to answers which state that an enabler is not necessar\', for example, the given 
cause is not necessary for the effect to occur: 
You don't need a key to start some cars' 
Type 4 included more remote answers referring to generalizations, invalid rules and fantastical 
inter\rening instances, for example: 
The car started by magic spell' 
Responses which fell outside these four tj^ pes were not included in analysis. Excluded 
responses included reasons which bore no relation to the question, incomplete responses or 
those which simply repeated the statement. A total of all acceptable responses were calculated 
for each participant, for each question. Means for each t3'pe of counterexample generated and 
total counterexamples generated are shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Mean number of counterexamples generated for each t)^e by the t}^ical group and 
the group with ASD in Experiment 3. 
T\'pe generated 
Real counterexamples 
Possible exceptions 
Missing enablers 
Remote counterexamples 
Total counterexamples 
Mean 
12.10 
0.15 
2.15 
0.40 
14.80 
Autistic 
SD 
4.89 
0.67 
1.81 
0.68 
5.79 
Mean 
11.75 
0.13 
2.34 
0.72 
14.94 
Topical 
SD 
3.16 
0.34 
1.29 
0.99 
3.67 
Multivariate analysis revealed no significant difference between autistic and topical groups 
in terms of overall numbers of counterexamples generated, F(2,49) = 0.32 p= .73 r|"p = .01. 
FoUow up Univariate Anovas also revealed no significant differences between groups in terms 
of tjrpes of counterexamples generated (See Table 4.3). 
Further analysis was performed on numbers of counterexamples generated for MP and AC 
questions with low/high available counterexamples, as identified in Experiment 1. Means and 
standard deviations are shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Mean number of counterexamples generated by the t)'pical group and the group 
with ASD, for questions with low/high available disablers and alternatives in Experiment 3. 
Av^ailabilitj' of counterexamples 
Low available disablers 
High available disablers 
Low available alternatives 
High available alternatives 
Mean 
2.55 
4.95 
1.60 
5.75 
Autistic 
SD 
1.39 
2.44 
1.04 
2.47 
Mean 
2.71 
5.41 
1.75 
5.94 
T}'pical 
SD 
1.20 
1.88 
0.92 
1.68 
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A 2 (group) by 2 (high vs low disablers) Anova was performed on the numbers of 
acceptable counterexamples generated for MP questions, with autism as a between subjects 
factor. The analysis revealed a main effect of disablers (F(l,50) = 68.16, MSE = 2.34, p < 
.001 Ti^ p = .58) showing that participants generated more counterexamples on those problems 
found to have higher numbers of available disablers in Experiment 1. The two-way interaction 
between disablers and autism was not found to be significant (F(l,50) = 0.22, MSE = 2.34, p 
= .64 r|''p = .004), such that there was no significant difference in generation performance 
between the two groups. 
An equivalent Anova was performed on the data for AC questions. The analysis revealed a 
main effect of alternatives (F(l,50) = 278.82, MSE - 1.53, p^< .001 Ti^ = .85) In Une with 
the previous analysis of disabling conditions the two-way interaction between alternatives and 
autism was not found to be significant (F(l,50) = 0.01, Mi"F = 1.53, p - .94 rj^ p = .00) 
showing, once again, that there was no significant difference in generation performance 
between the two groups. 
A measure of the influence of counterexamples in the reasoning task from Experiment 1 
across all inferences was also derived by calculating the difference between levels of 
endorsement where many counterexamples were available compared to cases where few 
counterexamples were available. As expected, the means for the group with ASD (M=0.85, 
SD=2.60) and the control group (M=3.58, SD=3.52) were found to significandy differ (/(62) 
= 3.37 p— .001). Since all the participants in Experiment 1 also took part in this experiment it 
was possible to correlate this measure with total numbers of counterexamples generated. 
Remote or invalid t)'pe 4 examples were excluded. Among typical participants we would 
expect that higher influence of counterexamples during reasoning would be associated with 
higher numbers of counterexamples generated. Analysis revealed significant correlations 
between the influence of counterexamples during reasoning and numbers of counterexamples 
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generated for the t}'pical group r(32) = 0.39, p =.03, but not for the group with ASD /^20) = 
0.16,^ =.49. The significance of the difference between the two correlations was, however, 
not found to be significant using Fisher r-to-z transformation (z = 0.82,^ = 0.21). 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 shows that the t^ ^pical group and the group with ASD did not differ in the 
numbers or tfpc of counterexamples generated. Both groups, therefore, appear to have similar 
background information available for activation. These findings also show that the adolescents 
with ASD are able to retrieve background knowledge when instructed to do so. There is still a 
possibilit}', however, that they do not spontaneously activate such background knowledge 
during reasoning. These results appear to conflict with previous studies showing an 
impairment in the generation of novel ideas. The fact that the participants with ASD were able 
to generate counterexamples may be related to the fact that they were expUcitiy cued to do so. 
Analysis revealed significant correlations, for the tj'pical group, between the influence of 
counterexamples during reasoning and the generation of counterexamples. For the group with 
ASD the abilit}^ to generate counterexamples when instructed to do so was not related to 
reasoning performance. The difference between the two correlations was not, however, found 
to be significant. Conclusions about differences between the groups in terms of the 
relationship of the generation of counterexamples to reasoning performance, therefore, 
remain tentative. 
Experiment 4 
The purpose of Experiment 4 was to explore two plausible explanations for a lack of 
contextualized reasoning among the adolescents with ASD in Experiment 1. One possibility is 
that counterexamples do not spontaneously come to mind for the ASD participants during 
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reasoning, despite their abilit)^ to generate counterexamples when asked to do so, as 
demonstrated in Experiment 3. Another is that, while available, counterexample cases are not 
integrated during online reasoning consequendy failing to influence reasoning outcomes. In 
this experiment we adopt the conditional suppression paradigm (Byrne, 1989), a method 
which actively prompts counterexamples within the given reasoning task. For example: 
If Mar}' has an essay to write, then she will study late in the librar)'. 
(If the librar)' stays open, then Mar}' will study late in the librar}'.) 
Mar}' has an essay to write 
Does it follow that she will study late in the librar}'? 
With the standard presentation, which omits the conditional statement shown in parentheses, 
most participants draw the valid MP inference. When the second conditional is presented, 
however, then a disabling condition is prompted: Mar}' may not be able to stay late if the 
librar}' closes. These cases are known as additional arguments, since the second conditional 
suggests an additional condition required to achieve the consequent. Participants in this group 
make the valid MP and MT inferences less often. In the same way, fallacies like AC and DA 
can be suppressed when a second conditional prompts consideration of an alternative 
antecedent, as in the following case: 
If Mary has an essay to write, then she will study late in the Ubrar}'. 
(If she has a textbook to read, then she will study late in the library.) 
Mar}' studies late in the librar}' 
Does it follow that she has an essay to write? 
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These cases are known as alternative arguments, because they suggest an alternative means by 
which the consequent may be achieved. When told that Mar}' studies late in the librar}' and 
asked if it follows that she has an essay to write, the tendency wiU be to infer that there may be 
other possible causes, and hence suppress the AC inference. Maty may have an essay to write 
or she may have a textbook to read. In this case the alternative argument lessens the tendency 
to endorse the inference and encourages a logical uncertaint}' response. Examples of both 
additional and alternative arguments used in Experiment 4 are shown in Appendix A4. 
If the participants with ASD do not spontaneously generate counterexamples during 
reasoning, then this paradigm will alleviate the need for spontaneous generation by providing 
explicit prompts referring to counterexample cases. In this case more influence of background 
knowledge would be expected among participants with ASD on this reasoning task compared 
to that used in Experiment 1. If, on the other hand, the adolescents with ASD are able to 
generate counterexamples but do not integrate available information during reasoning, similar 
reasoning performance to that found in the first experiment would be expected. 
Method 
Participants 
High functioning participants with ASD were recruited from mainstream schools known 
to have special units and one special school supporting pupils on the autistic spectrum. Four 
of the participants had also taken part in previous experiments. Adolescents with ASD were 
included if they had a definitive clinical diagnosis of autism or asperger syndrome meeting 
either DSM-IV (APA, 1994) or ICD-10 (WHO, 1993) criteria. As in previous experiments 
diagnoses were carried out by a pediatrician or child and adolescent psychiatrist after 
multidisciplinary assessment. Adolescents with ASD who had a medical diagnosis such as 
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epilepsy or a neurodevelopmental diagnosis in addition to autism or who were taking 
medication, were excluded. 
Tj'picaUy developing participants were recruited from within the same mainstream schools 
and were excluded if they had a diagnosis of ASD or a statement of special educational needs. 
None of the tjpical group had taken part in previous experiments. Participants in both groups 
were between 11 and 16 years of age. 
Participants were given individual difference measures including 'The Counting Span 
Task' (Case et al.,1982) used in Experiment 2. As in Experiment 2 the expressive vocabular}' 
test of The Wechsler Intelligence Test for Children (WISC-III, Wechsler, 1991) was also 
given to all participants. 
40 t}'pically developing participants and 25 high functioning participants with ASD were 
included in the study. No significant differences between the groups were found (See Table 
4.5) for chronological age (/(63) = 1.78/)= .08), scaled score equivalents for vocabulary' (/(63) 
= -1.98/)= .07) or working memor}' span (/(63) = -1.49 p- .14). 
Table 4.5. Indi\'idual difference measures for the t^'pical group and the group with ASD in 
Experiment 4. 
Differences 
ASD (N=25) Topical (N=40) bemeen groups 
Range Mean SD Range Mean SD 
Chronological Age 
(Months) 
Vocabular}' (scaled 
score) 
Working Memory' 
Span 
139-192 
3.0-12.0 
1.5-5.0 
170.80 
6.16 
3.42 
17.58 
2.76 
0.98 
137-194 
3.0-13.0 
0.5-5.0 
162.68 
7.35 
3.79 
18.09 
2.07 
0.96 
.08 
.07 
.14 
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Materials and procedure 
All materials were presented by a robot character on a computer who read all instructions and 
questions out loud. The materials consisted of two programs presenting alternative or 
additional arguments. In the first program, participants were given 16 statements with four 
questions of each inference t}'pe. The two valid inferences Modus Ponens (If p then q, p/q) 
and Modus ToUens (If p then q, not-q/not-p) and the two invalid inferences. Affirmation of 
the Consequent (If p then q, q/p) and Denial of the Antecedent (if p then q, not-p/not-q). 
Half of the questions for each inference tj'pe were presented as simple statements without 
extra information, which acted as control questions. The other half were presented with extra 
information in the form of alternative arguments. The program presenting additional 
arguments followed the same pattern (AU the questions used are shown in Appendix A4). All 
participants completed both programs. Half of the participants received the alternative 
arguments program first, and half received the additional arguments program first. 
AW participants were given with the following instructions and simple example: 
I am going to give you some problems to work out. I will read some sentences out to you. I want you 
to assume that what you hear is true. Then I will ask you to think about what follows from the 
sentences. There will be three answers to choose from and I want you to decide which one of the answers 
is correct based on the sentence. It is important that you listen and answer each question carefully. 
Let's look at an example together. 
Listen to these sentences and suppose they are true. 
If Joan is lucky, then she wins apri^. 
Joan is lucky. 
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Does it follow that? 
1. Joan wins apn:(e 
2. Joan does not win aprii^ 
5. Joan may or may not win apri^ 
Results 
Mean rates of endorsement for simple, additional and alternative arguments are presented in 
Table 4.6. Endorsements in the simple control condition are comparable for both valid and 
invalid inferences. 
Table 4.6 Mean rates of endorsements for the t)pical group and the group with ASD 
comparing simple with alternative and additional arguments in Experiment 4. 
Additional 
MP 
Simple 
Autistic 3.12 
T}pical 3.60 
Additional 
3.00 
2.73 
MT 
Simple 
2.56 
3.33 
Additional 
2.24 
2.40 
AC 
Simple 
3.08 
3.60 
Additional 
2.88 
3.23 
DA 
Simple 
2.72 
3.28 
Additional 
2.12 
2.85 
Alternative 
MP 
Simple 
Autistic 3.04 
T}pical 3.63 
Alternative 
3.36 
3.33 
MT 
Simple 
2.84 
3.33 
Alternative 
2.92 
2.90 
AC 
Simple 
3.00 
3.58 
Alternative 
2.04 
1.53 
DA 
Simple 
3.00 
3.50 
Alternative 
1.80 
1.50 
This pattern of responding is customary for children and younger adolescents. Children tend 
to interpret inferences biconditionaUy (if and only if p then q) and consequentiy tend to 
respond with certainty to AC and DA (Markovits, 2000; Markovits, Venet, Janveau-Brennan, 
Malfait, Pion, & Vadeboncoeur, 1996). The ability to respond consistentiy with uncertainty to 
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invalid inferences develops across adolescence (MuUer et al., 2001) and would not be 
expected, particularly among our younger participants (Janveau- Brennan & Markovits, 1999). 
The data for the additional and alternative arguments blocks were analysed separately. For 
the additional arguments block, a 2x argument (additional and simple) 2x validit}' (valid and 
invalid) and 2x endorsement (affirmative endorsements for MP and AC or negative 
endorsements for MT and DA) analysis of variance was performed, with autism as a between 
participants factor. This revealed a main effect of argument (F (1,63) = 16.24, MSE = \.15,p 
— <.001 ri"p =.21) and a significant three-way interaction between argument, validit}' and 
group. (F (1,63) = 5.64, MSE - 0.63,p = .02 Ti-p =.08) of the type predicted. That is the 
tendency to withhold valid inferences when an additional argument was present was more 
strongly marked in the tj^ picaUy developing than the ASD group, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 suppression effect with additional arguments comparing autistic and tjfpical groups 
in Experiment 4. 
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FoUow-up t tests were performed to check for an effect of additional arguments in the two 
groups separately. There was found to be a significant difference in levels of responding to 
additional and simple arguments for t\'pical adolescents for valid inferences (/(39) = -4.44 p = 
<.001) and for invalid inferences (/(39) = -3.09 p = .004). For the group with ASD there was 
no significant difference in levels of responding to additional and simple arguments for valid 
inferences (/(24) = -0.99 p = .33), or for invalid inferences (/^ 24) = -1.79 p = .09). 
An equivalent analysis was performed on the data where alternative arguments were 
presented. A 2x argument (alternative and simple) 2x validit}' (valid and invalid) and 2x 
endorsement (affirmative or negative endorsement) analysis of variance revealed a significant 
main effect of argument (F(l,63) = 56.58, MSE = 1.45, p= <.001 ^-p = .47) and validit}' 
(F(l,63) = 39.83, MSE = 1.41, ^ <.001 rj'p - .39), and a two-way interaction between validit}' 
and argument (F(l,63) = 67.28, MSE = 0.99, p <.001 r|~p = .52), indicating a greater effect of 
alternative premises on invalid compared to valid arguments. There was also a two-way 
interaction between argument and group (F(l,63) = 12.04, MJ"E = 1.45, p— .001 r|^ p = .16) 
such that the effect of alternative arguments on all inferences was greater for the t3'pical group 
than for the group with ASD. Mean endorsement rates for all inferences for both simple and 
alternative arguments are shown in Figure 4.2. 
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groups in Experiment 4. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 4 demonstrate that the adolescents with ASD are substantially less 
influenced than controls by the presentation of contextual cues in the form of alternative and 
additional arguments during reasoning. This is the case for both valid arguments with 
additional requirements and invalid arguments with alternative causes. These findings extend 
those of Experiment 1 in demonstrating that, despite the pro\dsion of explicit contextual 
prompts, the individuals with ASD did not integrate background knowledge with the premises 
to the same degree as tjpical adolescents. These findings strongly suggest, therefore, that the 
tendency not to take account of background knowledge among the group with ASD is related 
to a tendency not to draw all available information together, rather than a failure to 
spontaneously generate background material. 
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General Discussion 
Experiment 2 explored the possibility' that the results of Experiment 1 reflected a yes response 
bias among the group with ASD. The adolescents with ASD were not found to differ from 
topically developing adolescents in their willingness to give negative responses. The possibilit)' 
that the reasoning performance of the group with ASD reflected differential availabiJit}' of 
counterexamples in long term memorj' was ruled out by Experiment 3, which showed no 
differences between groups on a counterexample generation task. Experiment 4 found that 
the adolescents with ASD were substantially less influenced in their conditional reasoning by 
the presentation of contextual cues in the form of alternative and additional arguments. This 
was the case for both valid arguments with additional requirements and invalid arguments 
with alternative causes. 
The fact that a yes response bias was not exhibited by the adolescents with ASD 
contradicts previous studies. Leevers and Harris (2000) found that children with autism 
displayed a pattern of yes responding in response to contrary-to-fact reasoning problems, they 
also claim that the results of a similar study (Scott, Baron-Cohen & Leslie, 1999) reflect a yes 
bias among children with ASD. Unlike the questions used in Experiment 2, which were 
empirically true, both of these studies used contrar}'-to-fact materials. As the questions we 
used were ver}' similar to those used in the Leevers and Harris study, but differed in content, it 
maybe that children with ASD have specific difficulties reasoning with empirically false 
material. There is comparable evidence that individuals with ASD show poor performance on 
counterfactual reasoning tasks involving reasoning about alternative possibilities not reflected 
in realit}' (Grant, Riggs & Boucher, 2004; Peterson & Bowler, 2000). 
The fact that the participants with ASD were able to generate counterexamples also fails 
to support previous studies which show impaired generation of novel ideas. Individuals with 
ASD have shown restricted performance relative to controls in response to tasks involving 
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word fluency (generation of as many words as possible in a given time span) (e.g. Minshew, 
Goldstein, Muenz & Payton, 1992), ideational fluency (generation of as many uses as possible 
for a given object in a set time span) (e.g. Turner, 1999) and impairment in the spontaneous 
use of pretence in play (Jarrold et al., 1996). There are, however, other studies which show 
that individuals with ASD show no impairment in similar tasks (e.g. Boucher, 1988; Minshew, 
Goldstein and Seigel, 1995). Boucher demonstrates that indi\aduals with ASD have a specific 
problem with the spontaneous generation of novel ideas when no cues are provided. The 
generation task involved ver}' specific prompts in the form of rules and facts. Participants did 
not have to devise a generation strategy', they simply had to report the resulting 
counterexamples activated on the basis of the cues given. What is perhaps surprising, 
nonetheless, is that the group with ASD did not differ in terms of the tjjpes of 
counterexamples generated. Turner, for example, found that indi\'iduals with autism were able 
to report the usual uses, cued b}?^  a given object, but were unable to derive more imaginative or 
out of the ordinar}' responses not normally associated with the use of the target. It seems 
likely, therefore, that the typical group and the group with ASD would differ in the generation 
of remote or exceptional instances of counterexamples. This was found not to be the case. 
The results do show, however, that both groups show a marked tendency to generate 'real 
counterexamples' as opposed to generalisations and more remote or exceptional examples, 
where numbers generated by both groups were ver)' low. 
The results of Experiment 4 extend the previous findings of Experiment 1, which found 
that adolescents with ASD did not spontaneously contexmalise conditional reasoning 
problems. In Experiment 4 the methodology differs, as background knowledge was actively 
prompted. Despite the provision of explicit contextual prompts, the individuals with ASD did 
not integrate available background knowledge with the premises to the same degree as tj'pical 
adolescents. The adolescents with ASD were substantially less influenced in their conditional 
reasoning by the presentation of alternative and additional arguments. This was the case for 
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both valid arguments with additional requirements, and invalid arguments with alternative 
causes. 
Experiment 4 refines interpretation of the results reported in Experiment 1. In the 
previous study it is possible that the group with ASD failed spontaneously to generate 
counterexamples. In Experiment 4, however, information specifically relating to 
counterexample cases was provided. In this case, it seems that the propensit}' not to 
contextualize given problems is the result of a tendency among participants with ASD not to 
integrate relevant and available contextual knowledge into the reasoning process. 
For the tj'pical group, the presentation of alternative arguments was associated with 
significanti}' lower endorsement rates for both valid and invalid problems. There is prior 
evidence that prompting a search for alternatives can also activate disabling conditions 
(Markoxats & Potvdn 2001). Markovits and Pot\'in claim that withholding valid inferences, in 
such cases, results from a failure to inhibit irrelevant material. In considering this paradigm it 
is important to note that contextualized reasoning involves the activation of generally 
associated background knowledge which may or may not be relevant. Specific prompts to 
activate alternative antecedents, for example, may also lead to retrieval of disabling conditions. 
The influence of activated knowledge will depend upon its relevance to the inference 
presented. This account may be applicable here, as compared to adults, adolescents are less 
able to employ metacognitive and inhibitory skills to deal selectively with activated 
information (Markovits & BarrouiUet, 2004; MuUer, Overton & Reene, 2001). 
As indicated at the outset, there has been some debate in the psychology of reasoning as to 
whether contextualisation in reasoning should be viewed primarily as a source of bias, or as a 
normally adaptive mechanism which creates problems in the artificial world of deductive 
reasoning experiments. However, it is clear that prior knowledge does substantially influence 
and interfere with the capacit}' of normal participants to reason logically in compliance with 
the instructions given. Furthermore, the ability to decontextualise such problems, and hence 
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reason more logically, is associated with those of higher general intelligence (for reviews, see 
Stanovich, 1999; 2004; Evans & Over, 2004; Evans, 2007). In the current study, intelligence 
levels and working memor)' capacit)' were weU matched in the ASD and tj'pical groups, so this 
should not be a factor. Furthermore, our methodolog}' controls for any influence of logical 
reasoning ability per se. As we have seen the influence of background knowledge in conditional 
reasoning can be both to suppress valid and invalid inferences, making it both a biasing and a 
debiasing influence from the viewpoint of logic. The ASD group was less sensitive to the 
context manipulation both on additional arguments (biasing) and on alternative arguments 
(debiasing). Hence, principal findings have nothing to do with differences in logical reasoning 
abilit)' as such. 
Since completion of the experiments described here a new study has been published which 
reports similar findings with an adult population. Pijnacker et al. (2009) employed the 
Suppression Task to investigate defeasible reasoning among adults with autism. This study 
explored the abilit}' of high functioning adults with autism to revise conditional reasoning 
conclusions, on the basis of new contextual information in the form of additional or 
alternative arguments. Participants with autism showed no significant differences in 
performance, compared to controls, on simple conditional reasoning tasks where no extra 
statements were given. This was the case for both valid and invalid inferences. Where 
additional and alternative arguments were presented all participants showed a suppression 
effect with significandy fewer endorsements for all inferences. In the case of valid inferences, 
however, this effect was significantiy less marked for the group with autism compared to 
controls. Pijnacker et al. claim, therefore, that the participants with autism exhibit a specific 
difficultiy with exception-handling resulting in a tendency not to rexase conclusions on valid 
inferences. 
The focus of this study was very different to ours. We were interested in the effect of 
background knowledge on everyday reasoning whereas Pijnacker et al. were interested in 
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logical reasoning performance. Anatysis of reasoning outcomes focused, therefore, on logically 
correct rather than endorsement responses. In the case of valid inferences, where 
endorsement and logical responses coincide, the group with autism showed less suppression 
of MP and MT where additional arguments were presented. For MP this difference was 
significant {p — 0.008) and for MT it was marginally significant ip = 0.058). Re-examination of 
the available data on endorsements for MP and MT. is shown in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 endorsement responses for valid inferences for the typical group and the group 
with autism. Graph derived from means taken from Pijnacker et al. 2009. 
Where additional arguments were presented, the typical group show customary suppression of 
both MP and MT inferences. In other words, where explicit information refers to background 
knowledge the tjpical group are less likely to endorse the inferences. In the case of the adults 
with autism the effect of background knowledge is significandy less marked. 
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For the invalid inferences AC and DA the logically correct response is one of uncertaint)', 
but there is a tendency for adults and particularly children to respond with certainty and 
endorse AC by responding ^es ' and DA by responding 'no'. The Pijnacker et al. study reports 
significant differences in endorsement responses for simple and alternative arguments on AC 
and DA for aU participants. What is more difficult to ascertain, is whether this suppression 
effect is significandy less marked in the case of the participants with autism. A re-examination 
of available data for patterns of endorsement across all participants on AC and DA would 
suggest that this is the case (see Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4 
endorsement responses for invalid inferences for the t}fpical group and the group with autism. 
Graph derived from means taken from Pijnacker et al. 2009. 
Overall the data from the Pijnacker et al. (2009) study presents similar findings to those of 
Experiment 4. The current results and those of Pijnacker et al. show that the presentation of 
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extra contextual information influences the reasoning of indi\'iduals with ASD to a lesser 
extent than t}^ical participants. The adults with ASD do appear, however, to show more 
influence of background knowledge on reasoning compared to adolescents with ASD. The 
findings of the two studies also differ, as Pijnacker et al. did not find an effect of alternative 
arguments on valid inferences. Given the age of the participants in the two studies, this 
finding would support the proposal that t)'pical adolescents are less able to inhibit irrelevant 
material compared to an adult population. 
Unlike high abilit}' participants who can, with effort, decontextualise their reasoning, the 
present results suggest that the reasoning of the adolescents with ASD is not contextualized in 
the first place. In our daily lives, reasoning on the basis of all relevant knowledge allows us to 
pursue our goals and deal flexibly with a range of situations (Evans, 2007). This normally 
adaptive process of contextualizing reasoning appears absent (or weak) in ASD populations. 
This view is consistent with the general treatment of contextualized thinking in the 
mainstream literature on autism. Tj^pically, within this literature, contextualized thinking is 
presented as an adaptive and inherent abilit}'^  to integrate relevant information in order to 
derive meaning. Incoming stimuli tend to be contextualized in order to derive a meaningful 
gist of the situation, often at the expense of surface details (Frith, 1989). However, individuals 
with ASD are presented as having either a tendenc}' not to integrate all available knowledge 
(e.g. Happe & Frith, 2006) or an inabilit}^ to do so (e.g. Just, Cherkassky, Keller & Minshew, 
2004) resulting in a lack of contexmalized processing. 
The next chapter explores possible processes underlying a tendency not to integrate 
information, relating to inner speech and working memor)'. Recent experimental findings 
suggest that indi\'iduals with ASD may differ from t}'pical populations in their use of inner 
speech in problem sohdng. There is some evidence that individuals with ASD make less use of 
inner speech compared to t}'pical groups when engaged in a number of problem solving tasks 
(Whitehouse, Maybery & Durkin, 2006; Maybery, Whitehouse, Durkin & Comerford, 2007). 
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At the same time theories about how disparate areas of the brain interact to integrate 
information focuses on the role of inner speech, as a means of combining and broadcasting 
information across distinct modules (Carruthers, 2002; 2009). Bringing together such work, 
results in the h)pothesis that a tendency not to use inner speech may be related to a lack of 
integration of information exhibited by individuals with ASD. The final studies of the thesis, 
outlined in Chapter 5, investigate this h}^othesis. 
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Chapter 5 
Introduction 
Chapters 3 and 4 indicate that individuals with ASD make less use of background knowledge 
in reasoning about the world, compared to typical controls. This proposal is supported by a 
number of previous studies (See Happe & Frith, 2006) which demonstrate that individuals 
with autism have a tendency not to process incoming stimuli in context. The assertion that 
individuals with autism tend not to integrate all available information is arguably descriptive. 
Previous work seeking to explain a lack of contextualised processing has focused largely on 
the tendency to rely on piecemeal rather than holistic processing (Frith 1989, 2003) and a 
number of neurological studies providing neuroimaging (e.g. Just et al, 2004) and anatomical 
evidence (e.g. Courchesne et al., 2001; Herbert et al., 2004) for a lack of connectivity between 
brain regions. Thinking st)4e in autism has been linked not only to enhanced attention to 
details and reduced central coherence, but also to a tendency to rely on visual rather than 
verbal processing (e.g. Koshino et al., 2004; Muller et al., 1999). Recendy evidence has also 
emerged that individuals with autism make less use of inner speech during problem solving 
(Whitehouse, Maybery & Durkin, 2006). 
Accounts of the integration of information within the reasoning literamre, present complex 
reasoning tasks as involving explicit thought processes which are limited by working memor}', 
and are realised in natural language sentences (Evans & Over, 1996; Frankish, 2004). Other 
accounts go beyond this, in proposing that language is the medium through which 
information is integrated (Carruthers, 2002; 2009). Alternative explanations for a lack of 
contextualised thinking stem from new models of working memory which propose reasoning 
to be dependent on a domain general sub-component of working memory, serving to bind 
information from different sources. This chapter will begin to explore, therefore, the 
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relationship between the integration of background knowledge in conditional reasoning, inner 
speech and working memorj'. A wider question deriving from the work presented here is 
whether reduced inner speech is related to a lack of integrative processing in autism. This 
work draws upon the reasoning literature, philosophical theories about language, and evidence 
relating to thought processes among individuals with ASD. 
Carruthers (2002; 2009) claims that natural language is the means by which information is 
integrated in the brain. Carruthers presents a model of the brain as being essentially modular. 
Input and output modules deal with specific domains such as early visual processing, face 
recognition or language. In addition, 'central' modules process concepmal information 
concerned with particular domains such as a naive physics or theor}' of mind. These central 
modules are not necessarily linked to particular neural locations, and are not encapsulated in 
the same sense as peripheral modules such as those processing early visual inputs. 
Carruthers draws on archaeological evidence (Mithen, 1996) in proposing that early 
hominids were not able to integrate diverse information from different domains. The 
appearance of language and conscious thought coincided with the modern abilit}' to join 
information across domains in thinking and reasoning about the world. Carruthers claims, 
therefore, that it is language itself which is the medium of non domain specific thinking. 
Language serv^es to integrate information from diverse domain specific modules, and results in 
the complexit}' of modem thought processes. 
Carruthers (2002) proposes that central conceptual modules take their input from 
perception, but that their output enters a non domain specific central 'arena'. This arena is 
manifested in the integration of central inputs through language. All domain general reasoning 
is realised through language, whether it is conscious or not. Carruthers borrows from 
Chomsky (1995) in suggesting that language in the central arena is realised in some kind of 
pre-conscious proto sentences or logical form. Reasoning may be in a rudimentary form, but 
once it is represented in sentences it becomes conscious. It is only language that can act to 
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combine the outputs of central modules; this is because it is both an input and an output 
module. Central modules provide inputs resulting in language production. Once language is 
produced and attended to, whether it is produced externally or internally, then comprehension 
processes act to broadcast outputs back to central modules, such as theor}f of mind. In this 
way a cyclical dynamic process effectively combines and recombines information across 
domains. Carruthers proposes a special relationship between language, theory of mind and 
conscious awareness. Consciousness occurs when language inputs become available to the 
theor)' of mind module, hence we are aware of our own inner speech. 
Carruthers (2002; 2009) is not claiming that we consciously combine information; in fact he 
claims that we have no conscious access to our own reasoning and decision making, and we 
interpret our own conscious thoughts in much the same way as we interpret the speech of 
others. If we consider the act of reasoning about a given statement, the statement is read and 
recoded into inner speech. According to Carruthers, comprehension processes then act to 
broadcast the statement to the central conceptual modules. The outputs of the central 
modules are combined in the central arena, through proto linguistic forms, resulting in 
sentences appearing in conscious awareness which relate to the question at hand. 
Carruthers is not suggesting, however, that all thought is in the form of inner speech. 
Thoughts can be visual in nature, but visual thinking relies upon a peripheral module which 
does not have both input and output capacit}'. Visual thoughts are not open to comprehension 
sub-processes in the same way that linguistic thoughts are. Visual thoughts cannot, therefore, 
serve to integrate information in the same way as inner speech. 
Firsthand accounts by people with autism suggest that they rely on visual thought patterns. 
Temple Grandin (1995), for example, explains her extraordinary capacit}^ for design as 
resulting from visual thinking. Grandin claims that she thinks in pictures and uses visualisation 
to work through problems and represent concepts. There is supporting experimental evidence 
that people with autism may be more reliant on visual rather than verbal processing. 
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Indixdduals with autism tend to show particularly good performance on visual search tasks and 
tasks requiring the analysis of \nsuo-spatial details, such as the block design assembly subtests 
of the Wechsler intelligence test (e.g. Tymchuck, Simmons & Neafsey, 1977). Neuroimaging 
studies (e.g. Koshino et al., 2005) also show unusual levels of activation during executive tasks, 
in areas associated with visual processing among participants with autism. T)^ical controls 
engaged in the same tasks show activation in areas associated with verbal processing. 
Individuals with autism also show greater activation in the right hemisphere and posterior 
brain regions, compared with controls, when engaged in a range of tasks. This pattern of 
activation has been taken to suggest a reliance on non-verbal processing (e.g. Koshino et al., 
2004; MuUeretal., 1999). 
A somewhat different approach to the role of language in cognition stems from the work 
of Vygotsk)^ Vygotsky claimed that inner speech developed from external speech. In young 
children thought is limited by its preverbal nature. Inner language transforms thought allowing 
for more complex mental functioning. Vygotsky claimed that the primary^ role of inner speech 
was cognitive self-regulation (Vygotsky, 1988). There are a number of studies which suggest 
that inner speech modulates executive function (e.g. Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Kray, Eber & 
Lindenberger, 2004; Baldo, Dronkers, Wilkins, Ludy, Raskin & Kim, 2005). There is also a 
growing body of evidence that children with autism make less use of inner speech on 
executive tasks. 
Whitehouse, Mayber}' and Durkin (2006) presented children with autism and t3'pical 
controls with three tasks known to implicate inner speech. Participants were given a verbal 
recall task presenting both pictures and words. T '^picaUy, pictures are easier to recall because 
they are encoded through both visual and verbal routes. The children with autism showed a 
lower superiority effect for pictures, compared to controls, suggesting that they did not 
employ additional verbal encoding. In a second experiment Whitehouse et al. presented an 
additional recall task where words with either one or many syllables were included. T)'pically, 
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shorter words are easier to recaU. This effect is known to be related to verbal coding. 
Participants were presented with verbal and visual representations of words. Where pictures 
are presented, the word length effect is associated with verbal recoding. The children with 
autism showed a smaller word length effect in the pictorial condition, compared with controls. 
Whitehouse et al. claim that both of these experiments suggest a reduced use of inner speech 
in the group with autism, compared to controls. In a final experiment the children were given 
a measure of task switching, known to be contingent upon inner speech. Participants were 
also required to carr)^ out a concurrent task designed to suppress inner speech. Articulator}^ 
suppression only affected the t}'pical control group. In this case, therefore, the children with 
autism were not hindered by the secondary' task, and demonstrated better task performance 
compared to controls. This suggests that the group with autism were employing an effective 
but at}'pical processing strateg}' which did not rely upon inner speech. 
Russell, J arrold and Hood (1999) found intact executive performance in children with 
autism on tasks which were not dependent on inner speech. They claim that these findings 
support the view that children with autism tend not to encode rules verbally. As a result, they 
perform poorly on tasks which require the holding of self-instructional information in 
working memory, such as arbitrar}' rule-based executive tasks. On the other hand, the tying up 
of inner speech will have less effect on children with ASD, compared with typically 
developing children, on executive tasks which can be approached with non-verbal processing. 
Russell et al. claim, therefore, that inner speech plays an important role in self-regulation on 
tasks requiring working memory, the capacit}' to hold information in mind while performing 
another mental operation. This proposal is supported by Joseph, McGrath and Tager-Flusberg 
(2005). This study explored the relationship between language and a number of executive tasks 
among children with autism. Children with autism were shown to perform poorly on a 
number of executive tasks, but showed comparable performance to controls where verbal 
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responding alleviated the need for rehearsal in inner speech. They concluded that performance 
was related to a lack of verbal self-regulation. 
The experiments presented in this chapter aim to investigate whether suppressing inner 
speech impairs the ability to integrate information in conditional reasoning. The suppression 
of inner speech has not been shown to affect performance on conditional reasoning problems 
with arbitrarily related content. There are, however, no previous studies which explore the 
effect of articulator)' suppression on the use of background knowledge in ever)'day conditional 
reasoning. Evans and Brooks (1981) presented participants with simple conditional reasoning 
problems where the content expressed arbitrar)' relationships between colours and shapes, as 
in the following example: 
Premises: If it is a circle, then it is red 
It is a circle 
Conclusion: It is red 
Participants were given simple concurrent articulator)' load (saying the numbers 1 -6 
repeatedly) or articulator)' load with a working memor)' component (recalling and repeating a 
different sequence of the numbers 1-6 for each trial). Evans and Brooks found articulator)' 
load did not affect reasoning performance, either with or without additional memor)' load. 
They did find a latency effect, however. Reasoning under secondar)' articulation resulted in 
faster response times than reasoning with no secondar)' load. However, this study has been 
criticised for using a beuveen subjects design. A subsequent study (Toms, Morris & Ward, 
1993) repeated the tasks used by Evans and Brooks with a within subjects design. They found 
that although secondary articulation had no effect on reasoning outcomes, articulation with 
memor)' load had a detrimental effect particularly on Modus ToUens (MT). MT ('if p then q, q 
is false' it follows that 'p is false.') is generally accepted to be a difficult inference to draw, 
involving the processing of negatives. 
I l l 
The main focus of the studies by Evans and Brooks (1981) and Toms et al. (1993) is the 
role of working memory' in conditional reasoning. The dominant model of working memory 
referred to in these studies is that of Baddeley (Baddeley & Hitch,1974; Baddeley, 1986). 
Baddeley's influential model proposes that working memor)'^ is made up of a central processor 
or executive which acts in conjunction with slave systems providing temporar)' storage of 
information. A visuo-spatial scratchpad stores limited amounts of visuo-spatial information in 
the form of images, and an articulator}' loop acts as a temporarj' store for speech information. 
Spatial and verbal working memor}' are dissociable in terms of their respective storage 
mechanisms. The question of whether the central executive can be compartmentalised into 
spatial and verbal processing is more controversial, although there is evidence for dissociations 
between central executive spatial and verbal processing in both children (Jarvis & Gathercole, 
2003) and adults Qurden, 1995; Shah & Miyake, 1996). 
Working memor}' has been implicated in the integration of information through a specific 
domain general sub-component of the central executive. Recent studies of the namre of 
working memor}' have proposed the integration or binding of information from disparate 
sources as a key function of the central executive (Wheeler & Treisman, 2002; Oberauer, SiiB, 
Wilhelm & Sander, 2007). This binding function has also been specifically linked to the 
integration of information in reasoning (Halford, Cowan & Andrews, 2007). Baddeley himself 
has also proposed a new component of the central executive, the episodic buffer (e.g. 
Baddeley, 2007), which deals specifically with the integration of information across domains. 
The episodic buffer is presented as a temporary store which is able to integrate information 
from multiple sources. It is controlled by the central executive which can retrieve information 
from it in the form of conscious thought or awareness. This information can be further 
manipulated by the central executive. 
Carruthers (1998) does make reference to working memory, and has made parallels 
between his own model of cognition and Baddeley's model of working memor}'. He points 
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out that the integrative capacit}'^  of linguistic thought would best be equated with the central 
executive and the phonological loop, although he would attribute additional functions to the 
phonological loop, in providing access to our own thoughts and hence allowing for recursive 
processing. More recentiy Carruthers (2006; 2009) has also linked his model to dual process 
accounts where the working memor)' dependent System 2 is associated with an explicit, 
conscious reasoning capacit}' invohdng natural language. 
It seems reasonable to assume that tasks which suppress inner speech would be likely to 
interfere with Carruthers linguistic integration model. What is less clear, however, is whether 
interference would result from articulatory suppression alone or whether some involvement of 
executive processing would be necessar}^ to suppress the integration of information during 
reasoning. Experiment 5 will, therefore, focus on the use of a secondary' articulator)^ task 
during conditional reasoning where background knowledge is manipulated. This wiU be 
extended in Experiment 6 to include a secondar}'^ articulator}^ load with additional working 
memor)' demands. 
Given the results of Experiment 1, an observable effect of background knowledge among 
adolescents with ASD would not be expected. Since it is also the case that litde is known 
about the relationship between inner speech and contextualsed reasoning in t)^ical 
populations, the experiments presented here focus on a t^'pical adult population. It is well 
established that tjpical adult populations are influenced by background knowledge during 
conditional reasoning. 
Although participants with ASD were not included in Experiments 5 and 6, aU participants 
were given the Autism Quotient (AQ) Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
Martin & Clubley, 2001). The AQ is a relatively new instrument designed to measure autistic 
traits among adults with normal intelligence. Since it has been postulated that autism 
represents the extreme of a continuum (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997), people within the 
typical population can have more or less autistic traits reflecting their position on that 
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continuum. The AQ has also been shown to be a useful screening tool for ASD in identif)'ing 
individuals who are candidates for full diagnostic assessment (Woodbur)'-Smith, Robinson, 
Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 2005). The questionnaire is made up of 50 questions assessing 5 
areas; social skill, attention switching, attention to detail, communication and imagination (See 
Appendix A5). These subcategories reflect the triad of symptoms in autism (APA 1994) and 
known cognitive impairments in autism. High autistic traits are associated with poor social 
skills, poor communicative skills, exceptional attention to local details, poor attention 
switching or a strong focus of attention and poor imagination. Each question is in a forced-
choice format. Participants must respond by circling 'Definitely agree', 'Slightiy agree', 'Slightly 
disagree' or 'Definitely disagree'. Questions are scored according to numbers of agree or 
disagree responses. Participants score one point for each response reflecting autistic 
tendencies. 
Although adults within the tjpical population are known to be influenced by knowledge 
and belief in conditional reasoning, the results of Experiments 1 and 4 suggest that people 
with high autistic traits may be less influenced by background knowledge compared to those 
with low traits. Use of the AQ allows for the investigation of the relationship between autistic 
traits and the influence of counterexamples, including the contributions of specific categories 
of traits to reasoning outcomes. 
As individuals with autism show less reliance on inner speech, compared to the typical 
population, it is plausible that people with high autistic traits make less use of inner speech 
during reasoning. Individuals with high traits may be more dependent on alternative reasoning 
strategies involving, for example, visual simulation of the presented scenarios or probabilistic 
judgements not based on explicit counterexample cases. As a result, high trait participants may 
be less affected by the suppression of inner speech compared to low trait participants. 
In Experiment 5, participants were presented with two conditional reasoning tasks one 
with a concurrent articulator}' suppression task and one with a simple tapping task. All 
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participants were also given a working memor}' task and the AQ questionnaire. In Experiment 
6 all participants were given the same two reasoning tasks as in Experiment 5. One group was 
given the secondar)' articulator}' and tapping tasks as in the previous experiment. The other 
group received more complex articulator}' and tapping tasks designed to burden working 
memor}'. Once again all participants were also given a working memor}' task and the AQ 
questionnaire. In line with the findings of Experiments 1 and 4, it was predicted that 
participants with high traits would show less influence of counterexamples compared to those 
with low traits. It was also predicted that participants would show less influence of 
counterexamples under articulator}' load compared to tapping and this would be more marked 
where working memor}' was also burdened. Suppressing inner speech was also expected to 
have less influence on the contextualization of reasoning for those participants with high 
autistic traits. 
Experiment 5 
The purpose of Experiment 5 was to investigate whether suppressing inner speech would lead 
to less integration of background knowledge during ever}'day conditional reasoning. The 
relationship between working memor}' capacit}', AQ and reasoning outcomes was also 
explored. 
Method 
Participants 
47 adults took part in the study. The sample included 25 females and 22 males. Participants 
were recruited through the Universit}' of Plymouth participant pool on a paid volunteer basis. 
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Materials and procedure 
All participants were given a conditional reasoning task with a secondar)^ articulatory load, and 
a conditional reasoning task with a simple tapping load. Participants were also given the 
autism quotient questionnaire (AQ) designed to measure autistic tendencies (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001) and a measure of working memor)' based on that developed by Case, Kurland and 
Goldberg (1982) known as 'The Counting Span Task'. This task incorporates a processing 
component (counting) and a storage component (remember the number of dots counted) and 
increases in difficult}' over time. 
There were two question sets in the reasoning task. AH of the questions had been used 
previously in Experiment 1. Each question set presented 16 MP and 16 AC arguments largely 
drawn from Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis and Rist (1991). Half of the questions in each set were 
known to have high levels of available background knowledge in the form of 
counterexamples, and half were known to have low levels of available counterexamples. The 
questions were presented on a computer. Participants were presented with brief instructions as 
follows: 
In this task you mil he shown some statements. After each statement there will be a fact and a 
conclusion. Given the statement and the fact, you need to make a decision about whether the conclusion 
follows. 
All questions were presented as a statement, an invitation to suppose a fact, and a question 
about what follows: 
If the ignition key is turned, then the car will start 
Suppose that the ignition key is turned, 
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Does it follow that the car will starts 
Participants were required to respond by pressing one of two buttons, labelled "YES, 
definitely' and 'NO, not necessarily.' 
AH participants completed both question sets presented in a random order. In the 
articulator}' condition participants were asked to answer the reasoning questions whilst saying 
the words 'Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday' repeatedly, in time to a metronome. 
The metronome was set at set at 140 beats per minute, corresponding approximately to the 
average number of words articulated per minute in namral speech (e.g. Hargie and Dickson, 
2003). Since response times were recorded, it was decided to present a control condition 
which also included a secondar}' task component with a minimal cognitive load. A simple 
tapping task was chosen, as previous studies have demonstrated that simple tapping load does 
not affect conditional reasoning performance (Toms, Morris & Ward, 1993). The simple 
tapping task required repetitive tapping of 5 keys with one finger, at the same rate as the 
articulatory task. Reasoning outcomes and response times were recorded for both tasks. All 
participants were given the AQ questionnaire prior to the experiment, and articulator}' and 
tapping conditions were counterbalanced across participants. 
Results 
The scores on the AQ questionnaire ranged from 9-36 with a mean score of 18.30. Baron-
Cohen et al.(2004) report an average of 16.4 with 80% of individuals with ASD scoring 32 or 
above. 2 individuals scored above the 32 point cut off. Means, range and standard deviations 
for each of the AQ subcategories are shown in Table 5.1 
For the purposes of analysis a median split was performed on the AQ scores resulting in 
two groups with high and low autistic traits. The scores on the working memory task were 
117 
high with 51% of participants having the maximum span score. This possible ceiling effect 
su^ests that the processing element included in the task may not have been sufficientiy 
challenging for this population. These scores were similarly split with the high working 
memor}' group being at ceiling on working memor)' span. 
Table 5.1 Means, range and standard deviations for each subcategor}' of the AQ 
Subcategor)' Range Mean SD 
Social skills 0^9 Z68 Z28 
Attention switching 0-8 4.23 1.81 
Attention to detail 1-10 5.83 2.33 
Communication 0-8 3.00 1.96 
Imagination 0-7 2.51 1.80 
Mean endorsement responses for the reasoning task with high vs low available disablers on 
MP and high vs low available alternatives on AC under articulation and tapping are shown in 
Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Mean endorsements made by low/high AQ groups for MP and AC varjdng in 
availability^ of counterexamples under articulatory and tapping load in Experiment 5. 
MP AC 
Low disablers High disablers Low alternatives High alternatives 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
LowAQ 
High AQ 
Total 
Articulation 
Tapping 
Articulation 
Tapping 
Artictilation 
Tapping 
3.29 
3.29 
3.17 
3.35 
3.23 
3.32 
0.95 
0.91 
0.89 
1.03 
0.91 
0.96 
2.46 
2.71 
2.61 
2.65 
2.53 
2.68 
1.67 
1.55 
1.64 
1.47 
1.64 
1.49 
2.70 
2.79 
2.30 
2.70 
2.51 
2.74 
1.49 
1.35 
1.55 
1.55 
1.52 
1.44 
1.08 
1.38 
1.09 
1.13 
1.09 
1.26 
1.35 
1.31 
1.31 
1.46 
1.32 
1.37 
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A 2x availabilit)' of disabling conditions (high vs low), 2x secondar)' condition (articulation vs 
tapping) analysis of variance was carried out on the MP responses. High and low autistic traits 
were entered as a between subjects factor. Working memor)' groups were also added as a 
between subjects factor. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of the availabilit}' of 
disabling conditions (F(l,43) = 21.85, MSE = 1.19, p < .001, r|"p= .30) such that participants 
were more likely to deny the MP inference where there were high numbers of available 
disabling conditions. There was no significant effect of condition (F(l,43) = 1.29, AdSE = 
0.59, p =.26, r|%= .03), such that reasoning outcomes did not significandy differ under 
articulator}' compared to tapping load. There were no significant interactions with AQ 
suggesting that broad AQ traits were unrelated to reasoning outcomes. There were also no 
significant interactions with working memor}', showing that high and low span groups did not 
significandy differ in the use of background knowledge during reasoning. 
A 2x availabilit}' of alternative antecedents (high vs low), 2x secondar}' condition 
(articulation vs tapping) analysis of variance was carried out on the AC responses. Once again 
working memor}' and AQ were entered as between subjects factors. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of the avaUabilit}' of alternative antecedents (F(l,43) = 87.98, MSE = 
1.12, p < .001, r|^ p = .67) such that participants were more likely to deny the AC inference 
where there were high numbers of available alternatives. There was no significant effect of 
condition (F(l,43) = 2.78, MSE =0 .70, p= .10, rfp= .06), such that reasoning outcomes did 
not significandy differ under articulator}' compared to tapping load. Once again there was also 
no significant interactions with working memor}' or AQ. 
The influence of specific autistic traits was explored in more detail through correlation 
analysis. A measure of the effect of counterexamples was derived by calculating the difference 
between numbers of endorsements when few and many counterexamples were available. This 
measure was correlated with scores for each of the AQ subcategories. Analysis revealed a 
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significant negative correlation between attention to detail and the effect of counterexamples 
across all conditions r{47) = -0.30,^ —.04. There were no other significant correlations. 
High attention to detail is associated with high autistic traits. Participants were identified as 
having either high or low attention to detail on the basis of the median score, t tests revealed 
significant differences between participants with high and low attention to detail on the effect 
of counterexamples measure. This was the case for both MP (/(45) = 2.\\ p = .04) and AC 
(/(45) — 2.05 p = .05). Participants with high attention to detail were less influenced by 
counterexamples on both t3'pes of inference, as shown in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 The effect of counterexamples across all conditions for low and high attention to 
detail groups. 
Further analysis was carried out on the response times for the reasoning questions. 
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Response times for MP and AC inferences are shown in Table 5.3. An analysis of variance was 
performed on the response times for all inferences, 2x inference t}pe (MP vs. AC) 2x 
condition (articulation vs. tapping) with autistic trait groups as a between subjects factor. 
Analysis revealed a main effect of condition (F(l,45) = 28.23, MSE = 30.13, p <.001, ri"p = 
.39) such that response times were significantiy higher for tapping compared to articulator}' 
secondary' loads. A significant interaction was also revealed between inference tjpe and 
condition (F(l,45) = 4.09, MSE = 14.03, p - .05, r|-p= .08) such that the difference between 
response times for articulation and tapping was more marked for MP. There was also a 
significant two-way interaction between condition and autistic traits (F(l,45) = 5.94, MSE — 
30.13, ;> = .02, T P = . 1 2 ) . 
Table 5.3 Mean response times in milliseconds for MP and AC inferences under tapping and 
articulator)' secondary load for Experiment 5. 
Articulation 
Tapping 
Mean RT (ms) 
7313 
12627 
MP 
SD 
4759 
9861 
Mean RT (ms) 
7936 
11050 
AC 
SD 
4993 
7948 
Follow up t tests revealed that the difference in response times between tapping and 
articulation was significant for groups with both high autistic traits (/(23) = 3.37/) = .003) and 
with low autistic traits (/(22) = 4.22/) = <.001). The difference between tapping and 
articulation response times was also significantiy greater for those with the lowest autistic 
tendencies compared to those with high autistic tendencies (/(45) = 2.06/) = .05) Mean 
response times across all inferences under articulation were 7737ms (SD=5014) for low AQ 
participants and 7518ms (SD=399l) for high AQ participants. Mean response times across all 
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inferences under tapping were 13944ms (SD—7051) for the low AQ group and 9821ms 
(SD=4356) for the high AQ group (see Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2 Mean response times for aU inferences under articulation and tapping load for 
groups with high and low autistic traits in Experiment 5. 
Discussion 
Articulatory secondar}' load was not found to affect reasoning outcomes in Experimment 5, 
for either MP or AC inferences. Where disabling conditions and alternative antecedents were 
available, participants were influenced by background knowledge and showed the typical 
pattern of responding. Disabling conditions acted to increase the tendency to deny the MP 
inference, and alternatives acted to reduce endorsements of AC. This was found to be the case 
under secondar}' articulator}' load and simple tapping. These results are in line with previous 
studies of conditional reasoning with arbitrarily related material. (Evans & Brooks, 1981; 
Toms et al. 1993). This finding suggests that the integration of background knowledge with 
presented material is not affected by articulatory suppression. 
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The prediction that the influence of background knowledge on reasoning outcomes would 
be related to AQ scores was not supported. The effect of counterexamples on reasoning was 
found to be significantiy related, however, to the attention to detail subcategory' of AQ. 
Those participants with high attention to detail showed less influence of counterexamples 
compared to those with low attention to detail. Attention to detail is also referred to as 
attention to local details (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and is taken here to reflect weak central 
coherence in autism. Previous studies also show that the AQ attention to detail subcategor)' is 
significandy correlated with measures of weak central coherence, including local processing 
tasks such as the Embedded Figures task (Grinter, Van Beek, Maybery & Badcock, 2008) and 
global processing tasks such as context effects on speech perception (Hui-Chun & Ota, 2007). 
Attention to detail questions can, therefore, be seen to assess the degree to which a person is a 
local or a global processor. As weak central coherence accounts would predict, a local 
processing style is associated with less integration of background knowledge during reasoning. 
These results hence support the findings of Experiments 1 and 4 which show that individuals 
with autism tend not to integrate all available knowledge during reasoning. 
Although reasoning outcomes were unaffected by articulatory suppression, response times 
were significand)' longer for simple tapping compared to articulation. This finding is 
interesting in the light of the work of Evans and Brooks (1981) who found that reasoning 
under secondar)' articulation resulted in faster response times than reasoning with no 
secondary load. Neither the Evans and Brooks study nor the work presented here show that 
response times under articulation are related to any deficit in performance. The present data 
differ somewhat from that of Evans and Brooks, as a measure of autistic traits was included. 
For groups with low and high autistic traits the response times do not differ for articulatory 
load. It is rather the case that both groups take longer to respond under simple tapping, and 
that this effect is significandy more marked in the individuals with low autistic traits. It is 
possible that simple tapping slows participants down, although this is unlikely given that 
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previous studies show no effect of simple tapping on condtional reasoning performance or 
latencies (Toms et al. 1993). It is perhaps more likely, that where participants are free to 
engage in inner speech, in the simple condition, they spend longer reflecting on the problem. 
Hence reflection appears to spontaneously take place, but thinking about the problem does 
not ultimately influence reasoning outcomes. There is evidence that introspection does not 
include consideration of underlying reasoning processes (e.g. Evans, 1996) and that people's 
reports of their inner trains of thought during reasoning actually reflect confabulations (Evans, 
1989; Wason & Evans, 1975; Carruthers, 2008). The reported findings support this account, as 
inner speech appears to be peripheral to the actual reasoning taking place. 
The difference in response times between articulation and simple tapping is more marked 
among those participants with low autistic traits. This implies that those with higher autistic 
traits spend less time spontaneously thinking about reasoning problems. This finding raises 
the possibility that a reduced reliance on inner speech may be related to autistic traits, shared 
by those diagnosed with ASD and members of the general population. 
Overall, these findings suggest that the production of inner speech alone is not related to 
the integration of information in reasoning. It may be, however, that integrative processes 
make use of central working memory components. In the previous study by Toms et al. 
(1993), although secondar}^ articulation was not found to influence reasoning performance, 
articulation with a working memory load had a detrimental effect, specifically on MT. 
Working memor}' has also been implicated in conditional reasoning with ever}'day content. 
De Neys, Schaeken and d'Ydewalle (2005) investigated the effect on everyday conditional 
inference of a secondary complex tapping task with a working memory component. For low 
working memor)f span participants, the concurrent task led to less integration of background 
knowledge for all inferences. For those with high working memor}', this effect was specific to 
invalid inferences. Verschueren, Schaeken and d'Ydewalle (2005) presented participants with a 
think aloud conditional reasoning task under working memorj' preload. Participants had to 
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memorize dot patterns, and hold these in mind during the reasoning task. Analysis of the 
answers given revealed that working memor}^ preload decreased reliance on counterexample 
information. Working memor}^ preload also increased acceptance of all inferences, even where 
there were large numbers of available counterexamples. Verschueren et al. claim that preload 
can, in some cases, result in a disregard for all background knowledge and reliance on a simple 
matching heuristic. 
Previous studies suggest that working memor}' load may affect reasoning performance 
whether that load has an articulator}^ element or not. These studies differed from the design 
presented here, however, as the Toms et al. (1993) study used arbitrarj' material where the 
integration of background knolwledge was not relevant for task performance. The 
Verschueren et al. (2005) study employed a preload, rather than secondar}' load task, and both 
this study and that of DeNeys et al (2005) employed a spatial working memor}' task load. The 
possibiUt)' that a working memor}' load would affect the integration of background 
information in conditional reasoning was explored in Experiment 6. Any effect was further 
defined by including both spatial and articulator};^ secondar}' working memor}' loads. 
Experiment 6 
The purpose of Experiment 6 was to investigate the effect of working memor}' load on 
reasoning outcomes. Experiment 6 also allowed for comparison of reasoning performance 
under simple and complex loads with verbal or spatial content. 
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Method 
Participants 
The participants for Experiment 6 were 87 undergraduate students from the Universit}' of 
Plymouth. Participants were enrolled on a points as reward system. There were 56 female and 
31 male participants. 
Materials and procedure 
Half of the participants were given a conditional reasoning task with a secondar}' simple 
articulator}' load and a conditional reasoning task with a simple tapping load, as presented in 
Experiment 5. The other half of the participants were given the same two reasoning tasks. 
One reasoning task was presented with a concurrent complex articulation task, and the other 
was presented with a complex tapping task. In the complex articulation task participants were 
presented with the words "Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday' on a computer 
screen. The words appeared in a mixed up order before each reasoning trial. Participants were 
required to repeat the words in the given order, then press a continue button. They had to 
remember the order of the words, and repeat the words in that order for the duration of the 
trial until a new sequence of the words appeared. Participants were instructed to say the words 
in time to a metronome set at 140 beats per minute. 
In the complex tapping task a different sequence of 5 keys lit up on a 3x3 button box before 
each reasoning trial. The keys staj'ed lit up during the first sequence tapped by the participants. 
They were required to remember the sequence and continue tapping for the duration of the 
reasoning trial. Participants were instructed to tap the keys in time to a metronome, set, once 
again, at 140 beats per minute. 
Participants were also given the AQ questionnaire used in Experiment 5. AH participants 
completed the AQ questionnaire prior to the other experimental tasks. Since many 
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participants seemed to be at ceiling on the Counting Span task used in Experiment 5, an 
alternative working memor}^ measure was employed, the operation span (OSPAN) (Turner & 
Engle, 1989). This version of the OSPAN was presented on a computer and participants had 
to maintain words for later recall while solving arithmetic problems. Reasoning and working 
memor)' tasks, as well as articulator}' and tapping conditions, were counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Results 
The scores on the AQ questionnaire ranged from 5-26 with a mean score of 14.12. Means, 
standard deviation and range for each of the AQ subcategories are shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Means, range and standard deviations for each subcategor)' of the AQ for 
participants in simple and complex conditions. 
Simple condition 
Complex condition 
Subcategory' 
Social skills 
Attention switching 
Attention to detail 
Communication 
Imagination 
Social sldlls 
Attention switching 
Attention to detail 
Communication 
Imagination 
Range 
0-5 
1-9 
0-8 
0-4 
0-6 
0-5 
1-8 
0-9 
0-7 
0-7 
Mean 
1.09 
4.50 
4.66 
2.09 
1.98 
1.41 
4.42 
4.49 
2.21 
1.67 
SD 
1.16 
1.58 
2.14 
1.39 
1.36 
1.33 
1.72 
2.15 
1.66 
1.41 
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Mean endorsements for the simple and complex conditions under articulation and tapping are 
shown in Table 5.5. 
A 2x availabilit}' of disablers, 2 x condition (articulation/tapping) analysis of variance was 
performed on the MP data with type of load (simple/complex) as a between subjects factor. 
Analysis revealed a main effect of the avaiiabiUt)'^  of disabling conditions (F(l,85) = 35.91, 
AdSE = 0.55, p <.001, r|~p= .30) Such that there was a general effect of disablers on 
reasoning performance regardless of load (see Figure 5.3). Participants with low and high AQ 
and working memor}' scores were identified on the basis of the median. No significant effects 
or interactions were revealed when working memory and autistic traits were entered as 
between subjects factors. 
Table 5.5 Mean endorsements for MP and AC var)'ing in availability' of counterexamples 
under simple and complex articulator}' and tapping load in Experiment 6. 
MP AC 
Disabling conditions Alternative antecedents 
Low High Low High 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Simple 
condition 
Complex 
condition 
Articulation 
Tapping 
Articulation 
Tapping 
3.65 
3.40 
3.39 
3.52 
0.65 
1.03 
0.89 
0.70 
3.05 
3.00 
2.84 
3.16 
1.23 
1.27 
1.36 
1.05 
3.05 
3.33 
3.00 
3.16 
0.97 
1.27 
1.28 
1.24 
1.53 
1.40 
1.82 
L91 
1.49 
1.38 
1.57 
1.55 
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Figure 5.3 Mean endorsements for MP with low and high available disabling conditions 
under simple and complex articulatoty and tapping loads in Experiment 6. 
Further analysis was carried out on the reasoning responses to AC questions. A 2x 
availability of alternatives (low/high), 2x condition (articulation/tapping) analysis of variance 
was performed with t}'pe of load (simple/complex) as a between subjects factor. A significant 
main effect of availability of alternatives (F(l,85) = 143.83, MS'E = 1.30, p <.001, 'n^p= .63) 
was revealed and a significant interaction between the availability of alternatives and load 
(simple V complex) (F(l,85) = 4.25, MSE = 1.30, p = 04, T]-,, = .05) such that the effect of 
background knowledge on reasoning outcomes was reduced under complex load (see Figure 
5.4). No significant effects or interactions with autistic traits or working memoty span were 
revealed when entered as between subjects factors. 
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Figure 5.4 Mean endorsements of AC with low and high available alternatives under simple 
and complex articulator}' or tapping load in Experiment 6. 
A measure of the influence of counterexamples was created by calculating the difference 
between numbers of endorsements when few and many counterexamples were available. The 
effect of counterexamples measure was correlated with scores for each of the AQ 
subcategories. Analysis revealed no significant correlations for the participants in the simple 
condition. There was a significant negative correlation, however, between attention to detail 
and the effect of counterexamples in the complex condition r(47) = -0.26,p =.05. Since the 
complex task was designed to load working memor}', a moderated regression analysis was 
performed to explore the contributions of both working memor)' and attention to detail on 
the effect of counterexamples. Moderated regression added something to the initial 
correlational analysis here as, unlike Experiment 5, there were two distinct predictors. The 
regression analysis allowed for the examination of interaction between these predictors as 
continuous variables. The results are summarised in Table 5.6. 
130 
Table 5.6 Summar)' of Moderated Regression analysis for variables predicting the effect of 
counterexamples on reasoning outcomes 
Predictors B SEB p 
Attention to detail -.134 .052 -.375* 
Working Memor)' .001 .011 .012 
Attention to detail x Working Memor}' -.014 .005 -.428" 
Note R^ =.24. Attention to detail and Working Memory were centered at their means. 
*p < .OS **p < .01. 
Analysis indicated a moderating influence of working memory on attention to detail, as a 
predictor of the effect of counterexamples. The fact that the beta coefficient is negative 
demonstrates that among this group, high attention to detail is associated with low influence 
of counterexamples. The beta coefficient for the linear regression between attention to detail 
and endorsements also indicates an independent influence of attention to detail on 
performance (See Table 5.6) Means for the influence of counterexamples in the complex 
condition, for groups with low vs high working memory and low vs high attention to detail are 
shown in Table 5.7. 
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Table 5.7 Means and standard deviations for the influence of counterexamples in the 
complex condition, for low/high working memor};^  and low/high attention to detail 
Working memor}' capacit}' 
low 
high 
AQ Attention 
low 
high 
low 
high 
to detail Mean 
0.92 
0.56 
1.55 
0.63 
SD 
0.88 
0.73 
0.74 
0.53 
Additional analysis was carried out on the response times for all inferences. A 2x inference 
tjpe (MP/AC) 2x avilabilit)' of counterexamples (low/high) 2x condition 
(articulation/tapping) analysis of variance was carried out with t}^e of load (simple/complex) 
as a between subjects factor. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of t}'pe of load 
(F(l,85) = 4.10, MS'E - 44.22, p =.05, fy^ = .05) such that response times were longer for 
complex load oompared to simple load. No significant effects were found when working 
memor}' and AQ were entered as between subjects factors. 
Further analysis was carried out on the response time data from the simple condition alone, 
in order to establish whether the findings from Experiment 5 were replicated. A 2x inference 
Vfpe (MP vs. AC) 2x condition (articulation vs. tapping) analysis of variance was performed 
with autistic trait groups as a between subjects factor. Analysis revealed a main effect of 
condition approaching significance (F(l,42) = 3.24, M.S'£ = 12.66, p = .08, •r|"p= .07) such 
that response times were higher for tapping compared with articulatory secondar}' loads. 
There was also a main effect of AQ (F(l,42) = 5.80, MSE = 9.89, p = .02, Ti-p = .12) such 
that response times were longer overall for participants with low autistic traits. 
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Discussion 
In Experiment 6, participants were less influenced by counterexamples under working 
memor}f load. This effect was particular to the invalid inference AC. For the valid inference 
MP, working memor}' load did not significandy reduce the influence of background 
knowledge on reasoning responses. This pattern of results is partiy in Une with those of 
DeNeys et al. (2005) who found that a complex spatial load lessened the influence of 
counterexamples on AC for all participants, but increased the the effect of counterexamples 
on MP for those with ver}'^  high working memor)' capacity'. DeNeys et al suggest that this 
finding is related to the ability of high working memor}' participants to inhibit disabling 
conditions where they are not deemed relevant. Working memor}' load is taken to interfere 
with this inhibitor}' process. 
The effect of working memor}' load on AC was found across both articulatory and spatial 
secondar}' tasks. This suggests that the integration of background knowledge is related to 
domain general working memor}' processes and is not specifically related to inner speech. 
As in Experiment 5, in the simple condition participants with low AQ scores spent longer 
thinking about the reasoning problems. In Experiment 6 this appeared to be the case 
regardless of t}'pe of load. In both Experiment 5 and the simple condition of Experiment 6 
longer latencies were not related to reasoning performance. 
In the complex condition, attention to detail predicted the degree to which participants were 
influenced by background knowledge. This relationship was moderated by working memor}' 
capacity. As in Experiment 5, piecemeal processing was associated with less influence of 
background knowledge on reasoning. 
In Experiment 6 the mean AQ score was lower than in Experiment 5 and there were no 
participants who exceeded the 32 point cut off for ASD. In fact, the highest AQ score in the 
simple condition was only 23. As shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.4, maximum scores on the 
subcategory attention to detail were also lower in Experiment 6 compared to Experiment 5. 
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The fact that the influence of counterexamples was related to attention to detaO in Experiment 
5, but not in the simple condition of Experiment 6 may reflect a lack of high AQ scorers in 
Experiment 6. 
General Discussion 
The results of Experiment 5 showed that the influence of background knowledge on 
reasoning was unaffected by the suppression of inner speech, on both valid and invalid 
inferences. Response times in both experiments were found to be longer under simple tapping 
compared to a articulation. In Experiment 5, this finding was specific to those participants 
with low autistic traits. This result was partly replicated in Experiment 6 where participants 
with low autistic traits showed longer latencies overall. Experiment 6 showed that working 
memory load lessened the effect of background knowledge on reasoning outcomes, this effect 
was particular to invalid inferences. Further results showed that the effect of working memor}' 
load was significant across both spatial and articulator}' complex load. Response times were 
also shown to increase under complex load compared to simple load. In Experiment 5 and the 
complex condition in Experiment 6 there was a significant inverse relationship between the 
AQ subcategor}', attention to detail, and the influence of background knowledge on reasoning. 
In Experiment 6 this relationship was moderated by working memor)'. This finding was not 
replicated in the simple condition of Experiment 6, although mean scores for attention to 
detail were lower among this group, with maximum scores being well below the 32 point cut 
off for ASD. 
Overall the findings presented here do not support Carruther's (2002; 2009) claim that the 
integration of information in cognition is dependent upon inner speech. The results of 
Experiment 5 and 6 showed that reasoning response times varied for articulatory and simple 
tapping load. Response times were longer under tapping compared to articulation. This 
difference in latency was not related to reasoning outcomes. These findings suggest that the 
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processes involved in everj'day conditional reasoning are not dependent on the use of inner 
speech. Under the simple control condition participants were free to spend time thinking 
about the problem. This was not the case in the articulator}' condition, where inner speech 
was surpressed. Hence inner speech appears to spontaneously occur, but additional thinking 
time does not impact on reasoning performance. There is additional evidence that thinking 
about a problem does not reflect underlying reasoning processes (e.g. Evans, 1996). It has, 
therefore, been proposed that thinking during conditional reasoning is involved with the 
justification of choices made, and ser\'es no purpose within the reasoning process itself 
(Evans, 1996; 1989; Wason & Evans, 1975). The findings presented here add additional 
evidence to the claim that inner speech during conditional reasoning reflects confabulation. 
The results of Experiments 5 and 6 suggest that thinking style may have some bearing on 
the use of inner speech during reasoning. In Experiment 5, those participants who had low 
autistic traits spent more time thinking about the problem where they were free to do so. 
Those who had higher autistic traits showed no significant difference, however, in the times 
taken to respond to reasoning questions, whether inner speech was suppressed or not. This 
finding was partiy replicated in Experiment 6 where low AQ scores were associated with 
longer latencies overaU. These findings add support to previous studies which show that 
individuals with autism make less use of inner speech in a number of problem solving tasks 
(e.g. Whitehouse et al., 2006) and also extends these findings to the wider population. 
Experiment 5 and Experiment 6 indicate that the integration of background knowledge 
during reasoning is related to the attention to detail subcategor}' of the AQ. High AQ scores 
are known to be related to poor performance on tasks requiring the integration of information 
for higher meaning, such as combining visual information into coherent wholes (Grinter, 
Maybery, Van Beek, Pellicano, Badcock & Badcock, 2009). The subcategor}', attention to 
detail, is also significandy correlated with tasks taken to measure local (Grinter, Van Beek, 
Mayber)' & Badcock, 2008) and global processing (Hui-Chun & Ota, 2007). Low attention to 
135 
detail is, therefore, associated with integrative processing whereas high attention to detail is 
associated with piecemeal processing. The findings presented here indicate that a lack of 
influence of background knowledge during conditional reasoning is associated with just one 
AQ trait. This finding adds support to the results of Experiments 1-4 which indicated that an 
absent or weak influence of background knowledge was due to a failure to integrate 
counterexample information. 
Where cognitive demands are ver)' high, the relationship between attention to detail and 
the influence of background knowledge is moderated by working memor}' capacit}'. As 
discussed previously, individuals with low working memor)^ capacit}', including young children 
also tend not to integrate all available information during reasoning, especially where 
representational demands are high. Across previous experiments, participants have been 
matched on standard working memor}' scores so differences in the influence of 
counterexamples are not attributable to working memor)' capacit)' per se. Since participants 
with ASD have extreme attention to detail, however, they are likely to apply a piecemeal 
processing strateg)' which may overload available resources. This is demonstrated more clearly 
among the typical population where there is more variation in attention to detail scores (See 
Table 5.7). Hence, in Experiment 6 where processing demands were ver)' high, the 
participants with low working memory and high attention to detail show the lowest effect of 
counterexamples, whilst those with high working memor)' and low attention to detail show the 
highest. Attention to detail also independendy predicted influence of background knowledge 
in Experiment 6 and it is unclear whether individuals with high piecemeal processing scores 
fail to draw together information in working memory due to a strong processing choice or an 
inabilit)' to do so. 
The development of the AQ has facilitated the study of autistic traits within the t)'pical 
population. Such studies show that many of the tendencies associated with autism are also 
found in the wider population among those with high autistic traits (e.g. Stewart, Watson, 
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Allcock & Yaqoob, 2009; Grinter et al.,2009). The findings presented here add to those 
studies, in showing that a reduced influence of background knowledge during reasoning is 
found among individuals with high attention to detail within the broader autism phenot)pe as 
well as among individuals diagnosed with ASD. Hence, in the studies presented here, both the 
adolescents with autism in Experiments 1 and 4 and adults from the tj^ pical population with 
high attention to detail show less influence of counterexamples on reasoning outcomes. 
The fact that the integration of background knowledge was suppressed by both spatial and 
articulator}' working memor}' load suggests that a domain general component of working 
memor}' is implicated in the integration of counterexamples in conditional reasoning. This 
finding supports a model (Oberauer et al., 2007) where working memory' plays a central role in 
integrating information, and this role is not specifically reUant on either verbal or spatial 
storage mechanisms. This model is incompatable with traditional models of working memor}' 
which propose primar}' functions to be processing and storage of domain specific information 
(Baddeley & Hitch,1974; Baddeley, 1986). According to the account, principally put forward 
by Oberauer and colleagues (Oberauer et al. 2007; Oberauer, Sii^, Wilhelm & Wittmann, 
2008), the primar}' purpose of working memor}' is to integrate information and create new 
temporar}' relational representations. These representations are necessar}' for perfomance on a 
variety of complex tasks including text comprehension and reasoning. Oberauer et al. (2008) 
found that relational integration was highly correlated with reasoning performance. According 
to this account, reasoning relies on the creation of complex models similar to situation models 
taken to underlie text comprehension (e.g. Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Such models include 
not only the binding of elements from disparate domains together, but also the integration 
and maintenance of a number of relational combinations (Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 1998). 
The fact that reasoning response times were longer under complex spatial and articulatory 
load compared to simple load further suggests that interference was affecting a domain 
general rather than a specific language based component of working memor}'. 
137 
Interestingly Oberauer also points to the necessity' of binding in a number of everj^day tasks 
such as 
'"seeing" a constellation in a collection of stars.' Oberauer et al. 2008 (pg 641) 
reminiscent of the t}^ical drive to bring details together to create meaningful wholes described 
by accounts of central coherence (Frith 1989). It is exacdy this kind of relational 
representation that individuals with autism appear not to rely upon. Oberauer et al. (2008) also 
suggest that this binding function is capacit}' limited. Hence the ability to integrate information 
is not a question of all or nothing, but is dependent, to some degree, on capacity and task 
complexit}'. 
The results of Experiment 6 show a similar pattern to those of DeNeys et al. (2005). In this 
study conditional reasoning problems were presented with a concurrent complex tapping load 
with a working memor)' component. They also found a reduced affect of background 
knowledge under load. Participants with low working memor)' span showed this effect across 
both valid and invalid inferences. For high span participants this was limited to invalid 
inferences. For the high span group the effect of disabling conditions on reasoning outcomes 
under load increased. DeNeys et al. suggest that the lack of an effect of load on MP reflects a 
cancelling out of effect across high and low spans. High span participants are sensitive to the 
logical vaUdit}' of MP and MT and consequentiy tend to inhibit background knowledge in 
favour of logical argument. Working memor}' load suppresses inhibitory capabilities, however, 
hence the influence of background knowledge increases. 
The results of the final two experiments raise intriguing questions regarding the 
relationship between new formulations of working memor)' involving relational integration, 
and a lack of integrative processing in individuals with ASD. These questions raise possibilities 
for future study outside of the scope of this thesis. The implications of the findings presented 
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in this chapter will be explored, with reference to the findings of the previous experiments, as 
part of the main discussion which forms the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion 
The studies presented in this thesis explore contextualized reasoning predominandy among 
adolescents with ASD compared to t}pical control groups. This work draws on two distinct 
literatures referring to the effect of knowledge and belief on reasoning in t^ ^pical populations 
and information processing among individuals with autism. Both of these literatures are 
concerned with the processing of information in context. A number of accounts of autism, 
including weak central coherence (Frith, 1989), underconnectivit)' theor)' Qust et al., 2004) and 
complex processing deficit theory? (Minshew et al., 1997), propose that individuals with autism 
have a tendency not to integrate background information for higher meaning. Reasoning 
within the t}fpical population has also been extensively explored with regard to the influence 
of background knowledge. In everj'day life, reasoning on the basis of knowledge and belief is 
an adaptive human drive which helps us to deal flexibly with a range of situations. This drive 
topically results in the consideration of all available information in reasoning about the world 
(Evans, 2007). 
The combination of these two literatures led to the hjpothesis that individuals with ASD 
would be less influenced by background knowledge in everyday reasoning. Contextualized 
conditional reasoning was chosen to test this hypothesis for a number of reasons: first there is 
substantial previous knowledge regarding performance on conditional reasoning tasks among 
tj'pical participants, secondly everyday conditional reasoning is known to be influenced by a 
specific kind of background knowledge in the form of counterexamples, thirdly previous work 
has shown a robust effect of background knowledge on conditional reasoning outcomes for 
both typical adolescent and adult populations (e.g. Markovits & Janveau-Brennan, 1999; 
Cummins, 1995; Thompson, 1994). 
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Overall the findings of the thesis show that adolescents with ASD are less influenced by 
background knowledge compared to t)'pically developing adolescents when engaged in 
conditional reasoning with evetyday content. The findings also strongly suggest that a lack of 
contextualized reasoning is due to a weak or absent tendency to integrate information among 
adolescents with ASD. These results add to knowledge about information processing in 
autism by exploring a previously understudied domain. 
In order to establish whether the reasoning results were attributable to a lack of integrative 
processing, a number of tasks were presented exploring other explanatoty possibilities. 
Although adolescents with autism tend not to integrate background information during 
conditional reasoning, they show an ability to draw information together in simpler tasks. 
Performance on these tasks offers some insight into the mixed findings associated with weak 
central coherence. 
In the final two experiments topical participants with a local processing style show less 
influence of counterexamples in conditional reasoning, compared to those with a global 
processing style. The typical participants also show less influence of background knowledge in 
conditional reasoning when working memoty is overburdened. These results add support to 
models which claim that integrating information is a core function of working memoty. These 
findings are also of interest in the light of late processing accounts of autism, which claim that 
cognitive overload may play a role in processing difficulties. 
Findings relating to the weak central coherence account of autism 
In Experiment 1, the adolescents with ASD show significandy less influence of background 
knowledge during evetyday conditional reasoning compared to topical controls. Typically 
developing adolescents display the customaty effect of both disabling conditions and 
alternative causes. For the typical group, available counterexamples in the form of disabling 
conditions lead to a significant drop in acceptance rates for MP. Where counterexamples in 
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the form of alternative causes are available there is a significant increase in uncertainty 
responses to AC. The participants with ASD, however, are significandy less influenced by 
counterexamples on both the valid inference MP and the invalid inference AC. This pattern of 
performance is not associated with individual differences in expressive vocabulary, inhibition 
or working memor}'. These results cannot be explained by differences in logical reasoning 
abilit}', since background knowledge acts to discourage logical reasoning on valid inferences 
and encourage logical reasoning on invalid inferences. The group with ASD also show similar 
logical performance to the t}'pically developing adolescents where few counterexamples are 
available. 
This work supports previous findings falling broadly within the weak central coherence 
account of autism, which show that individuals with autism tend not to process stimuli in 
context. This processing style is demonstrated in a failure to use sentence context to 
disambiguate homographs (Frith & SnowUng 1983; Happe 1994), reduced wholistic 
processing of faces (Teunisse & De Gelder, 2003), a reduced abilit}^ to identify pictures from 
visual fragments (Booth, 2006) and a lack of inference on the basis of context in short stories 
(JoUiffe & Baron-Cohen, 2000). 
Weak central coherence accounts propose a failure to process stimuli in context deriving 
from an absence of the drive to draw information together for higher meaning. According to 
this account, individuals with autism wiU not contextualize their reasoning due to a tendency 
not to integrate available information. There are, however, a number of other possible 
explanations. The likelihood judgment task and the subsequent experiments outlined below 
investigated whether the results from Experiment 1 can be explained b}' a simple response 
bias, differences in underl}ing beliefs or differences in background knowledge available to the 
two participant groups. 
The likelihood judgement task in Experiment 1 required participants to rate their belief in 
the statements used in the reasoning task. As well as the explicit consideration of 
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counterexample cases, implicit information about the believabilit}' of the premises has been 
shown to influence reasoning outcomes (e.g. Lui, Lo & Wu, 1996; Oaksford, Chater & Larkin, 
2000, Evans, Handley & Over, 2003; Weidenfield, Oberauer & Hornig, 2005). The likelihood 
judgment task explored whether underlying beliefs about the content of the reasoning 
statements differed for the group with ASD compared with controls. The results of this task 
show that the adolescents with ASD do not differ from controls in likelihood ratings of the 
reasoning statements. Hence the likelihood judgement task eliminates the possibiUt}' that the 
results of Experiment 1 are due to differing underlying beliefs about the information in the 
premises. 
Further explanations for the results of Experiment 1 are explored in Chapter 4. 
Experiment 2 investigated whether adolescents with ASD exhibit a yes response bias. The 
customar}' effect of background knowledge is to reduce 'yes' responses for both MP and AC. 
An apparent lack of influence of counterexamples on reasoning performance among the 
group with ASD could, therefore, reflect a yes response bias. Previous studies of contrar}'-to-
fact reasoning have found evidence for an affirmative response bias among younger children 
with autism (Leevers & Harris, 2000). The problems presented in Experiment 2 have a similar 
structure to those used by Leevers and Harris, but with factual content. The participants with 
ASD do not significantiy differ from tj'pical controls in the responses given to these materials, 
however, and they show no difference in their willingness to give 'no' responses. 
The findings of Experiment 1 could also be explained by differences in the background 
knowledge available to the two groups. Experiment 2 investigated whether participants with 
ASD generate similar numbers and types of counterexamples to controls in response to rules 
and facts derived from the materials used in Experiment 1. The results show that the two 
groups do not significantiy differ in either the number or types of counterexamples generated. 
The adolescents with ASD, therefore, have comparable information available to them, and are 
able to retrieve that information when prompted to do so. 
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Although adolescents with ASD are able to generate counterexamples when instructed to 
do so, it does not follow necessarily that they can spontaneously generate background 
knowledge during the reasoning process. Experiment 4 actively provided participants with 
information referring to counterexample cases in order to explore whether all available 
information was integrated during reasoning. This experiment specifically relates, therefore, to 
the weak central coherence claim that a failure to process information in context is the result 
of a weak or absent drive to integrate information. The Suppression Task (Byrne, 1989) was 
used, as it allows for the presentation of an extra premise: a second conditional statement 
which direcdy prompts consideration of a counterexample. Extra premises were presented in 
the form of additional and alternative arguments. 
According to the principal theoretical account of the Suppression Task (Bj^rne, 1989; 
Byrne, Espino & Santamaria, 1999), underlying reasoning mechanisms depend on models 
which represent the world as if the premises were true. The presentation of the extra premise 
calls the conclusion derived from such a model into question by bringing counterexamples to 
mind. Where the extra premise is an additional argument antecedents and consequents are 
combined conjointiy, as in the following example: 
If Mary has an essay to write, then she will study late in the librar)' 
If the librar}' stays open, then Mar)' will study late in the librar)' 
(Mar)' win study late in the Ubrar}' if she has an essay to write and the librar}' is open). 
Where the extra premise is an alternative argument antecedents and consequents are 
combined disjointiy, as shown below: 
If Mar}' has an essay to write, then she will study late in the library 
If she has a textbook to read, then she will study late in the librar}' 
(Mar}' may have an essay to write or she may have a textbook to read). 
T}'pical performance on the suppression task relies, therefore, on the integration of presented 
contextual information with existing models of the premises. Processing will also involve 
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background knowledge to some extent, as reasoners need to recognise that the extra premise 
refers to a counterexample case. In considering the additional argument presented above, for 
example, participants need to infer that libraries can only be accessed when they are open. 
Therefore, Mary cannot study in the library if it is shut. This task differs from that presented 
in Experiment 1, however, as the extra premise alleviates the need to spontaneously generate 
explicit counterexample cases. 
The adolescents with ASD show significandy less effect of contextual information on 
reasoning outcomes in this task compared to controls, even though specific cues referring to 
counterexample cases are provided. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that reasoning 
performance among the adolescents with ASD reflects a tendency not to integrate available 
background information. 
The findings of the first four experiments add support to the weak central coherence 
account of autism in demonstrating that adolescents with ASD show less influence of 
background knowledge in reasoning. As suggested by the weak central coherence account, 
adolescents with ASD show a weak or absent tendency to integrate all available information in 
order to reason in context. The work presented here clearly adds to the known domains in 
which individuals with autism show weak central coherence. 
The AQ and the integration of background information in the wider population 
In Experiments 5 and 6 adult participants from the t)'pical population were given the Autism 
Quotient questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) as a measure of autistic traits. The AQ is 
designed to measure autistic traits among adults with normal intelligence. The AQ has been 
presented as a useful screening tool for ASD in identifying individuals who are candidates for 
full diagnostic assessment (Woodbur)'-Smith, et al., 2005). The questionnaire assesses social 
skill, attention switching, attention to detail, communication and imagination. These 
subcategories reflect the triad of symptoms in autism (APA 1994) and known cognitive 
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impairments in autism. High autistic traits are associated with poor social skills, poor 
communicative skills, exceptional attention to local details, poor attention switching and poor 
imagination. 
Experiments 5 and 6 explored the roles of language and working memor)' in the integration 
of background information during conditional reasoning. Both experiments employed 
secondary' tasks designed to burden inner speech, and in the case of Experiment 6 also 
working memor)' whilst solving conditional reasoning tasks. The results relating to secondar}? 
task load will be discussed further in a later section. Since Experiments 1 and 4 show that 
adolescents with ASD tend not to integrate background knowledge during reasoning it was 
predicted that individuals in the wider population with high autistic traits would also be less 
influenced by contextual information. 
Experiments 5 and 6 show that overall AQ scores are not related to reasoning 
performance, but scores on the attention to detail subcomponent are significandy correlated 
with the degree to which reasoning is influenced by available counterexamples. In Experiment 
5 those participants with high attention to detail scores show significantiy less influence of 
available background information, compared to those with low scores. This is partiy replicated 
in Experiment 6. In the complex condition where secondar}' load had a working memor}' 
component, once again, participants with high attention to detail show less influence of 
background knowledge, this relationship is also mediated by working memor}' scores. 
The attention to detail subcomponent of the AQ is shown to be related to weak central 
coherence. Attention to detail is significantiy correlated with measures of weak central 
coherence, including local processing measures such as the Embedded Figures Task (Grinter 
et al., 2008) and global processing tasks such as context effects on speech perception (Hui-
Chun & Ota, 2007). Attention to detail questions can be seen as assessing the degree to which 
a person is a local or a global processor. As weak central coherence theor}'^  predicts. 
Experiments 5 and 6 show that a local processing stj'le, with a high attention to detail, is 
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associated with less integration of relevant information during conditional reasoning. These 
findings extend those of Experiments 1 and 4 in demonstrating that a particular autistic trait is 
predictive of the degree to which an individual will be influenced by available contextual 
material. These results also add weight to the conclusion that among individuals with ASD a 
tendency not to take account of background knowledge during conditional reasoning is due to 
a failure to integrate all relevant information. 
The AQ is a relatively new measure, but existing studies show that many autistic tendencies 
are also found among individuals in the wider population with high autistic traits (e.g. Stewart 
et al., 2009; Grinter et al., 2009). Individuals who score highly on the AQ, and are identified as 
potentially having autism, show high attention to detail in combination with a pattern of poor 
social and communicative skills, poor attention switching and poor imagination. In the wider 
population individuals may present very different patterns, scoring highly on the attention to 
detail subcomponent, for example, but having good social or attention switching skills. The 
AQ may, therefore, be usefiil in assessing which autistic traits are associated with atypical 
performance on a number of tasks. 
Individuals with Asperger syndrome and high fianctioning autism score significandy higher 
on the AQ than individuals in the wider population (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The measure 
was designed as a brief tool for identifying levels of autistic traits in the general population and 
as a potential screening tool for further diagnosis of autism. It seems to work well for these 
purposes (e.g. Woodbury-Smith et al., 2005). As we have seen, measures of weak central 
coherence such as the Embedded Figures Task are significantiy correlated with attention to 
detail. Further work is needed, however, to establish that scores on all subcomponents of the 
AQ are meaningful as distinct measures. It may be that the AQ subcomponents present a 
useful starting point for assessing which traits are implicated in particular tasks. Nevertheless, 
the AQ is a self report questionnaire and as such is open to general criticisms of measures of 
this t}'pe. The questions are closed and, therefore, limit the responses available to participants. 
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For some individuals results may also reflect what participants erroneously believe to be true 
about themselves or what they may wish to present to the experimenter. 
In both Experiment 5 and Experiment 6 mean scores for the attention to detail component 
are higher than mean scores for any other subcomponent. Examination of Baron-Cohen et 
al's. (2005) original wide-ranging study shows similar patterns. With the exception of the 
group with Asperger syndrome or high functioning autism, who necessarily scored highly 
across the board, all other groups show higher mean scores for attention to detail compared to 
other categories. It may be that high attention to detail is relatively common in the wider 
population compared to other autistic traits. Alternatively these findings may reflect the nature 
of the participants recruited. In the Baron-Cohen et al. study participants included 
mathematicians, scientists, olympiads and students. Nevertheless, Baron-Cohen et al. did have 
a group of randomly selected controls and participants in Experiment 5, reported here, were 
from a voluntar}' participant pool. These participants also show high scores on this 
subcomponent. 
The findings of Experiments 5 and 6, along with Experiments 1 and 4 strongly suggest that 
individuals with autism fail to take account of background knowledge due to a lack of 
integrative processing. Recent reappraisals of weak central coherence, however, (Happe & 
Frith, 2006; Happe & Booth, 2008) have highlighted mixed results with regard to the abilit}' of 
individuals with autism to integrate information. Individuals with autism seem able to draw 
information together to arrive at meaningful outcomes in some cases. Although the 
adolescents with ASD in the present studies tend not to integrate information during 
conditional reasoning, they do show the ability to combine information in a number of the 
other tasks. These results will be discussed in the next section. 
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Findings reflecting mixed results associated with weak central coherence 
The findings presented here show that adolescents with ASD are able to draw together 
information to derive meaning in certain circumstances. In Experiment 1, for example, where 
background knowledge is not available both groups show similar reasoning outcomes and 
levels of logical performance. This means that the adolescents with ASD are able to integrate 
information presented in the premises to arrive at reasoning responses. Both groups also show 
similar patterns of performance on the simple reasoning task used in Experiment 2 to assess a 
possible yes response bias. Furthermore, the group with ASD demonstrates similar 
performance compared to controls in generating counterexamples when prompted to do so, 
and in deriving a degree of a belief in the conditionals presented. Both of these tasks require 
the generation of background knowledge, in the light of given material, in order to achieve 
meaningful outcomes. These tasks are, however, intrinsically less complex than contexmalised 
conditional reasoning. Both involve specific prompts to retrieve background knowledge. 
These tasks also involve the activation of a response without further manipulation. The 
reasoning tasks in Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 involve either the spontaneous activation 
of background information, or the activation of background knowledge in response to explicit 
cues referring to counterexample cases. This knowledge must then be further integrated and 
manipulated with information presented within the premises. 
Within the weak central coherence literature there are also mixed results showing that 
people with autism can integrate information for higher meaning in specific cases. Individuals 
with autism can, for example, integrate information about a given object or routine (Ameli, 
Courchesne, Lincoln, Kaufman, & Grillon, 1988; Pring & Hermelin, 1993). Happe and Frith, 
(2006) suggest that connecting information in these tasks depends upon item to item 
associations or chaining. Integrating information within a single domain may also be intact; 
individuals with autism are able, for example, to draw together information relating to 
calendrical calculations.(Heavey, 2003). There is also evidence that people with autism can 
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attend to global features when they receive explicit prompts to do so, as in the hierarchical 
figures task, for example (Plaisted, Swettenham & Rees, 1999). 
Conflicting results in the abilit}' of individuals with autism to process information in 
context are not reflected in studies of enhanced local processing where results are more 
consistent (Happe & Frith, 2006). This has resulted in a recognition that enhanced local 
processing and weak global coherence do not necessarily go hand-in-hand (e.g. Reyna and 
Kiernan, 1994; Burack, Enns, larocci & Randolph, 2000; Porporino, Shore, larocci & Burack, 
2004). An enhanced piecemeal processing style has, therefore, been emphasized as a core 
abilit}' in autism. A lack of global processing has been played down to some degree, and is 
conceptualized as a tendenc}' rather than a deficit. At the same time, there is a retrospective 
acknowledgement that previous smdies have conflated poor global coherence with good local 
processing abilities, hence good performance on the Embedded Figures Task, for example, 
has been taken as evidence for weak central coherence (Happe & Booth, 2008). 
The mixed findings related to processing in context have been explained with reference to 
the modaUt}' of the task at hand. Lopez and Leekam (2003), claim that individuals with ASD 
have a specific problem with processing verbal information in context. This account draws on 
the finding that people with autism do not show impairments in contexmalised processing in a 
number of visuo-spatial tasks including Navon tasks or visual illusions tasks (E.g. Ozonoff, 
Strayer, McMahon, & Filloux, 1994; Ropar & Mitchell, 1999), but do demonstrate difficulties 
processing complex verbal information in context (e.g. Frith & Snowling, 1983; Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999). 
The results of the experiments reported here do not support the account presented by 
Lopez and Leekham (2003), since there is no reason to believe that the verbal nature of these 
tasks is responsible for the information processing difficulties experienced by participants with 
ASD. Although both the likelihood judgment task and the conditional reasoning task are 
verbal in nature and use materials with the same content, the adolescents with autism show 
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similar performance to controls on one task and not the other. It appears that it is the 
complexity' of the task at hand and the degree to which it is effortful in nature which are the 
relevant factors. In both the generation task and the likelihood judgment tasks participants 
were specifically prompted to retrieve background knowledge but to make no further use of it. 
Performance on these tasks did not differentiate between the two groups. In the reasoning 
tasks, however, the t}^ical tendency to integrate contextual informadon was weak or absent in 
the ASD group. Since these participants were matched for working memor}' capacit}' it seems 
likely that they were able to hold presented information in mind as well as information 
activated by the context. What they apparentiy did not do was to engage in the effortfial 
processing required to integrate this contextual information with their reasoning. 
Previous studies of the nature of probabilistic judgment show that underljang processes 
are implicit in nature (Evans & Over, 1997; Oaksford & Chater, 2001). Probabilistic 
judgments and the explicit consideration of background information both draw on the same 
knowledge base, but the nature of the contextual information is very different. Ever}fday 
conditional reasoning typically involves available examples being brought to mind. Integration 
and manipulation of these examples is limited by executive resources and is effortful in nature. 
Probabilistic judgment, on the other hand, is not dependent on cognitive resources 
(Verschueren, Schaeken & d'Ydewalle, 2005). 
Both weak central coherence and complex processing deficit accounts pro\dde additional 
evidence for specific difficulties relating to the effortful integration of information. Within the 
vast literature related to weak central coherence, perhaps the most relevant work to this 
discussion concerns text comprehension in autism. Aspects of reading appear to be intact, but 
individuals with autism have difficult}' using context in reading and generally appreciating the 
meaning of texts (e.g. Frith and Snowling, 1983; Happe', 1997). This difficult}' is t}rpicaUy 
explained with reference to central coherence and a tendency not to integrate information. 
Available studies support the work presented here in demonstrating a specific processing 
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problem relating to the effortful integration of explicit background information with online 
presented material. 
Saldana and Frith (2007) explored the possibilit}' that text comprehension difficulties in 
autism lie at an automatic level of processing. They employed a task known to tap the use of 
implicit bridging inferences in text comprehension (Singer & Halldorson, 1996). Bridging 
inferences allow for information to be filled in which is not actually stated in the text. Their 
results show, however, that individuals with autism are able to make implicit inferences when 
reading short texts. They found a strong priming effect of such inferences on the speed with 
which subsequent questions were answered by participants with autism and controls. Saldana 
and Frith show that readers with autism are able to draw on implicit processes involving world 
knowledge in order to arrive at inferences which influence subsequent responses. Saldana and 
Frith conclude that the problems in text comprehension exhibited by individuals with autism 
lie at a higher processing level. 
Other studies of text comprehension in autism focus on effortful processes. Individuals 
with autism show impairment in integrating presented information with explicitiy available 
contextual information in order to arrive at ongoing deep text comprehension (Joliffe and 
Baron-Cohen, 1999; 2000). This deficit is demonstrated in a variet)^ of tasks. Individuals with 
autism fail to use context to interpret ambiguous sentences (Joliffe and Baron-Cohen 1999), or 
to integrate sentence information with a theme in order to arrange sentences coherentiy. They 
also fail to integrate stor)' information to arrive at global inferences which allow for the 
accurate interpretation of character actions (Joliffe and Baron-Cohen, 2000). Participants with 
autism demonstrate some implicit level of text comprehension, however, in answering 
questions about the text requiring basic bridging inferences and using temporal cues to 
arrange sentences. 
Joliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999; 2000) claim their findings reflect a difficulty in achieving 
global coherence, or making causal connections between disparate information in order to 
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arrive at local, then higher level chunks of contextualised meaning. In this case, global 
coherence is related to the creation of a simation model. Such models require the integration 
of information at several levels. Zwaan and Radvansky (1998) for example, make parallels 
between text comprehension and problem solving in describing the complex interplay 
between explicit and implicit processes. Causal links are made on the basis of background 
knowledge and presented material, this results in the creation of an integrated model which is 
instigated by the search for meaning in any narrative across modalities. This model is 
described as being implicit in focus, but is constandy updated by integrating the current model 
in working memor}'. 
The kind of situation models necessar}' for complex contextualised reasoning or text 
comprehension require implicit processes, but also the effortful manipulation and integration 
of the outcomes of such processes with other information. Information from a range of 
sources is rapidly drawn together, including basic linguistic information, semantics, empirical 
knowledge, non-linguistic information and external cues (Hagoort & Berkum, 2007). 
It seems that individuals with autism are able to make implicit inferences and link 
information together in order to engage in aspects of text comprehension. ^X l^at they fail to 
do is to integrate resulting representations with other information. The findings of this thesis 
also show that adolescents with autism can draw upon implicit processes and engage in simple 
inference. They can also activate background knowledge, particularly when cued to do so. As 
with text comprehension, however, when engaged in contextualised reasoning the adolescents 
with ASD do not create integrated representations informed by all available information. 
The work of Joliffe and Baron-Cohen (2000) shows particular parallels with the results of 
Experiment 4. In the suppression task we presented participants with explicit prompts 
referring to counterexample information. Similarly Joliffe and Baron-Cohen actively provided 
contextual information relating to storj' themes. In both cases, the individuals with autism 
tend not to integrate contextual information. 
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Accounts of text comprehension and contextualised reasoning refer to the creation of 
integrative models. There is evidence that models supporting contextualized reasoning are 
similar in nature to situation models in that they are necessarily informationally rich. Such 
models reflect complex interaction between stimuli and context encompassing a range of 
types of knowledge about counterexamples, probabilities, causal relationships and temporal 
order (Handley & Feeney, 2007). The creation of integrative models in reasoning and text 
comprehension is dependent on effortful processes for the dynamic integration of a range of 
inputs, including the results of implicit processing. A tendency not to integrate all relevant 
information implies that individuals with autism will not form complex models of this ty'pe. 
Much of the evidence from studies of text comprehension refers to effortful and implicit 
processes. Individuals with autism show comparable performance to controls on tasks 
requiring predominantiy implicit processing, but poor performance compared to controls on 
tasks which rely on the effortful integration of information. In the reasoning Literature such 
distinctions are generally explained with reference to dual process theories, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. The next section will explore, therefore, how dual process theories of reasoning 
can help to describe the mixed results on tasks requiring the integration of information among 
individuals with ASD. 
Dual process theoty and the integration of information in autism 
Dual process theories propose that there are two cognitive systems or types of processing in 
the brain. System 1 is fast, unconscious, associative and implicit in namre. System 2 is slow, 
sequential, effortful and related to conscious intentions. Dual process theor)' is relevant to the 
proposal that individuals with autism have a specific tendency not to engage in the effortful 
integration of information. Such a tendency is specifically associated with System 2. 
According to dual process accounts, cognitive abilit}' is relevant to the sequential nature of 
System 2, and can be described as the limiting capacity of that system. Recentiy there has been 
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some agreement that System 1 is actually a collection of systems (Stanovich, 2004; Evans, 
2006). These systems all operate in response to stimuli without recourse to the cognitive 
capacit)' of System 2. Any task requiring working memor)' wUl, therefore, involve System 2. 
System 2 is fed, however, by content from a variet}' of implicit systems (Evans, 2009). 
Combinations of systems result in temporar}^ networks which are realised in differing 
connections between neural regions of the brain, depending on the task at hand (Goel, 2007). 
In real life, decisions are often made on the basis of automatic or habitual System 1 
responses. System 2 provides a different kind of thinking, one which is unique to human 
beings and allows us to think h)'potheticaUy about a range of possibilities. Hypothetical 
simulations allow for thought processes divorced from what is known about the world. 
Equally, however, effortful contextualised reasoning involves System 2 resources. Dual 
process theor}' thus accounts for both t:he abilit}' to reason logically whilst inhibiting belief but 
also reasoning on the basis of explicit background knowledge. 
Dual process theor)' implies that there are different kinds of knowledge which can act to 
influence behaviour. S3'Stem 1 draws upon implicit knowledge and habitual routines whereas 
System 2 applies explicit knowledge to contextualise thought processes (Evans, 2009). The 
outcomes of Sj'stem 1 processes are available to us in the recognition, for example, that we 
believe or disbelieve a given statement. This kind of input to System 2 is distinct, however, 
from knowledge about specific examples drawn from explicit memory. 
Dual process theories provide a framework for understanding the influence of different 
kinds of knowledge and differing levels of processing complexit}' involved in conditional 
reasoning. Implicit knowledge about the degree of connection between antecedent and 
consequent reflected in likelihood judgment tasks has been shown to influence conditional 
reasoning outcomes. Such judgments are not dependent on working memorj' resources and as 
such involve System 1. On the other hand the active consideration of specific counterexample 
cases is working memor}' dependent (Verschueren et al., 2005). Dual process theory 
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consequend}' suggests that an abilit)' to derive belief in a given statement but an inabiUt}' to 
reason on the basis of counterexamples implies a specific S^ s^tem 2 difficulty. 
Further relevant definitions of the components of System 2 are provided by Stanovich 
(2009). According to Stanovich, System 2 involves three levels of processing. The simplest 
level involves serial associative cognition. This is a form of shallow processing that does not 
involve the creation of complex ^^pothetical models. Rather processing involves associative 
cognition on the basis of information provided to the individual. Such processing makes 
minimal cognitive demands. Stanovich's ideas are of interest here in relation to item to item 
associations or chaining as a means of explaining why individuals with autism may be able to 
link explicit information in order to arrive at calendrical representations, or derive simple 
inferences on the basis of presented material. 
At a higher level of processing, what Stanovich refers to as the algorithmic mind is 
responsible for h)pothetical models requiring the representation of possibilities. Hypothetical 
representations must be maintained apart from the actual state of the world. Such processing 
is necessarily dependent on cognitive capacit)' to some degree. Differing demands are 
associated with the complexity^ of the task involved. As discussed, the consideration of 
possibilities prompted by counterexample cases and the integration of those possibilities with 
presented information involve such models. The effortful integration of information lacking 
among individuals with autism is, therefore, associated with algorithmic level function. 
Stanovich's final level of System 2 processing is also of interest, as it highlights the role of 
thinking dispositions in reasoning outcomes. The reflective mind is responsible for activating 
the algorithmic mind in response to task demands mediated by the goals, motivations and 
thinking disposition of the individual. Evidence for the existence of the reflective mind 
includes studies demonstrating additional variance in reasoning performance attributable to 
thinking dispositions after cognitive capacity has been accounted for (e.g. Bruine de Bruin et 
al., 2007; Toplak & Stanovich, 2002, 2003). Measures of thinking disposition include 
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dimensions such as absolutism, willingness to perspective switch, willingness to 
decontextualise and the tendency to consider alternative opinions (e.g., Stanovich & West 
1998a). These dimensions are t}'pically investigated as possible predictors of the tendency to 
inhibit background knowledge in reasoning tasks. In such cases, the influence of background 
knowledge is regarded as a bias. These tasks have a different emphasis to the reasoning tasks 
used here. The task used in Experiment 1, for example, explored the influence of background 
knowledge rather than the abiUt}' to suppress it. As we have seen, in ever}'day reasoning there 
is an inherent drive to consider all relevant knowledge among tjipical populations. 
Dispositions reflecting a willingness to decontextualise, for example, are consequentiy not 
relevant to this task. Among the individuals with ASD, however, this drive appears to be weak 
or absent. In this case, a willingness to contextualise is relevant. 
As outlined in a previous section, the mixed findings associated with global coherence in 
autism have led Happe' and Frith (2006) to suggest that a failure to take account of context is 
due to a bias rather than a deficit. Studies which show that individuals with autism are able to 
take account of the bigger picture when instructed to do so support this claim. SnowUng and 
Frith (1986), for example, found that the usual failure of children with autism to disambiguate 
homographs on the basis of context was removed when participants were first instructed in 
the nature of homographs, and the need to identify one of two possible meanings. Happe' 
and Frith suggest that individuals with autism employ a piecemeal processing style, which 
means they tend not to draw information together. It is possible that this processing approach 
can be overridden with effort, in some circumstances. This is in opposition to the view of 
reasoning among the typical population, as being characterised by a primar}' tendency to 
reason in context which is difficult to suppress. 
On the basis of Stanovich's model, whether individuals choose to employ effort to reason 
in a particular way is dependent on the reflective mind. Individuals with autism whose 
thinking disposition reflects an unwillingness to contextualise will not send out a caU for the 
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algorithmic mind to be brought online. Stanovich's work, therefore, provides a potential 
framework for understanding the role of thinking dispositions on task performance in autism. 
For example, disposition may help to explain instances where individuals with autism draw 
information together only when instructed to do so. 
Dual process theories imply that the integration of representations associated with complex 
reasoning tasks necessarily depends on working memor)'. The results of Experiment 6 and the 
work of De Neys et al. (2005), discussed in the previous chapter, also show that the 
integration of background information during conditional reasoning is dependent on working 
memory resources. Recent models of working memor}' propose that a central function 
involves the integration of information from different sources. These models will be explored 
in the next section with reference to the findings under discussion. 
Working Memory and integration 
Stating that individuals with autism have a specific difficult}' with the integration of 
information during reasoning is to some degree descriptive. Experiments 5 and 6 explored 
why such a difficult}' might arise. Carruthers (2002) proposes that the integration of 
information from disparate sources is reliant on inner speech. Individuals with autism show 
less use of inner speech in problem solving compared to controls (NX'hitehouse et al., 2006). 
Reduced inner speech could, therefore, potentially explain a lack of integrative processing in 
autism. On the other hand, recent models of working memor}' (Oberauer et al., 2007; 
Oberauer et al., 2008) claim that a central, domain-general function serves to integrate 
information. This integrative function is specifically implicated in complex reasoning tasks. 
Experiments 5 and 6 explored the role of language and working memory in the integration of 
background knowledge in reasoning among typical adults. 
158 
Experiment 5 investigated the role of inner speech in integrating information during 
conditional reasoning. The results of Experiment 5 show that burdening inner speech does 
not affect the integration of background knowledge during reasoning. Participants engage in 
more inner speech where they are free to do so, as in the simple control condition. Increased 
thinking has no effect, however, on reasoning outcomes. These findings were replicated in 
Experiment 6. In Experiment 5 longer latencies impljdng more inner speech were specific to 
those participants with low autistic traits. This finding was also pardy replicated in the simple 
condition of Experiment 6, showing longer latencies overall for participants with low autistic 
traits. 
Experiment 6 investigated the role of working memor}' in integrative processes by 
presenting reasoning problems with a secondar)' verbal and spatial working memor)' load. 
Under working memory' load, participants show less influence of background knowledge. This 
effect is particular to AC and is consistent across both verbal and spatial working memor}' 
load. 
In Experiment 5 and the complex condition of Experiment 6 the influence of background 
knowledge is associated with the attention to detail subcomponent of the AQ. Those 
participants with a local processing st}'le, w i^th a high attention to detail, show less influence of 
background knowledge during reasoning. In Experiment 6, where cognitive demands are high, 
this relationship is mediated by working memor}' capacit}'. The participants with low working 
memory and high attention to detail show the lowest effect of counterexamples, whilst those 
with high working memor}' and low attention to detail show the highest. These findings 
suggests that reasoning in context is related to the processing style of the individual, the 
demands of the task at hand and the cognitive resources available. 
The findings of Experiment 6 reflect previous work which shows that loading working 
memory acts to suppress the integration of background knowledge, but also interferes with 
inhibitor)' processes (DeNeys et al., 2005). People with ver);^  high working memory tend to 
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inhibit background knowledge in favour of logical responding on valid inferences. T}dng up 
inhibition results in a greater influence of background knowledge, therefore, for a sub-group 
of participants. For this reason the effects of working memor)' load are clearer in the case of 
invalid inferences where no such confound is evident. The results of Experiment 6 show that 
working memor}' plays a domain general role in the integration of background knowledge 
during conditional reasoning. Integrative processes do not rely specifically on verbal working 
memor}' resources. 
The consideration of counterexamples during conditional reasoning is an effortful process 
which draws upon cognitive resources (De Neys, Schaeken & d'Ydewaile ,2005). Recent 
accounts of working memor)' claim that the integration of information is a central function. 
According to these accounts a particular component of working memor)' is involved in the 
integration of information in complex tasks such as reasoning (Oberauer et al. 2007; 
Oberauer, et al., 2008). The sub-component of working memor)' responsible for integration is 
domain general, and can act on information from a range of sources. Experiment 6 supports 
this claim; results show that the integration of information in ever)'day conditional reasoning is 
dependent on working memor)' resources which are not specifically verbal or spatial in focus. 
Studies exploring working memor)' show evidence for poor performance compared to 
t)'pical controls among both adults and children with autism (Luna, Minshew, Gar\'er, Lazar, 
Thulborn, Eddy & Sweeney, 2002). Other studies conclude, however, that individuals with 
autism do not have impairment in working memor)' (Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001). The results 
presented here show no significant differences in either working memor)' capacit)' or measures 
of inhibition between the groups with ASD and t)'pical controls. Possible reasons for mixed 
findings in the literature include the fact that individuals with autism present at)'pical neural 
networks associated with working memory (Koshino et al., 2005; Koshino, Kana, Keller, 
Cherkassky, Minshew & Just, 2008). Such networks may signify compensatory mechanisms 
which allow for good performance in some cases. Traditional concepts of working memor)' 
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which focus on processing and domain specific storage sub-components may not reflect core 
functions associated with the integration of information. Since traditional models of working 
memor}' do not focus on integrative function, performance on tasks based on such models 
may also fail to effectively show specific processing difficulties associated with integration. 
Oberauer and colleagues (Oberauer et al., 2007; Oberauer et al., 2008) propose that a 
central function of working memoty is to integrate information and create new temporaty 
representational bindings. These representations underlie perfomance on a variety of complex 
tasks including text comprehension and reasoning. Other accounts of working memoty have 
also changed over time to account for the integration of material from different sources. 
Baddeley's traditional processing and storage model of working memoty has been updated to 
include an 'episodic buffer' (Baddeley, 2000) which is responsible for the integration of 
information across domains. The episodic buffer is presented as a temporaty store which is 
able to integrate information from multiple sources. 
Working memoty capacity has been repeatedly shown to be a good predictor of reasoning 
ability (For a review see Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005). Oberauer and colleagues (Oberauer 
et al., 2007; Oberauer et al., 2008) claim that it is the sub-component concerned with 
'relational integration' which is predominantiy related to performance on complex reasoning 
tasks requiring the drawing together of information to create new relational strucmres. 
The traditional processing and storage functions of working memoty are highty correlated 
with, but distinct from, relational integration (Oberauer, Sii^, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2003). 
This relational integration factor is strongly related to reasoning ability (Oberauer et al., 2008). 
The brain has a limited ability to hold multiple relational models simultaneously (Wheeler & 
Treisman, 2002) and consequendy the sub-component responsible for relational integration is 
defined by available capacity. Reasoning is dependent upon the representation of relations 
between elements, and the manipulation of those relations. Evetyday reasoning presents a 
complex web of relations similar to those posed by situational models used to describe text 
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comprehension processes. Reasoners must not only combine elements from the premises 
themselves in temporar}' structures, but must also incorporate contextual information 
including background knowledge and external cues. Relational integration is a good predictor 
of complex tasks such as reasoning or text comprehension without the need for storage or 
processing factors (Oberauer et al., 2008; Colom, Rebollo, Abad, & Shih, 2006). 
Oberauer and colleagues (Oberauer et al.,2007; Oberauer et al., 2008) are not claiming that 
other tasks do not make use of processing and storage sub-components just that relational 
integration is a core function relevant to many complex tasks. It is also important to note that 
a distinction is made between individual bindings and complex models requiring the 
manipulation of several bindings. It is not the creation and storage of relational bindings that 
requires this integrative sub-component; it is the integration of those relational structures with 
other relational structures. This distinction refers to levels of complexit)', and is relevant to the 
results of the likelihood judgment and generation tasks. Both of these tasks require the 
drawing together of information, since knowledge must be retrieved which is relevant to 
presented material. Nevertheless, these tasks do not involve the kind of relational complexit}' 
needed to reason in context. 
Evidence from neuroimaging studies shows that indi\dduals with autism may have atj'pical 
large scale brain networks, poor connectivit}' and compensator)' patterns of neural activation 
between frontal areas and other areas of the brain (e.g. Koshino et al., 2005; Just et al., 2004). 
Such studies suggest that the t)'pical circuitr)' involved in complex effortful tasks involving 
working memor)' resources may be unusually deployed in individuals with autism. 
Neuroimaging studies show that areas of the brain associated with working memor)' include 
frontal and posterior cortical regions depending on the type of information being processed 
and the demands of the task involved. The integration of information from different sources 
is particularly associated with the frontal cortex including, for example, the left inferior frontal 
g)'rus which is implicated in the integration of linguistic information (Hagoort, 2005), and the 
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right frontal cortex which is implicated in the domain-general integration of information in 
working memor)' (Prabhakaran, Narayanan, Zhao & Gabrieli, 2000). Prabhakaran et al. found 
relational integration in working memor}' to be associated with the right prefrontal region. 
Integrative processing in this area included verbal material but was distinct from left prefrontal 
regions which only showed involvement in verbal tasks, and posterior cortical regions 
associated with non-integrative processing and maintenance of information. 
It would be premature to suggest that people with autism necessarily have a specific 
impairment in a sub-component of working memor}^ This is a subject which raises interesting 
questions and requires further study. Working memor}' is, of course, only a construct and a 
lack of relational integration may better be described by taking a broader view of neural 
connectivit)'. Oberauer and colleague's model of working memor}'^  is useful, however, in 
providing a means of conceptualising the differing demands of given tasks in terms of implicit 
and effortful processing and levels of task complexit)'. These ideas may go some way to 
providing clearer definitions of the abUit}' of individuals with autism to engage in some tasks 
requiring the integration of information but not others. 
Complex processing deficit accounts of autism claim that working memor}' overload is a 
primar}' cause of poor performance on complex tasks among individuals with autism. Such 
overload results from a tendency not to integrate information to create supportive models and 
schemas. Complex processing deficit theor}' refers to underconnectivity between cortical 
regions in autism as underlying integrative difficulties. The next section will explore aspects of 
the complex processing account, and evidence of neural underconnectivity among individuals 
with autism which are relevant to the findings under discussion. 
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Working memory and accounts of autism: complex processing and 
underconnectivity 
Integrative difficulties are proposed to underlie a complex processing deficit in autism 
(Minshew, Goldstein & Siegel, 1997; Minshew & Goldstein, 2001; Williams, Goldstein & 
Minshew, 2006). According to Minshew and colleagues, a difficult}' in drawing information 
together, in order to create concepts and schemas, means that incoming information cannot 
be processed with the support of a contextual framework. This impairment is only apparent in 
tasks which draw on limited working memor}' resources. Less complex tasks, or those which 
generally make fewer demands on cognitive resources, will be unimpaired. Minshew and 
colleagues argue, therefore, that individuals with autism have difficulties with late processing 
and a reliance on lower level or early processing, due to poor connectivit}' between different 
regions of the brain. 
Supporting the account given here of a specific System 2 difficult)', Minshew and 
colleagues demonstrate impairment with effortful processing across a number of domains 
including motor skills, memor)' and language, among both adults (Minshew et al. 1997) and 
children (Williams et al. 2006). Such evidence relies upon demonstrating lower level 
competence but higher level incompetence in any given domain. In many cases this 
lower/higher level dichotomy can be mapped onto System 1 and System 2 processes. For 
example, Minshew et al. (1997) found impairment in a range of complex language tests 
including the Reading Comprehension subtest from the Kaufman-Test of Educational 
Achievement, the Verbal Absurdities subtest from the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale and 
the Token Test. These tests explore complex higher order features of language involving 
executive dependent coordinating processes such as text comprehension, verbal problem 
solving, and the comprehension of complex grammatical constructions. At the same time 
intact simple language processing is demonstrated by performance on WTMS—R Vocabulary 
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test, K-TEA Reading Decoding task and the Controlled Oral Word Association (FAS) task. 
All of which rely on implicit associative processes. 
Minshew, Meyer and Goldstein (2002) describe a similar distinction in the domain of 
abstract reasorung between concept identification and concept formation. Individuals with 
autism are able to identify, learn rules and act upon them, but are unable to draw together 
information in order to generate concepts to deal with novel situations. Poor performance is 
shown on tasks requiring concept formation such as the Stanford-Binet absurdities subtests, 
the 20 Questions task, and the Goldstein-Scheerer Object Sorting task, contrasting with good 
performance on more simple tasks testing concept identification such as the Halstead 
Categor}' Test and the Trail Making Test Part B. 
The complex processing deficit model has parallels with weak central coherence theor}' in 
acknowledging a core abilit)' in autism to be a detail based processing st}4e. Both accounts also 
recognise a tendency, not to draw information together to create supportive models or gists of 
a situation. The complex processing deficit account highlights the need for such supportive 
frameworks to alleviate the demands of complex tasks on working memor}' resources. 
A piecemeal processing approach serv^es well enough where cognitive demands are not 
high, but without the top down support provided by integrative models, more complex tasks 
can rapidly overload available resources. This account can explain why the contextualised 
conditional reasoning task, which has been shown to be related to cognitive abilit}' 
(Verschueren et al. 2004), presents difficulties for the group with ASD, but less demanding 
tasks, such as the generation of counterexamples or the likelihood judgment task, do not. 
Importandy, however, the adolescents with ASD and controls did not significantiy differ on 
standard measures of working memor}', and Minshew and colleagues are not claiming that 
individuals with ASD have a problem with cognitive capacity' per se. A piecemeal processing 
approach without top down supportive mechanisms results, however, in overwhelming 
demands on working memory resources in response to complex tasks. 
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This account is relevant when considering the results of Experiment 6. In the complex 
condition tjfpical participants were given two concurrent tasks in order to overburden working 
memorJ^ As expected, those participants with a local processing st3'le show less influence of 
background knowledge compared to global processors, this relationship was also mediated by 
working memor}' capacit}^ Hence, in a ver}' demanding task those participants with low 
available cognitive resources and a strong local processing st}'le show the least influence of 
available counterexamples compared to other participants. In addition, all t}^ical participants, 
regardless of processing st^de, show less influence of available information on invalid 
inferences, in the complex task compared to the simple condition. In a sense this experiment 
models what Minshew and colleagues claim happens when individuals with autism are 
presented with a complex task. The t)pical adults had to attend to two distinct sets of 
information whilst experiencing cognitive overload. The results show a reduced effect of 
background knowledge on invalid inferences suggesting ineffective representations which fail 
to incorporate all available information. These results mimic those found earlier among the 
adolescents with ASD in response to the same reasoning questions without a secondar}' 
working memor}^ load. 
The idea that individuals with autism do not engage in complex integrative processing 
associated with working memor}^ is closely related to the model of autism proposed by 
Underconnectivity Theor}' (Just et al., 2004). A growing number of neuroimaging studies show 
reduced levels of connectivit}' across brain regions in autism (e.g. Just et al., 2004; CasteUi et 
al., 2002; Luna et al., 2002), at the same time, anatomical studies also present evidence for 
unusual development of white matter in the brain, affecting communication between cortical 
regions (e.g. Courchesne et al., 2001; Herbert et al., 2004). Cortical-cortical connections 
associated with complex integrative processing show underconnectivity, with more activation 
in areas associated with simpler processes (Just et al., 2004; Just et al., 2007). There is also 
evidence for hyperconnectivit}' in subcortical-cortical connections compensating for reduced 
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intercortical connectivit)' (Mizuno et al., 2006). Further evidence for an uneven impairment in 
connectivity in autism derives from studies of the temporal binding of information (Brock et 
al., 2002). Communication across brain regions involves two tj'pes of integration, temporal 
binding necessar)' for complex information processing and combination coding which is 
sufficient for simple processing. Combination coding is involved, for example, in the 
representation of object features. Brock et al. (2002) claim that people with autism have a 
specific difficult}' with temporal binding. 
Underconnectivit)' theor)' shows that poor connectivit}', reducing cortical-cortical 
communication will affect any task requiring high levels of contribution from frontal executive 
regions. This account, in conjunction with Oberauer and colleague's model of working 
memor}', suggests that the neural circuitr)' necessar)' for relational integration to occur may be 
lacking. Further e\'idence from neuroimaging studies of autism does indeed demonstrate that 
individuals with autism employ different areas of the brain when engaged in working memor}' 
tasks. For participants with autism working memor}' is associated with less frontal activation, 
and increased reliance on posterior brain regions (Koshino et al. 2005; 2008). 
It is important to note that reduced connectivit}' does not always result in poor task 
performance. Even where neural circuitr}' is shown to differ, individuals with autism show 
comparable performance to controls on tasks taken to involve working memory, such as the 
n-back working memor}' task (Koshino et al. 2005). The adolescents with ASD included in the 
studies under discussion did not differ from controls on traditional measures of processing 
and storage. The experiments reported here also show that individuals with autism are able to 
use working memor}' to process and store information, including information about beliefs 
derived from implicit processes or generated examples of background knowledge. They tend 
not to go on to integrate such information, however, in the creation of complex models. 
Studies exploring connectivit}' between brain regions during working memory tasks have 
tended to employ well-used measures such as the n-back task. Such tasks tap processing and 
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storage components of working memor)'. Further work is needed, in order to establish 
whether individuals with autism perform poorly on new tasks designed to measure relational 
integration in working memor)', and whether performance is associated with at)'pical 
connecti\nty between brain regions. This is just one of the many possible areas for future work 
emerging from this thesis. Ideas for future directions will be discussed in the next section. 
Future work 
Ideas for new work derive predominandy from major findings of the PhD relating to a 
tendency not to integrate background knowledge in conditional reasoning. Future work also 
emerges, however, from t}pical performance shown by the adolescents with ASD on a 
number of other tasks. Further ideas address the questions raised by the final two experiments 
involving possible reasons why contextuaUsation may not occur in this population. 
The fact that adolescents with ASD show a weak or absent influence of context in 
conditional reasoning extends previous findings associated with information processing 
accounts of autism by providing evidence from a new domain. There is ver)' litde work 
exploring contextualised reasoning among individuals with autism, a notable exception is the 
previously discussed study by Pijnacker et al. (2009). Clearly, more work is needed in this area. 
As previously stated, reasoning in context is primar}', adaptive and difficult to suppress in 
typical populations (see Evans & Over, 2004 for a review). As the belief bias literature shows, 
when reasoning about the world the responses people give typically reflect background 
knowledge and beliefs. It is, therefore, likely that individuals with autism will show different 
patterns of performance compared to controls across a range of tasks invoking contextualised 
reasoning. 
Current plans for future work include designing a series of experiments exploring the 
influence of background knowledge on the selection task (Wason, 1966) among individuals 
with ASD and t}'pical controls. The work presented in this thesis suggests that individuals with 
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autism wiU be less influenced by background information, compared to a tjpical population, 
and will consequently not exhibit the customarj' facilitation afforded by content-rich versions 
of the task. 
The findings of Experiment 2 also highlight the need for further investigation into 
reasoning among populations with autism. The adolescents with ASD did not show a yes 
response bias in a simple reasoning task with questions based on a universally quantified major 
premise. The structure of the questions was taken from the Leevers and Harris (2000) study 
which found evidence for a yes response bias in children with autism. The major difference 
between our experiment and that of previous studies was the content of the questions. 
Previous work used material which was contrar}r-to-fact whereas our experiment used familiar 
factual content. These mixed findings suggest that reasoning with empirically false material 
may present particular difficulties for individuals with autism. 
The work of Leevers and Harris (2000) also highlights the importance of considering 
developmental factors in reasoning among children and adults with autism. Both the Leevers 
and Harris study and that of Pijnacker et al. (2009) have different age participants to those 
studied here. With the exception of Experiments 5 and 6, the participants recruited spanned 
adolescence, a period known to be associated with the development of representational and 
inhibitor}' abilities. Further study is necessar}' in order to examine differences in reasoning 
performance in the Ught of such developmental issues. Reasoning abiUt}' across wider age 
ranges needs to be considered, for example, to establish both that patterns of responding do 
not simply reflect developmental delay, but also the possibUit}' that compensatory mechanisms 
may impact differentiy depending on age. 
The experiments described in Chapters 3 and 4 pose interesting questions regarding the 
reasons why individuals with autism may be able to see the bigger picture in some cases but 
not others. As discussed, the findings show that adolescents with ASD are capable of drawing 
information together in some cases. They can reason logically where background knowledge is 
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unavailable. They are also able to make implicit judgments in the Ught of presented material 
and can generate counterexamples based on given rules and facts. The final 2 experiments 
explore possible reasons for this pattern of results based, in part, on the model of working 
memor)' proposed by Oberauer and colleagues. 
What is of particular interest with regard to new models of working memor)' is that such 
models allow for distinctions between levels of integration involving implicit processes, 
processing and storage of information, and relational integration. Such models provide, 
therefore, explanatory' frameworks for exploring the nature of integration required by different 
tasks. Such an approach is relevant to investigations of the mixed results associated with 
global coherence. Of particular urgency is the reconsideration of measures of cognitive 
capacit}' to include measures of relational integration. These new measures can help to better 
assess the abilit)' of individuals with autism to draw together information for meaning on tasks 
with differing cognitive demands. 
Working memor)' has been implicated in both reasoning on the basis of counterexamples 
(Verschueren et al., 2004) and also the generation of counterexamples (Verschueren, 
Schaeken, De Neys, & d'Ydewalle, 2002; De Neys, Schaeken and dYdewalle 2005), 
particularly disabling conditions. These studies raise questions for future work as both the 
DeNeys et al. (2002) study and the Verscheuren et al. studies (2002; 2004) measured working 
memory capacit}' using the Ospan (La Point & Engle, 1990). In this task, participants solve a 
series of simple mathematical problems while holding in mind a list of unrelated words. 
Despite the fact that Verschueren et al. (2004) suggest that it is relational integration which 
defines contexmalised reasoning the measure used is not specifically designed to tap this 
aspect of working memory. The tasks taken to measure the relational integration sub-
component of working memory are ver}' different (Oberauer et al., 2008), including, for 
example, the abilit}' to identify the changing relationships between aeroplane and landscape 
features in a simulated flight control exercise. These measures present exciting possibilities for 
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exploring the specific aspects of working memor)' involved in reasoning and other tasks. 
Particular areas of interest include investigation of the relationship between relational 
integration measures, traditional processing and storage measures and performance on tasks 
previously taken to reflect global coherence. 
In considering the mixed findings associated with weak central coherence, and the results 
of this thesis, an important question arises regarding motivation or thinking disposition. 
Recent conceptions of weak central coherence describe a tendency rather than an inabilit}'. 
This reflects mixed findings generally but also work showing improvement in global 
processing among individuals with autism where specific instructions are given (e.g. Plaisted et 
al., 1999). 
Stanovich's (2009) model of the mind provides a possible framework for considering the 
role of disposition on task performance in autism. If thinking disposition involves an 
unwillingness to contextualize then the reflective mind may not activate the algorithmic mind. 
As previously described, the algorithmic mind is concerned with complex integrative 
simulations supporting reasoning or text comprehension. If the algorithmic mind is not 
activated then an individual will rely on serial associative processing or implicit processing. 
The question that specifically emerges from Stanovich's work is what role thinking disposition 
plays in the deployment of resources in complex tasks among individuals with autism. In order 
to investigate this question it may be necessar}' to design new dispositional measures which are 
relevant to this population. 
Conclusion 
The findings of the PhD present additional evidence for a lack of contextualised processing 
among adolescents with ASD in a new domain, conditional reasoning. Adolescents with ASD 
show litde influence of background knowledge on two reasoning tasks. In both of these tasks 
typical participants integrate available information from different sources, including contextual 
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information, to arrive at a response. It is proposed that a lack of contextualised reasoning 
stems from a tendency not to combine all available information to create complex integrative 
or situation models. The creation of such models is effortful and relies on working memory' 
resources. In terms of dual process theor)f this tendency is associated with System 2. 
Overburdening working memor}' reduces the influence of contextual information in topical 
participants suggesting that working memor)' plays an acdve role in the integration of 
information. 
New models of working memor}' suggest that a central function is the integration of 
information. A specific domain general sub-component of working memor}^ is responsible for 
integrating initial bindings and information from different sources. This sub-component is 
particularly implicated in the creation of complex models in reasoning. Individuals with autism 
may be unable to make effective use of working memor}^ resources allowing for integration. 
This may be due to poor connectivity^ between cortical regions and dispositional factors. A 
tendency or an inabilit}' to integrate information leads to an over reliance on implicit 
processing, serial associative cognition and piecemeal processing without the support of top 
down models or schemas. This processing st}de allows for good performance in many cases. 
Information can be drawn together through implicit inferences, item to item associations and 
manipulation of material within a single domain. The results of several tasks presented here, 
for example, show comparable performance between adolescents with autism and t)'pical 
controls. Adolescents with autism are able to derive beliefs about the content of statements 
provided, and they are able to generate information and arrive at meaningful responses on the 
basis of rules and facts. They are also able to make inferences which rely on the manipulation 
of presented material. When faced with complex tasks, however, where information from a 
variety of sources must be drawn together, individuals with autism tend to perform poorly. 
The application of non-integrative processing in response to complex reasoning tasks is likely 
172 
to result in working memor}' resources being overburdened. The result will be reasoning 
responses which do not reflect all available contextual information. 
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Appendix Al 
Conditionals used in the reasoning task in Experiment 1: 
Low alternatives and low disablers 
If butter is heated, then it will melt 
If iron touches a magnet, then it will stick to it 
If water is frozen, then it wUl become ice 
If Robert cuts his finger, then it will bleed 
High alternatives and high disablers 
If the brake is pressed, then the car will slow down 
If the window is opened, then the room will become cool 
If a stone is kicked, then it will move 
If a mug is dropped, then it wiU break 
High disablers and low alternatives 
If the ignition key is turned, then the car will start 
If the trigger is pulled, then the gun will fire 
If the correct switch is flicked, then the porch light will go on 
If the doorbell is pushed, then it will ring 
High alternatives and low disablers 
If the apple is ripe, then it will faU off the tree 
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If Camilla eats an ice-lolly, then her mouth will get cold 
If a towel is dropped in the bath, then it will get wet 
If a balloon is pricked, then it will burst 
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Appendix A2 
Questions used in Experiment 2: 
MP All birds have feathers All fish can swim 
standard 
Robins are birds Sharks are fish 
Does it follow that robins have Does it foUow that sharks can swim? 
feathers? 
MP All fires are hot All big cats are fast 
opposite 
A bonfire is a fire A cheetah is a big cat 
Does it follow that a bonfire is cold? Does it follow that cheetahs are 
slow 
MT All insects need oxygen 
standard 
Stones don't need oxygen 
All animals need food 
Rugs don't need food 
Does it follow that stones are Does it follow that rugs are animals? 
insects? 
MT All hot things can burn you All old people have wrinkles 
opposite 
vVn ice cube can't burn you Teenagers don't have wrinkles 
Does it follow that an ice cube is Does it follow that teenagers are 
cold? young? 
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AC vVU flowers have petals 
standard 
Roses have petals 
AH birds lay eggs 
Eagles lay eggs 
Does it follow that roses are flowers? Does it follow that eagles are birds? 
AC All tall animals can eat high up leaves AH small objects can fit inside a cup 
opposite 
Giraffes can eat high up leaves A pin can fit inside a cup 
Does it follow that Giraffes are 
short? 
Does it follow that a pin is big? 
DA AH reptiles have scales 
standard 
Bears are not reptiles 
AJl does bark 
Rabbits are not dogs 
Does it follow that bears have scales? Does it foUow that rabbits bark? 
DA All lemons are sour AH fires are hot 
opposite 
Chocolates are not lemons A snowball is not a fire 
Does it foUow that chocolates are 
sweet? 
Does it follow that a snowball is 
cold? 
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Appendix A3 
Questions used in the generation task in Experiment 3. High/low availabilit)' of 
counterexamples and type of inference is added in parentheses. 
Practice question 
Rule: If Mar\dn wears wellies, then his feet will stay dr)'. 
Fact: Marvin's feet stay dr)', but he is not wearing wellies. 
Tell the experimenter as many reasons as you can that could make this possible. 
(MP High disablers/low alternatives) 
Rule: If the ignition key is turned, then the car will start 
Fact: The ignition key was turned, but the car did not start. 
Tell the experimenter as many reasons as you can that could make this possible. 
(AC High alternatives/ high disablers) 
Rule: If the window is opened, then the room will become cool. 
Fact: The room becomes cool, but the window was not opened. 
Tell the experimenter as many reasons as you can that could make this possible. 
(AC High alternatives/low disablers) 
Rule: If a towel is dropped in the bath, then it will get wet. 
Fact: A towel gets wet, but it is not dropped in the bath. 
Tell the experimenter as many reasons as you can that could make this possible. 
(MP Low alternatives/low disablers) 
Rule: If butter is heated, then it will melt. 
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Fact: Butter is heated, but it does not melt. 
Tell the experimenter as many reasons as you can that could make this possible. 
(MP high alternatives/ high disablers) 
Rule: If the window is opened, then the room will become cool. 
Fact: The window is opened, but the room does not become cool. 
Tel] the experimenter as many reasons as you can that could make this possible. 
(AC high disablers/low alternatives) 
Rule: If the ignition key is turned, then the car will start. 
Fact: The car started, but the ignition key was not turned 
Tell the experimenter as many reasons as you can that could make this possible. 
(IMP high alternatives/low disablers) 
Rule: If a towel is dropped in the bath, then it will get wet. 
Fact: A towel is dropped in the bath, but it does not get wet. 
Tell the experimenter as many reasons as you can that could make this possible. 
(AC Low alternatives/low disablers) 
Rule: If butter is heated, then it will melt. 
Fact: Butter melts, but it was not heated. 
Tell the experimenter as many reasons as you can that could make this possible. 
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Appendix A4 
Conditionals used in the suppression task in Experiment 4: 
Simple statements Additional arguments 
If Mar}' goes shopping, then she buys 
some fruit. 
If the grocer is open, then Mar)' buys some 
fruit. 
If Chet meets his brother, then he goes 
ice skating. 
If Chet has a warm coat on, then he goes 
ice skating. 
If Amina has homework, then she will 
work in the sitting room. 
If the sitting room is quiet, then Amina will 
work in the sitting room. 
If it is windy, then Gemma's hair gets 
messed up. 
If Gemma goes out, then her hair gets 
messed up. 
If Liam has a long lunch break, then he 
rings his girlfriend. 
If Liam's mobile phone is charged, then he 
rings his girlfriend 
If Laura goes out with her friend, then 
she will go to her favourite restaurant. 
If Laura has enough money, then she will 
go to her favourite restaurant. 
If John goes to the caravan, then he will 
play scrabble. 
If John packs his favourite games, then he 
win play scrabble. 
If Tam has a babysitter, then she will go 
to the exercise class. 
If the babysitter is on time, then she will go 
to the exercise class. 
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Simple statements Alternative arguments 
If Paul goes fishing, then he has a fish 
supper 
If Paul goes to the fishmarket, then he has 
a fish supper 
If Susan meets her friend, then she goes 
to the cinema. 
If Susan meets her family, then she goes to 
the cinema. 
If Rosa has a report to write, then she 
studies in the library all evening. 
If Rosa has some textbooks to read, then 
she studies in the librar)' all evening. 
If it rains, then Alex gets wet. If it snows, then Alex gets wet. 
If Luke takes the afternoon off work, 
then he mows the lawn. 
If it is the weekend, then Luke mows the 
lawn. 
If Laura cooks dinner, then she has a nice If Laura buys a takeaway, then she has a 
meal. nice meal. 
If Jack goes to the beach, then he will fly If Jack goes to the playing field, then he 
a kite. will fly a kite. 
If Mei goes to the beach, then she will go If Mei goes to the swimming pool, then 
swimming. she wiU go swimming. 
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Appendix A5 
Autism Quotient Questionnaire (AQ) 
Name: Sex:., 
Date of birth: Today's Date.. 
How to All out the questionnaire 
Below are a list of statements. Please read each statement very carefully and rate how strongly jou agree or disagree with it 
by circlingyour answer. 
DO N O T MISS ANY STATEMENT OUT. 
Examples 
E l . I am willing to take risks. definitely sUghdy 
agree agree 
E2.1 like playing board games. definitely 
agree 
slighdy definitely 
disagree disagree 
E3.1 find learning to play musical instruments easy. definitely slighdy 
2.jSji^%~^ a g r e e 
E4.1 am fascinated by other culmres. slighdy slighdy \i^fcix 
agree disagree disagree 
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1. I prefer to do things with others rather than on my 
own. 
2. I prefer to d o things the same way over and over 
again. 
3. If I tr^' to imagine something, I find it vet}' easy to 
create a picture in my mind. 
4. 1 frequendy get so strongly absorbed in one thing 
that I lose sight of other things. 
5. 1 often notice small sounds when others do not. 
6. I usually notice car number plates or similar strings 
of information. 
7. Other people frequendy tell me that what I've said 
is impolite, even though I think it is polite. 
8. When I 'm reading a stor)', I can easily imagine 
what the characters might look like. 
9. I am fascinated by dates. 
10. In a social group, 1 can easily keep track of several 
different people's conversations. 
11. I find social situations easy. 
12. I tend to notice details that others do not. 
13 .1 would rather go to a librarj' than a part}'. 
14. I find making up stories easy. 
15. I find myself drawn more strongly to people than 
to things. 
16 .1 tend to have ver}' s trong interests which I get 
upset about if I can' t pursue. 
17 .1 enjoy social chit-chat. 
18. When I talk, it isn't always easy for others to get a 
word in edgeways. 
19 .1 am fascinated by numbers . 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
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20. W h e n I 'm reading a stor}', I find it difficult to 
work out the characters' intentions. 
21. I don ' t particularly enjoy reading fiction. 
22. I find it hard to make new friends. 
2 3 . 1 notice patterns in things all the time. 
24. I would rather go to the theatre than a museum. 
25. I t does not upset me if my daily routine is 
disturbed. 
26. I frequendy find that I don ' t know how to keep a 
conversation going. 
27. 1 find it easy to "read between the lines" when 
someone is talking to me. 
28. I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, 
rather than the small details. 
29. I am not very good at remembering phone 
numbers . 
3 0 . 1 don ' t usually notice small changes in a simation, 
or a person's appearance. 
3 1 . 1 know how to tell if someone listening to me is 
getting bored. 
32. I find it easy to do more than one thing at once. 
33. When I talk on the phone , I 'm not sure when it's 
my turn to speak. 
3 4 . 1 enjoy doing things spontaneously. 
35. I am often the last to understand the point of a 
joke. 
3 6 . 1 find it easy to work out what someone is 
thinking or feeling just by looking at their face. 
37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to 
what I was doing ver)' quickly. 
38. I am good at social chit-chat. 
39. People often tell me that I keep going on and on 
about the same thing. 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
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40. W h e n I was j 'oung, 1 used to enjoy playing games 
involving pretending with other children. 
41 . 1 like to collect information about categories of 
things (e.g. tjfpes of car, t^'pes of bird, t^pes of 
train, t}^es of plant, etc.). 
42. I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like 
to be someone else. 
43. I like to plan any activities 1 participate in carefully. 
44. I enjoy social occasions. 
45. I find it difficult to work out people's intentions. 
46. N e w situations make me anxious. 
4 7 . 1 enjoy meeting new people. 
4 8 . 1 am a good diplomat. 
49. I am no t ver)' good at remembering people's date 
of birth. 
50. 1 find it vety easy to play games with children that 
involve pretending. 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
definitely 
agree 
sUghdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slightiy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
agree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
slighdy 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
definitely 
disagree 
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Appendix Bl Experiment 1 
Table 1.1 ANOVA performed on MP data from the conditional reasoning task in Experiment 
1. 2x group 2x availabiUt}' of disablers 
Intercept 
DISABLERS 
DISABLERS* 
Error 
GROUP 
SS 
5164.388 
6.751 
7.907 
71.968 
df 
1 
1 
1 
62 
MS 
5164.388 
6.751 
7.907 
1.161 
F 
964.199 
5.816 
6.812 
P 
.000 
.019 
.011 
9 
Tl'p 
.940 
.086 
.099 
Table 1.2 Paired sample T-test for an effect of disablers in each group. 
VIean 
-.038 
.974 
SD 
.999 
1.793 
SE Mean 
.196 
.291 
t 
-.196 
3.347 
df 
25 
37 
P 
.846 
.002 
ASD 
T)'pical 
Table 1.3 ANOVA performed on AC data from the conditional reasoning task in Experiment 
1. 2x group 2x availabilit}' of alternatives 
Intercept 
ALTERNATIVES 
ALTERNATIVES* GROUP 
Error 
SS 
4239.944 
94.009 
22.852 
169.866 
df 
1 
1 
1 
62 
MS 
4239.944 
94.009 
22.852 
2.740 
F 
675.733 
34.312 
8.341 
P 
.000 
.000 
.005 
Tip 
.916 
.356 
.119 
Table 1.4 Paired sample T-test for an effect of alternatives in each group. 
ASD 
T3'pical 
Mean 
.885 
2.605 
SD 
2.123 
2.477 
SE Mean 
.416 
.402 
t 
2.125 
6.483 
df 
25 
37 
P 
.044 
.000 
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Table 1.5 ANOVA performed on the P(q | p) data from the probabilit}' judgment task in 
Experiment 1. 2x availabilit}' of disablers 2x group 
Intercept 
DISABLERS 
DISABLERS* 
Error 
GROUP 
ss 
8883.076 
.805 
1.008 
30.147 
df 
1 
1 
1 
62 
MS 
8883.076 
.805 
1.008 
.486 
F 
4271.958 
1.655 
2.073 
P 
.000 
.203 
.155 
n'p 
.986 
.026 
.032 
Table 1.6 T-test of differences between ASD and tj'pical groups on P(q | p) questions with low 
and high available disablers 
_ s i ^ df Mean Diff SE Diff 
Low Disablers 
High Disablers 
1.927 
5.157 
.170 
.027 
-.889 
.361 
62 
62 
.377 
.738 
-.25810 
.10324 
.29023 
.28628 
Table 1.7 ANOVA performed on the P(p | q) data from the probabilit}' judgment task in 
Experiment 1. 2x availabilit}' of alternatives 2x group 
Intercept 
ALTERNATIVES 
ALTERNATIVES* GROUP 
Error 
SS 
7864.799 
69.445 
1.641 
52.644 
df 
1 
1 
1 
62 
MS 
7864.799 
69.445 
1.641 
.849 
F 
2795.909 
81.787 
1.932 
P 
.000 
.000 
.169 
7 
n"p 
.978 
.569 
.030 
Table 1.8 T-test of differences between ASD and typical groups on P(p | q) questions with low 
and high available alternatives 
_sig_ df Mean Diff SE Diff 
Low Alternatives 
High Alternatives 
4.863 .031 -.543 
2.138 .149 .781 
62 
62 
.621 
.438 
-.17156 
.28947 
.31605 
.37058 
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Appendix B2 Experiment 2 
Table 2.1 t-test of differences between groups in inference rates for standard or opposite 
conclusions on all argument forms. 
MP standard 
MP opposite 
MT opposite 
MT standard 
AC standard 
AC opposite 
DA opposite 
DA standard 
t 
.490 
-.722 
.337 
.432 
1.198 
1.390 
-.290 
.223 
df 
56 
56 
56 
56 
56 
56 
56 
56 
P 
.626 
.473 
.737 
.670 
.327 
.330 
.773 
.825 
Mean Diff 
.045 
-.026 
.039 
.097 
.074 
.100 
-.039 
.021 
SE Diff 
.091 
.036 
.117 
.078 
.061 
.072 
.136 
.095 
Diff (lower) 
-.138 
-.099 
-.195 
-.059 
-.049 
-.044 
-.312 
-.168 
Diff (upper) 
.228 
.047 
.274 
.253 
.197 
.244 
.233 
.211 
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Appendix B3 Experiment 3 
Table 3.1 ANOVA (between subjects effects) performed on t}'pes of counterexamples 
generated by t^'pical and ASD groups. 
Intercept 
GROUP 
Error 
T5'pe 1 
T}'pe 2 
T)'pe3 
T)'pe 4 
Tj'pe 1 
T5'pe2 
Type 3 
T)'pe 4 
Tj'pe 1 
Tj'pe 2 
Type 3 
Tjfpe 4 
ss 
7000.892 
.931 
248.539 
15.404 
1.508 
.008 
.462 
1.250 
763.800 
12.050 
113.769 
39.269 
df 
50 
50 
50 
50 
MS 
7000.892 
.931 
248.539 
15.404 
1.508 
.008 
.462 
1.250 
15.276 
.241 
2.275 
.785 
F 
458.294 
3.862 
109.230 
19.614 
.099 
.032 
.203 
1.592 
P 
.000 
.055 
.000 
.000 
.755 
.859 
.654 
.213 
n'p 
.902 
.072 
.686 
.282 
.002 
.001 
.004 
.031 
Table 3.2 ANOVA performed on data from the generation task in Experiment 3. 2x 
availabilit}' of disablers with group as a between-subjects factor. 
Intercept 
DISABLERS 
DISABLERS* 
Error 
GROUP 
SS 
1502.404 
159.278 
.509 
116.838 
df 
1 
1 
1 
50 
MS 
1502.404 
159.278 
.509 
2.337 
F 
401.176 
68.162 
.218 
P 
.000 
.000 
.643 
7 
n"p 
.889 
.577 
.004 
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Table 3.3 ANOVA performed on data from the generation task in Experiment 3. 2x 
availabilit)' of alternatives with group as a between-subjects factor. 
Intercept 
ALTERNATIVES 
ALTERNATIVES* GROUP 
Error 
ss 
139L547 
427.778 
.009 
76.712 
df 
1 
1 
1 
50 
MS 
1391.547 
427.778 
.009 
1.534 
F 
400.532 
278.819 
.006 
P 
.000 
.000 
.940 
n'p 
.889 
.848 
.000 
Table 3.4 MANOVA performed on counterexamples generated for t}rpical and autistic 
groups 
Value Hypothesis df Error df n\ 
Intercept 
GROUP 
.910 
.013 
2.471 
.315 
2.000 
2.000 
49.000 
49.000 
.000 
.731 
.910 
.013 
Table 3.5 Correlations between measure of influence of counterexamples on the conditional 
reasoning task and counterexamples generated by ASD and t)^ical groups 
Counterexamples generated 
ASD Measure of influence of counterexamples 
(conditional reasoning task) 
Correlation 
Sig (2 tailed) 
N 
Correlation 
Sig (2 tailed) 
N 
.163 
.493 
20 
.386* 
.029 
32 
Tjfpical Measure of influence of counterexamples 
(conditional reasoning task) 
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Appendix B4 Experiment 4 
Table 4.1 ANOVA For additional arguments in Experiment 4. 2x argument 2x validit)' and 2x 
endorsement with group as a between-subjects factor. 
Intercept 
ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT* GROUP 
Error 
V/\LIDITY 
VALIDITY'* GROUP 
Error 
ENDORSEMENT 
ENDORSEMENT* GROUP 
Error 
ARGUMENT* VALIDITY 
ARGUMENT* VALIDITY* GROUP 
Error 
ARGUMENT* ENDORSEMENT 
ARGUMENT* ENDORSEMENT* GROUP 
Error 
VALIDITY* ENDORSEMENT 
VALIDITY* ENDORSEMENT* GROUP 
Error 
ARGUMENT* VALIDITY* ENDORSEMENT 
ARG* VALIDITY* ENDORSEMENT* GROUP 
Error 
ss 
4197.612 
28.357 
3.557 
110.020 
1.170 
2.001 
49.030 
26.899 
2.499 
87.070 
.788 
3.557 
39.720 
.942 
.481 
27.950 
.019 
.173 
30.450 
.077 
.077 
25.500 
df 
1 
1 
1 
63 
1 
1 
63 
1 
1 
63 
1 
1 
63 
1 
1 
63 
1 
1 
63 
1 
1 
63 
MS 
4197.612 
28.357 
3.557 
1.746 
1.170 
2.001 
.778 
26.899 
2.499 
1.382 
.788 
3.557 
.630 
.942 
.481 
.444 
.019 
.173 
.483 
.077 
.077 
.405 
F 
679.156 
16.238 
2.037 
1.503 
2.571 
19.463 
1.808 
1.249 
5.642 
2.124 
1.084 
.040 
.358 
.190 
.190 
P 
.000 
.000 
.158 
.225 
.114 
.000 
.184 
.268 
.021 
.150 
.302 
.843 
.552 
.664 
.664 
9 
.915 
.205 
.031 
.023 
.039 
.236 
.028 
.019 
.082 
.033 
.017 
.001 
.006 
.003 
.003 
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Table 4.2 ANOVA For alternative arguments in Experiment 4. 2x argument, 2x validit}' and 
2x endorsement with group as a between-subjects factor. 
Intercept 
ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT* GROUP 
Error 
VALIDITY' 
VALIDITY* GROUP 
Error 
ENDORSEMENT 
ENDORSEMENT* GROUP 
Error 
ARGUMENT* VALIDITY 
ARG* VALIDITY* GROUP 
Error 
ARGUMENT* ENDORSEMENT 
ARG* ENDORSEMENT* GROUP 
Error 
VALIDITY* ENDORSEMENT 
V^VLIDITY* ENDORSEMENT* GROUP 
Error 
ARG* VALIDITY* ENDORSEMENT 
ARG* VAL* ENDORSEMENT* GROUP 
Error 
ss 
3941.972 
82.127 
17.481 
91.442 
55.973 
1.096 
88.527 
5.590 
.006 
92.302 
66.602 
1.125 
62.367 
.592 
.315 
30.877 
2.020 
.097 
24.472 
.059 
.059 
24.472 
df 
1 
1 
1 
63 
1 
1 
63 
1 
1 
63 
1 
1 
63 
1 
1 
63 
1 
1 
63 
1 
1 
63 
MS 
3941.972 
82.127 
17.481 
1.451 
55.973 
1.096 
1.405 
5.590 
.006 
1.465 
66.602 
1.125 
.990 
.592 
.315 
.490 
2.020 
.097 
.388 
.059 
.059 
.388 
F 
960.724 
56.583 
12.044 
39.833 
.780 
3.816 
.004 
67.278 
1.137 
1.209 
.644 
6.158 
.297 
.152 
.152 
P 
.000 
.000 
.001 
.000 
.380 
.055 
.950 
.000 
.290 
.276 
.425 
.016 
.588 
.698 
.698 
n'p 
.938 
.473 
.160 
.387 
.012 
.057 
.000 
.516 
.018 
.019 
.010 
.089 
.005 
.002 
.002 
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Table 4.3 Paired sample t-test for effect of additional arguments on valid and invalid 
inferences for both groups 
Mean SD SE Mean t df p 
ASD Valid additional 
arguments-Valid simple -.44000 
arguments 
Invalid additional 
arguments-Invalid -.80000 
simple arguments 
2.21886 .44377 -.992 24 .331 
2.23607 .44721 -1.789 24 .086 
Tjfpical Valid additional 
arguments-Valid simple -1.80000 
arguments 
Invalid additional 
arguments-Inv-alid -.80000 
simple arguments 
2.56405 .40541 -4.440 39 .000 
1.63613 .25869 -3.092 39 .004 
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Appendix B5 Experiment 5 
Table 5.1 ANOVA performed on data from Experiment 5. 2x availability of disablers, 2x 
condition with AQ and working memor)' (WM) as between-subjects factors. 
Intercept 
DISABLERS 
DISABLERS* AQ 
DISABLERS* WM 
DISABLERS* AQ* WM 
Error 
CONDITION 
CONDITION* AQ 
CONDITION* WM 
CONDITION* AQ* WM 
Error 
DISABLERS* CONDITION 
DISABLERS* CONDITION* 
DISABLERS* CONDITION* 
DISABLERS* CONDITION* 
Error 
AQ 
WM 
AQ* WM 
SS 
1608.874 
21.846 
.025 
.033 
3.272 
51.240 
.762 
.000 
.518 
.189 
25.414 
.053 
.389 
.389 
.053 
14.827 
df 
43 
43 
43 
MS 
1608.874 
21.846 
.025 
.033 
3.272 
1.192 
.762 
.000 
.518 
.189 
.591 
.053 
.389 
.389 
.053 
.345 
F 
330.095 
18.333 
.021 
.028 
2.746 
1.289 
.001 
.876 
.321 
.153 
1.127 
1.127 
.153 
P 
.000 
.000 
.884 
.869 
.105 
.263 
.980 
.354 
.574 
.698 
.294 
.294 
.698 
7 
.885 
.299 
.000 
.001 
.060 
.029 
.000 
.020 
.007 
.004 
.026 
.026 
.004 
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Table 5.2 ANOVA performed on data from Experiment 5. 2x availabilit}' of alternatives, 2x 
condition with AQ and working memory (WM) as between-subjects factors. 
Intercept 
ALTERNATIVES 
ALTERNATIVES* AQ 
ALTERNATIVES* VCM 
ALTERNATIVES* 7\Q* VVM 
Error 
CONDITION 
CONDITION* AQ 
CONDITION* WM 
CONDITION* AQ* WM 
Error 
ALTERNATIVES* CONDITION 
ALTERNATIVES* CONDITION* 
ALTERNATIVES* CONDITION* 
ALTERNATIVES* CONDITION* 
Error 
AQ 
WM 
AQ* WM 
SS 
679.310 
98.406 
.210 
.008 
.114 
48.094 
1.944 
.013 
.066 
.206 
30.040 
.052 
.882 
.080 
.183 
25.023 
df 
43 
43 
43 
MS 
679.310 
98.406 
.210 
.008 
.114 
1.118 
1.944 
.013 
.066 
.206 
.699 
.052 
.882 
.080 
.183 
.582 
F 
116.486 
87.983 
.188 
.007 
.102 
2.783 
.019 
.095 
.295 
.090 
1.516 
.138 
.314 
P 
.000 
.000 
.667 
.934 
.751 
.103 
.891 
.760 
.590 
.766 
.225 
.712 
.578 
n'p 
.730 
.672 
.004 
.000 
.002 
.061 
.000 
, .002 
.007 
.002 
.034 
.003 
.007 
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Table 5.4 ANOVA performed on AC data from Experiment 5. 2x availabilit}' of alternatives 
2x condition with attention to detail (AD) as a betvveen-subjects factor. 
Intercept 
ALTERNATIVES 
ALTERNATIVES* AD 
Error 
CONDITION 
CONDITION* AD 
Error 
ALTERNATIVES* CONDITION 
ALTERNATIVES* CONDITION* AD 
Error 
ss 
675.078 
100.657 
4.147 
44.268 
1.883 
.393 
29.937 
.056 
.651 
25.551 
df 
1 
1 
1 
45 
1 
1 
45 
1 
1 
45 
MS 
675.078 
100.657 
4.147 
.984 
1.883 
.393 
.665 
.056 
.651 
.568 
F 
118.167 
102.322 
4.215 
2.830 
.591 
.098 
1.147 
P 
.000 
.000 
.046 
.099 
.446 
.756 
.290 
•y 
.724 
.695 
.086 
.059 
.013 
.002 
.025 
Table 5.5 Correlations between effect of counterexamples (difference between numbers of 
endorsements where few and many counterexamples are available) and AQ subcategories. 
Measure of the effect of counterexamples 
AQ subcategories N 
Social Skills 
Attention switching 
Attention to detail 
Communication 
Imagination 
47 
47 
47 
47 
47 
-.185 
-.211 
-.298 
-.198 
-.045 
.214 
.155 
.042 
.181 
.765 
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Table 5.6 T-test of differences between high and low attention to detail groups on the effect 
of counterexamples for MP and AC 
_ s i ^ df Mean Diff SE Diff 
Effect of 2.939 .093 2.105 
counterexamples MP 
Effect of .334 .566 
counterexamples AC 
2.053 
45 
45 
.041 
.046 
.64583 
.59420 
.30678 
.28941 
Table 5.7 ANOVA performed on response times for Experiment 5. 2x inference type, 2x 
condition with AQ as a between-subjects factor 
Intercept 
INFERENCE TYPE 
INFERENCE TYPE* AQ 
Error 
CONDITION 
CONDITION* AQ 
Error 
INF TYPE* CONDITION 
INF TYPE* CONDITION* AQ 
Error 
ss 
17882.483 
10.866 
1.610 
447.747 
850.637 
179.033 
1355.880 
57.352 
2.044 
631.660 
df 
1 
1 
1 
45 
1 
1 
45 
1 
1 
45 
MS 
17882.483 
10.866 
1.610 
9.950 
850.637 
179.033 
30.131 
57.352 
2.044 
14.037 
F 
119.586 
1.092 
.162 
28.232 
5.942 
4.086 
.146 
P 
.000 
.302 
.689 
.000 
.019 
.049 
.705 
Tl^ P 
.121 
.024 
.004 
.386 
.117 
.083 
.003 
Table 5.8 Paired sample t-test comparing response times under tapping and articulation for 
low and high AQ participants 
AQ 
low 
high 
RT under 
ardculation-RT 
under tapping 
RT under 
articuIation-RT 
under tapping 
Mean 
-6.20738 
-2.30305 
SD 
7.06230 
3.35317 
SE Mean 
1.47259 
.68446 
t 
-4.215 
-3.365 
df 
22 
23 
P 
.000 
.003 
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Table 5.9 t-test comparing low and high AQ groups on difference between RT for tapping 
and RT for articulation 
sig df Mean Diff SE Diff 
Difference in RT between 
tapping and articulation 1.838 .182 2.058 45 .045 3360.85009 1632.88511 
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Appendix B6 Experiment 6 
Table 6.1 ANOVA on data from Experiment 6. 2x availabilit}' of disablers 2x condition with 
t}'pe of load as between-subjects factor. 
Intercept 
DISABLERS 
DISABLERS* T \ T E OF LOAD 
Error 
CONDITION 
CONDITION* TYPE OF LOAD 
Error 
DISABLERS* CONDITION 
DIS* CONDITION* TYPE OF LOAD 
Error 
ss 
3675.862 
19.815 
.045 
46.909 
.126 
3.114 
88.495 
.832 
.004 
38.915 
df 
1 
1 
1 
85 
1 
1 
85 
1 
1 
85 
MS 
3675.862 
19.815 
.045 
.552 
.126 
3.114 
1.041 
.832 
.004 
.458 
F 
1540.550 
35.905 
.081 
.121 
2.991 
1.817 
.009 
P 
.000 
.000 
.776 
.729 
.087 
.181 
.925 
.948 
.297 
.001 
.001 
.034 
.021 
.000 
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Table 6.2 ANO VA on data from Experiment 6. 2x availabilit}' of disablers 2x condition with 
type of load and working memor}' groups (low/ver)' high) as between-subjects factors. 
SS df MS F p Ti-p 
Intercept 
DISABLERS 
DIS/\BLERS* TYPE O F LOYVD 
DISABLERS* VCM 
DISABLERS* TYPE OF LOAD* VX'M 
Error 
CONDITION 
CONDITION* TYPE OF LOAD 
CONDITION*\XT^I 
CONDITION* TYPE OF LO^VD* 
WM 
Error 86.216 83 L039 
DISABLERS* CONDITION 
DISABLERS* CONDITION* TYPE 
OF LOAD 
DISABLERS* CONDITION* VC^M 
DIS* CONDITION* LOAD* WM 
Error 
2708.287 
11.695 
.055 
.467 
.523 
46.030 
.216 
3.744 
2.104 
.356 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
83 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2708.287 
11.695 
.055 
.467 
.523 
.555 
.216 
3.744 
2.104 
.356 
1111.414 
21.089 
.100 
.842 
.942 
.208 
3.604 
2.026 
.342 
.000 
.000 
.753 
.362 
.335 
.649 
.061 
.158 
.560 
.931 
.203 
.001 
.010 
.011 
.003 
.042 
.024 
.004 
.202 
.061 
.343 
.256 
8.382 
1 
1 
1 
1 
83 
.202 
.061 
.343 
.256 
.462 
.436 
.131 
.742 
.554 
.511 
.718 
.391 
.459 
.005 
.002 
.009 
.007 
226 
Table 6.3 ANOVA on data from Experiment 6. 2x availabilit}' of alternatives 2x condition 
with tjpe of load as between-subjects factor. 
Intercept 
ALTERNATIVES 
ALTERNATIVES* TYPE OF LOAD 
Error 
CONDITION 
CONDITION* T i T E O F LOi\D 
Error 
ALTERNATIVES* CONDITION 
ALT* CONDITION* T \ T E OF LOAD 
Error 
ss 
2001.854 
187.570 
5.547 
110.850 
.825 
.066 
81.353 
1.288 
.668 
63.315 
df 
1 
1 
1 
85 
1 
1 
85 
1 
1 
85 
MS 
2001.854 
187.570 
5.547 
1.304 
.825 
.066 
.957 
1.288 
.668 
.745 
F 
458.800 
143.829 
4.253 
.862 
.069 
1.730 
.896 
P 
.000 
.000 
.042 
.356 
.793 
.192 
.346 
n'p 
.844 
.629 
.048 
.010 
.001 
.020 
.010 
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Table 6.4 Correlations between effect of counterexamples (difference between numbers of 
endorsements where few and many counterexamples are available) and AQ subcategories, in 
the simple and complex conditions. 
Simple condition 
Complex condition 
AQ subcategories 
Social Skills 
Attention switching 
Attention to detail 
Communication 
Imagination 
Social Skills 
Attention switching 
Attention to detail 
Communication 
Imagination 
Measure of the 
N 
44 
44 
44 
44 
44 
43 
43 
43 
43 
43 
effect of 
r 
.171 
-.008 
-.136 
.131 
.172 
.046 
-.167 
-.259 
.058 
.032 
counterexamples 
P 
.133 
.481 
.190 
.199 
.132 
.384 
.143 
.047 
.355 
.418 
Table 6.5 Moderated regression with effect of counterexamples as the dependent variable, 
attention to detail and working memor}' as predictors 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients 
Constant 
Attention to detail 
Working memory' 
Attention to detail* working memor\' 
.904 
-.134 
.001 
-.014 
SE 
.110 
.052 
.011 
.005 
Beta 
-.375 
.012 
-.428 
t 
8.194 
-2.562 
.079 
-2.739 
sig 
.000 
.014 
.937 
.009 
Dependent variable: effect of counterexamples 
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Table 6.6 ANOVA (within-subjects effects) on response time data from Experiment 6. 2x 
inference t)'pe 2x availability of counterexamples 2x condition with t3rpe of load as a between-
subjects factor 
SS df MS T1"P 
INFERENCE TYPE 
INFERENCE * TYPE OF LOAD 
Error 
AVvMUVBILITY 
AVAIL/VBILITY* TYPE OF LOAD 
Error 
CONDITION 
CONDITION* TYPE OF LOAD 
Error 
INFERENCE* AVAILABILITY 
INF* AVAILABILITY* LOAD 
Error 
INFERENCE TYPE* CONDITION 
INF* CONDITION* T \ T E OF 
LOAD 
Error 
AVAILABILITY* CONDITION 
AVAIL* CONDITION* LO^VD 
Error 
INF * AVAIL* CONDITION 
INF* AVAIL* CONDITION* LOAD 
Error 
16.234 
14.701 
1284.422 
16.087 
6.163 
1301.398 
84.387 
1.261 
2078.278 
2.145 
.958 
1027.391 
2.765 
1 
1 
85 
1 
1 
85 
1 
1 
85 
1 
1 
85 
1 
16.234 
14.701 
15.110 
16.087 
6.163 
15.310 
84.387 
1.261 
24.450 
2.145 
.958 
12.086 
2.765 
1.074 
.973 
1.051 
.403 
3.451 
.516 
.177 
.079 
.229 
.303 
.327 
.308 
.527 
.067 
.475 
.675 
.779 
.634 
.012 
.011 
.012 
.005 
.039 
.006 
.002 
.001 
.003 
1.213 1 1.213 .100 .752 .001 
1028.531 
1.758 
5.805 
966.567 
2.161 
5.269 
817.139 
85 
1 
1 
85 
1 
1 
85 
12.100 
1.758 
5.805 
11.371 
2.161 
5.269 
9.613 
.155 
.511 
.225 
.548 
.695 
.477 
.637 
.461 
.002 
.006 
.003 
.006 
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Table 6.7 Between-subjects tables of effects for A N O V A on response time data from 
Experiment 6. 2x inference t jpe 2x availabilit}' of counterexamples 2x condition with tjfpe of 
load as a between-subjects factor 
Tests of between-subjects effects 
Source SS df MS F p n~B 
Intercept 
TYPE OF LOAD 
Error 
13885.632 
181.381 
3758.775 
1 
1 
85 
13885.632 
181.381 
44.220 
314.006 
4.102 
.000 
.046 
.787 
.046 
Table 6.8 ANOVA (within-subjects effects) on response time data from the simple condition 
in Experiment 6. 2x inference type 2x condition with AQ as between-subjects factor. 
Intercept 
INFERENCE TYPE 
INFERENCE TYPE* AQ 
Error 
CONDITION 
CONDITION* AQ 
Error 
INF* CONDITION 
INF* CONDITION* AQ 
Error 
SS 
2754.915 
.010 
1.635 
53.538 
41.036 
19.834 
531.759 
1.932 
3.681 
413.910 
df 
1 
1 
1 
42 
1 
1 
42 
1 
1 
41 
MS 
2754.915 
.010 
1.635 
1.275 
41.036 
19.834 . 
12.661 
1.932 
3.681 
10.095 
F 
278.479 
.008 
1.283 
3.241 
1.567 
.904 
1.722 
P 
.000 
.931 
.264 
.079 
.218 
.347 
.197 
1 
.869 
.000 
.030 
.072 
.036 
.021 
.039 
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Table 6.9 Table of between-subjects effects for ANOVA on response time data from the 
simple condition in Experiment 6. 2x inference type 2x condition with AQ as between-
subjects factor. 
Source 
Intercept 
AQ 
Error 
ss 
2754.914 
57.342 
415.494 
Tests of between 
df 
1 
1 
42 
-subjects 
MS 
2754.914 
57.342 
9.892 
effects 
F 
278.479 
5.796 
P 
.000 
.021 
9 
.869 
.121 
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Abstract 
Ever)'day conditional reasoning is t}'pically influenced by prior knowledge and belief in the 
form of specific exceptions known as counterexamples. This study explored whether 
adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (N=26) were less influenced by 
background knowledge than t)'pically developing adolescents (N=38) when engaged in 
conditional reasoning. Participants were presented with pretested valid and invalid conditional 
inferences with varying available counterexamples. The group with ASD showed significantly 
less influence of prior knowledge on valid inferences {p= .01) and invalid inferences (p~ .01) 
compared to the tj^ pical group. In a secondary probabilit}' judgment task, no significant group 
differences were found in probabilistic judgments of the believability of the premises. Further 
experiments found that results could not be explained by differences between the groups in 
the abilit)' to generate counterexamples or any tendency among adolescents with ASD to 
exhibit a yes response pattern. It was concluded that adolescents with ASD tend not to 
spontaneously contextualize presented material when engaged in everj^day reasoning. These 
findings are discussed with reference to Weak Central Coherence Theor)' and the conditional 
reasoning literature. 
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Four decades of research into adult deductive reasoning has shown that participants are 
highly influenced by the content and context used to frame problems (Evans, 2002). Such 
effects are t)'pically referred to in this literature as a cause of 'cognitive bias', since participants 
are routinely instructed to draw only necessar}' conclusions based on the information given. 
Arguably, this is a paradigm-bound perspective as the abilit}' to take account of background 
knowledge and belief in ever}'day reasoning is highly adaptive and instrumental in achieving 
our personal goals (Evans, 2007). In this study, we test the hjpothesis that the reasoning of 
adolescents with Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) wiU be less contextualized than that of a 
t}fpically developing control group. We do this with reference to the study of conditional 
reasoning, with 'if-then' arguments, as much is already known about the influence of prior 
knowledge on this task (Evans, 2007; Evans & Over, 2004). 
Conditional reasoning involves inference with a major premise of the form 'if p then q' 
and four possible minor premises. In the case of Modus Ponens (MP) this involves reasoning 
from the premises 'if p then q, p is true,' this leads logically to the response 'p is true.' Modus 
Tollens (MT) requires reasoning from the premises 'if p then q, q is false' leading logically to 
the conclusion 'p is false.' Both MP and MT are valid inferences in that there is a single 
logically correct response. Affirmation of the Consequent (AC) requires reasoning with the 
premises 'if p then q, qis true. Denial of the Antecedent (DA) requires reasoning with the 
premises 'if p then q, p is false.' AC and DA are invalid inferences in the sense that the correct 
logical response is one of uncertaint)'. Here the implied responses are not logically correct, 
although there is a tendency for people to respond with certaint}' bj^ giving the pragmatically 
implied conclusion 'p is true' for AC and 'q is false' for DA. 
Context in the form of disabling conditions and alternative antecedents, collectively 
known as counterexamples, have been shown to influence the tendency to endorse both valid 
and invalid conclusions (e.g., Cummins, 1995; Cummins et al., 1991; Quinn & Markovits, 
1998; Thompson, 1994). It has been claimed that willingness to endorse arguments is 
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influenced by the extent to which knowledge about counterexamples is activated and 
integrated with premise information. Consider the following example of a MP argument 
(Markovits & Pot\an, 2001). 
If a chair is thrown at a mndow, then the window will break 
Suppose a chair is thrown at the window, does it follow that the window is broken? 
Whilst the conclusion follows logically in this case, many participants will withhold the 
inference because there are man}' available exceptions. They may think of specific conditions 
in which the effect does not follow from the cause (e.g. the window is made of toughened 
glass or the chair is made of plastic etc.) In the case of valid inferences these exceptions or 
counterexamples are known as disabling conditions. The activation and integration of such 
disablers increases the tendency for people to withhold the inference. 
Similarly if we consider the invalid AC form: 
Suppose the window is broken, does it follow that a chair was thrown at the ivindoiv? 
Whilst reasoners often endorse the AC conclusion, in this example there are many 
counterexamples in the form of alternative antecedents or causes which would lead to the 
same effect (such as throwing a rock or a cricket baU at the window). In the case of invalid 
inferences, where alternatives are available, people are more likely to give the correct logical 
'uncertaint}'' response to this argument form. The influence of context on conditional 
reasoning is, therefore, distinct from logical reasoning ability since the impact of knowledge 
on valid and invalid inferences acts both to suppress and facilitate logical reasoning. 
This account assumes that specific counterexamples are activated and integrated with 
premise information. Recent evidence suggests that conditional reasoning can also be 
influenced by more automatic associative belief based processes, consistent with dual-
processing accounts of reasoning (Evans, 2008). The associative processes underl}'ing 
probabilistic judgments, for example, have been shown to have a distinct influence on 
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conditional reasoning that is partially independent of the influence of retrieved 
counterexamples (Weidenfield, Oberauer & Hornig, 2005). 
The influence of background knowledge on reasoning is subject to development Qanveau-
Brennan & Markovits, 1999; Klaczynski, Schuneman & Daniel, 2004; Markovits & 
Thompson, 2008; MuUer, Overton & Reene, 2001) and in children, at least, involves effortful 
processes (Morsan^d & Handley, 2008). Although children as young as 4 years of age can draw 
valid inferences when presented with familiar content (Dias & Harris, 1990; Markovits, 2000), 
ver}' young children show littie effect of background knowledge (Markovits & Barrouillet, 
2002). Contextualised reasoning among t^'pically developing youngsters, develops through late 
childhood into adolescence. There are a number of reasons why this is the case (Markovits & 
Barrouillet, 2002; Markovits, Fleur}', Quinn & Venet, 1998; Markovits & Thompson, 2008). 
Young children simply have less background knowledge available in long term memor}'. 
Retrieval of information is also less efficient in 3'ounger children compared to adolescents. 
Critically children's contextualized reasoning performance is also related to the cognitive 
demands of representational processes. Young children are limited in the complexit}^ of the 
models they are capable of forming and for ver)' young children reasoning relies 
predominantly on the consideration of the major premise presented (Markovits & Barrouillet, 
2002). Children tend to interpret inferences biconditionally (if and only if p then q). The ability 
to respond with uncertaint}' to invalid inferences does not reliably appear until adolescence 
(MuUer et al. 2001).Not until around 11 years are children able to respond with uncertaint}' to 
DA as well as AC, this is accompanied by relatively high reference to counterexamples as 
justifications and denial of MP in some cases (Markovits & Janveau-Brennan, 1999). 
Developmental factors seem to specifically impact on the cognitively demanding 
consideration of counterexamples in conditional reasoning. Tj'pically developing 6 year olds 
are able, for example, to make probabilistic judgments about conditional statements but find it 
difficult to draw on background knowledge when engaged in everj'day reasoning, even when 
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such information is actively presented (Markovits and Thompson, 2008). As adolescents move 
towards adulthood, the development of inhibitor}' and meta-cognitive processes allows for 
more control over reasoning and a more selective use of background knowledge (Markovits & 
Barrouillet, 2002; 2004; Muller et al. 2001). T)'pically developing adolescents, therefore, 
present a population which is arguably more influenced by background knowledge compared 
to younger children and adults. 
While studies of the development of conditional reasoning have tended to focus on 
topically developing groups, the information processing st}de of individuals with ASD suggests 
that their reasoning processes may differ in significant ways. A number of current theories 
about the nature of autism explore the difficulties people with ASD may have with 
contextualizing or integrating information. Weak Central Coherence Theor)' (Frith, 1989; 
2003; Happe & Booth, 2008; Happe & Frith, 2006) proposes that human beings have an 
inherent drive towards central coherence, the formation of coherent wholes through the 
integration of pieces of relevant information. Incoming stimuli tend to be processed in 
context in order to derive a meaningful gist of the situation, often at the expense of surface 
details. Frith claims that individuals with ASD differ from the t^'pical population in exhibiting 
a tendency towards weak central coherence, which results in an oyer reliance on local or 
piecemeal processing and a tendency not to integrate information in order to process stimuli 
in context. 
The tendency towards weak central coherence in populations with ASD has been 
demonstrated across a number of domains. This processing st}4e results in good performance 
in tasks which rely upon the identification of localized details, such as the Embedded Figures 
Task, (Frith, 1989), Block Design Test (Shah & Frith, 1993) and perceptual learning tasks 
(Plaisted, O'Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 1998), but results in poor performance on tasks which 
require the integration of details such as the disambiguation of homographs (Frith & 
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SnowUng, 1983; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999a) and the interpretation of words in ambiguous 
sentences (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999b). 
Litde is known about the conditional reasoning performance of individuals with ASD. 
One recent study (Pijnacker et al., 2009) explored the abiUt}' of high functioning adults with 
autism to revise conditional reasoning conclusions on the basis of new contextual information 
in the form of a secondar)' conditional statement. Participants with autism showed no 
significant differences in performance compared to controls on simple conditional reasoning 
tasks with valid and invalid inferences. Where extra conditional statements were presented the 
participants with autism were found to exhibit a specific difficultiy with exception-handling 
resulting in a tendency not to re^^se conclusions on valid inferences. Analysis of reasoning 
outcomes focused on logically correct rather than invited responses. Consideration of 
endorsement responses for invalid inferences suggests, however, that the presentation of extra 
information influenced the reasoning responses of topical participants to a greater extent than 
participants with autism for both valid and invalid inferences. 
It has been repeatedly shown that tjpically developing populations tend to contextuaUze 
presented information when they reason. This is particularly true of t}'pically developing 
adolescents compared to younger children and adults. At the same time there is a growing 
body of research which suggests that individuals with ASD have difficult)' integrating 
information in order to process stimuli in context. The explicit influence of background 
knowledge on conditional reasoning relies upon the activation of specific exceptions available 
in long term memor}' and the integration of such counterexamples with presented stimuli. We 
surmised that difficulties with integrating information and impairment in contextualized 
thinking would, therefore, result in a tendency among adolescents with ASD to be less 
influenced by counterexamples compared to controls when engaged in conditional reasoning. 
In Experiment 1 we manipulated the availability of disablers and alternative antecedents 
on conditional reasoning problems. As suggested by the work of Pijnacker et al. (2009), we 
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anticipated that individuals with ASD would be able to engage in simple conditional reasoning 
tasks and show similar patterns of response to tj^pical controls where counterexamples were 
not available. Where counterexamples were available we predicted that our group with ASD 
would be less influenced by disabling conditions on MP compared to controls and would not 
show the t}'pical decreased tendency' to accept the logically correct conclusion. We also 
predicted that the adolescents with ASD would be less influenced by alternative causes on AC 
compared to the t^ ^pical group and would not exhibit the usual increased tendenc}' to give the 
logically correct uncertaint}' response. 
Background knowledge in the form of counterexamples can both facilitate and suppress 
logical reasoning performance. The presentation of both valid and invalid inferences allowed 
us, therefore, to examine the effect of context on reasoning outcomes controlling for any 
group differences in logical reasoning abilit}'. In addition, a probabilit}' judgment task was 
included, which allowed us to measure the relevant associative beliefs concerning the relation 
expressed in each conditional statement, in order to ensure that any differential effects of 
counterexamples between the two groups could not be attributed to differences in underlying 
beliefs. Further possible differences between the two groups likely to affect reasoning 
outcomes were explored in Experiments 2 and 3. In Experiment 2 we investigated whether 
the adolescents with ASD were more likely to habitually give affirmative responses to 
reasoning problems compared to the t)'pically developing participants. In Experiment 3 we 
compared the abilit)' of t}fpically developing adolescents and the group with ASD to generate 
counterexamples. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 examined conditional reasoning and probabilistic judgments in relation to 
available counterexamples. Adolescents with ASD and a typically developing control group 
performed a conditional reasoning task, where statements had varjdng available disabling 
239 
conditions and alternative antecedents. This task was followed by a likelihood judgment task, 
in which participants were asked to rate the believabilit}' of the statements presented. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants included 26 adolescents with ASD and 38 t}'pically developing adolescents. 
The adolescents with ASD were between the ages of 11 and 16 years. The typically developing 
adolescents were between the ages of 11 and 15. Participants were recruited by approaching 
mainstream schools with special units supporting pupils on the autistic spectrum. In the group 
with ASD only those adolescents were included who had a definitive clinical diagnosis of 
autism spectrum disorder meeting criteria from the Diagnostic and Statistical Aianual of Mental 
Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) or International 
Classification of Diseases (10th ed; lCD-10; World Health Organization, 1993). Diagnoses were 
carried out by either a paediatrician or child and adolescent ps3^chiatrist following 
multidisciplinar}' assessment. Adolescents with ASD with either a medical diagnosis such as 
epilepsy or a neurodevelopmental diagnosis other than autism such as attention deficit 
h^^peractivit}' disorder, or who were taking medication, were excluded from the study. There 
were 21 boys and 5 girls in the group with ASD. There were 23 boys and 15 girls in the 
tj'pically developing group. There were 22 high functioning adolescents diagnosed as having 
autism and 4 adolescents diagnosed with asperger syndrome. Within the t)'picaUy developing 
group children were excluded if they had a diagnosis of autism, asperger syndrome or were 
documented as having autistic traits. Children who had a statement of special educational 
needs were also excluded. 
Typically developing participants and those with ASD were recruited from the same 
mainstream schools in lower middle class urban areas within Plymouth and West Devon. All 
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of the teenagers who took part in the study were white, predominantly lived in urban areas 
and English was the first language for all of the participants. 
All participants were given a range of tests measuring participant characteristics, including 
a non verbal working memorjf task (adapted from Wilson, Bettger, Niculae & Klima, 1997). 
Our task differed from that of Wilson et al. in that it included processing and storage 
elements. Participants had to recall, in sequence, the location of a series of blocks. In addition 
to the span task, participants were also required to recall the final location of the previous trial 
sequences. Scores represent, therefore, a measure of the abilit}' to process and store given 
information. Working memory' was measured as it has been shown to be highly correlated 
with general intelligence (Colom, ReboUo, Palacios, Juan-Espinosa & Kj'Uonen, 2004) and has 
also been implicated in conditional reasoning performance (e.g. De Neys, Schaeken, & 
d'Ydewalle, 2005; Verschueren et al., 2004; Verschueren et al., 2005). Variations in working 
memor)^ have, for example, been shown to influence the strategies reasoners employ and 
consequent reasoning outcomes (Verschueren et al., 2005). 
Participants were also given The Stop-Signal Task (Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 1997), 
taken to measure inhibition. A measure of inhibition was included since inhibitor)' processes 
are proposed to mediate reasoning performance through individual differences in the selective 
suppression of competing responses (De Neys et al., 2005). If our two groups were found to 
differ on measures of inhibition this could, therefore, be an underlying factor in their abilit}' to 
selectively use background knowledge in reasoning. The Stop-Signal Task requires participants 
to suppress a prepotent response (pressing a button in response to a tone). Scores represent 
the overall number of correct responses to stop signal trials across a number of different time 
delays between the presentation of the tone and the stimuli. 
The expressive vocabulary test of The Wechsler Intelligence Test for Children (WISC—III, 
Wechsler, 1991) was also given to all participants. The WISC expressive vocabulary' test was 
chosen as it was felt to be of importance that the two groups were comparable on their ability 
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to understand the terms used within the given problems. This subtest measures verbal concept 
formation, fund of knowledge and degree of language development. 
Adolescents were excluded if they scored two standard deviations above or below the 
mean scaled score for their age group on the WlSC expressive vocabulary' measure. Scores 
above or below these points were deemed unacceptable as they reflected unusually high or low 
abilit}' for any given age range. Excluded individuals had scores which were the same as, 
higher than 2% of a given age range or lower than 2% of a given age range. Participants were 
also excluded if they failed to score on the storage or processing elements of the working 
memor}' task. 
Adolescents with ASD were matched as closely as possible with the typically developing 
adolescents on the basis of the individual differences measures and chronological age (See 
Table 1). No significant differences between the two groups were found for chronological age 
(/(62) = 1.07^= .29), age corrected standard vocabulary' scores(/(62) = -1.02 p— .31), working 
memory span (/(62) = -0.44 p~ .66), or inhibition (/(62) = -0.81 p- .42). 
(Put Table 1 here) 
A separate sample was used to pretest reasoning materials. The children included in the 
pretest were recruited from a mainstream school in the Plymouth area of Southern England 
with a lower middle class catchment profile. This school was also used to recruit adolescents 
with ASD in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. As such, the pretest group was deemed to be from 
similar educational and socioeconomic backgrounds as subsequent participants. The pretest 
group included typically developing adolescents with a range of educational abilities. Any child 
with a diagnosis for autism or asperger syndrome or a statement of special educational needs 
was excluded from the pretest group. Since we wanted to ensure that differences in availability 
of counterexamples in the statements used would be discernable even by the youngest 
children in further experiments, the children were recruited from the youngest age range 
included in our subsequent experiments and were between 11 and 12 years of age. 
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Materials and procedure 
Pretest 
Fort}' questions were largely drawn from Cummins et al. (1991). In this study pretested 
conditional statements were presented which were known to var}' in the number of alternative 
antecedents and disabling conditions available relating to the causal relationship. The purpose 
of the pretest was to categorise materials for use in later experiments as having either low or 
high available counterexamples. Since the Cummins et al. study used adult participants some 
additional questions were adapted for a younger audience. The questions were piloted with 
fort)' t^ fpically developing adolescents in four groups of ten in order to establish four groups 
of statements with: 
• High numbers of disabling conditions and high numbers of alternative antecedents, 
for example.- If a mug is dropped, then it ivill break. 
• High numbers of disabling conditions and low numbers of alternative antecedents, for 
example: If the trigger is pulled, then the gun will fire. 
• Low numbers of disabling conditions and high numbers of alternative antecedents, for 
example.' If a balloon is pricked, then it will burst 
• Low numbers of disabling conditions and low numbers of alternative antecedents, for 
example: If butter is heated, then it will melt 
Each group of 10 children was presented with 10 MP and 10 AC conditionals. The 
children were asked to generate as many counterexamples as possible, for each question, in 
one and a half minutes. Mean numbers of alternatives and disablers were calculated for each 
conditional. These means were split into quartiles, and 4 groups of 4 conditionals chosen, 
which best fitted the required high-low categories. Mean numbers of alternatives and disablers 
for each of the 4 categories listed above are shown in Table 2. 
(Put Table 2 here) 
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Conditional reasoning task 
There were 32 questions in the reasoning task, 16 MP and 16 AC statements, four from 
each of the pretest high-low categories (See Appendix). The task was presented by an 
animated robot on a computer screen. Participants were presented with brief pragmatic 
instructions as follows: 
In this task you mil be shown some statements. After each statement there mil be a fact and a 
conclusion. Given the statement and the fact, you need to make a decision about whether the conclusion 
follows. 
The participants were then presented with two practice questions, one of each inference t}^e. 
Feedback was given to ensure that participants understood the task. The experimental 
statements were then presented in a random order. Questions remained on the screen until 
the participant responded. All questions were presented as a statement, an invitation to 
suppose a fact, and a question about what follows, for example: "If the ignition key is turned, 
then the car will start. Suppose the ignition key is turned. Does it foUow that the car will 
start?" Participants were required to respond by pressing one of two buttons, labelled 'YES, 
definitely' and 'NO, not necessarily.' The correct logical responses for MP questions being 
'Yes, definitely' and for AC being 'No, not necessaril}^ 
Probabilitj'^ judgment task 
The probabilit)' judgment task was included to measure the relevant associative beliefs 
concerning the relation expressed in each conditional statement. The purpose of the task was 
to ensure that any differential effects of counterexamples between the two groups could not 
be attributed to differences in underlying beliefs. 
Participants were presented with the 16 conditionals used in the inference part of the 
study and asked to rate the likelihood of the consequent in the Ught of the antecedent. The 
conditionals either expressed forward causality (if cause then effect, P(q|p)) or backward 
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causalit)' (if effect then cause, P(p | q)), the probabilit}' judgments relevant to the MP and AC 
inferences respectively, giving a total of 32 questions. The task was presented on a computer 
screen by the animated robot used in the conditional reasoning task. Participants were given 
the following instructions: 
On the following screensjou will see some statements. You will be asked how likely each statement is. You 
will have to rate how likely the event is by clicking a number from 1 to 5. 
Participants were then shown an example question and the scale . They were told that clicking 
on number one meant 'not ver}^ likely' and five meant Ver}' likety' The statements were then 
presented in a random order. Questions remained on the screen until the participant 
responded. The participants were given tvvo practice questions. All questions were presented 
in the following format: 
How likely is it that 
If a towel is dropped in the bath, then it will get wet? 
Not likely 1 2 3 4 5 Ver)'likely 
Results 
Conditional reasoning task 
A 2 (group) by 2 (low vs high disablers) repeated measures Anova was performed on the 
MP inference data from the conditional reasoning task. Mean endorsement responses for MP 
questions, comparing autistic and t}^ical groups are shown in Figure 1. The analysis revealed a 
main effect of disablers (F(l,62) = 5.82, MSE -\.\6, p- .02, Ti \= .09) and a significant 
two-way interaction between disablers and group (F (1,62) = 6.81, M.S"£ - 1.16, p = .01, ri",, 
= .10), such that disablers affected the reasoning of the typical adolescents more than the 
adolescents with ASD (See Figure 1). 
(Put Figure 1 here) 
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In order to provide further information about the interaction between group and 
disablers, we performed paired sample t tests to test for an effect of disablers in each group. 
These showed a significant difference in endorsement rates on MP between high and low 
disabler questions among the t)'pically developing group (/(37) = -3.35 p = .002) but no 
significant difference in endorsement rates among the group with ASD (/(25) — -0.20^ = .85). 
A second Anova was performed to examine the effect of alternatives (high vs. low) on AC 
inferences, with autism as a between subjects factor. Mean endorsement responses for AC 
questions, comparing autistic and t}'pical groups are shown in Figure 2. The analysis revealed a 
main effect of alternatives (F(l,62) = 34.31, M5£ = 2.74,/) = < .001 rj'p = -36). Again, the 
predicted significant two-way interaction was found between alternatives and group (F(l,62) = 
8.34, MSE. — 2.1 A,p = .01 r j^ = .12), reflecting greater use of alternatives in the tjpically 
developing group (see Figure 2). 
(Put Figure 2 here) 
Once again, follow-up t tests were performed to check for an effect of alternatives in the 
two groups separately. In this case, paired sample t tests showed a significant difference in 
endorsement rates on AC between high and low alternative questions for both groups. 
Consistent with the significant interaction, this trend was considerably more marked in the 
t)'pical group (/(37) = -6.48/) = <.001), than in the group with autism (/(25) = 2.03/) = .04). 
Probability judgment task 
A 2 (group) by 2 (low vs high disablers) repeated measures Anova was performed on the 
P(q|p) data from the probability judgment task. The main effect of disablers was not found to 
be significant (F(l,62) = 1.66, MSE - 0.49, p - .20 ri^ p = .03). The two-way interaction 
between disablers and autism was also not found to be significant (F(l ,62) = 2.07, MSE — 
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0.49p = .16 r|% =.03), such that disablers did not affect likelihood judgments for either 
group). 
Follow-up t tests revealed that there were no significant differences between autistic and 
tj'pical groups on P(q | p) questions with low available disablers (/(62) = -0.89^ = .38) or 
P(q|p) questions with high available disablers (/(62) = 0.36p — .74). 
A 2 (group) by 2 (low vs high alternatives) repeated measures Anova was also performed 
on the P(p I q) data from the probability^ judgment task. The main effect of alternatives was 
found to be significant (F(l,62) = 81.79, MSB = 0.82, /> = < .001 y\-^ = ;57). The two-way 
interaction between alternatives and autism was, however, not found to be significant (F (1,62) 
= 1.93, MS]1 = 0.85, p - .17 r|"p =.03), such that available alternatives affected likelihood 
judgments for both groups. 
Follow-up t tests once again revealed that there were no significant differences between 
autistic and tj'pical groups on P(p | q) questions with low available alternatives (/(62) = -0.54p 
= .62) or P(p I q) questions with high available alternatives (/(62) = 0.78p = .44). 
Discussion 
In line with previous research, tj^ically developing adolescents showed a significant effect 
of available counterexamples on conditional reasoning. The tj^pical group were more likely to 
withhold MP, where there were higher numbers of available disabling conditions, and more 
likely to give uncertaint}' responses to AC, where there were high numbers of alternative 
antecedents. Our hypothesis that this pattern of responding would not be mirrored by the 
autistic group was confirmed. For both inferences we obsen^ed significant interactions, 
indicating that background knowledge had less influence on the reasoning of the adolescents 
with ASD. The possibility that the difference in performance between the two groups was 
driven by group differences in the believabilit}' of the conditional statements was eliminated. 
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No significant group differences were found in probabilistic judgments of the believabilit}^ of 
the premises. 
The conditional reasoning data are consistent with our general h}'pothesis that the 
reasoning of adolescents with ASD is less likely to be contextualized with relevant background 
knowledge. An alternative explanation for the results of the conditional reasoning task relates 
to the pattern of responses given by the adolescents with ASD. Although the correct logical 
response for the invalid inference AC is one of uncertainty, there is a tendency for people to 
respond with certaint)' to invalid inferences where Utde background knowledge is available. 
This is reflected in the high numbers of endorsements by both groups in response to AC 
questions with few alternative antecedents. Since the correct logical response for MP is also to 
endorse the inference, there is a tendency among topical populations for affirmative responses 
to be given to both MP and AC when reasoning outside of empirical knowledge. This pattern 
of responding is also shown by the participants with ASD where available counterexamples 
are low. Where background knowledge is available, tj'pical groups are less likely to endorse 
MP and AC and hence give less affirmative responses for both inferences. It is possible that 
the adolescents with ASD do not show this drop in affirmative responding because they 
simply have a stronger tendency to respond by saying yes. There is some previous evidence 
that younger children with autism exhibit a yes bias when engaged in contrar)f-to-fact 
reasoning tasks (Leevers and Harris, 2000). Contrary-to-fact reasoning is very different from 
the kind of everj'day conditional reasoning presented here. It is possible, nevertheless, that a 
yes response bias could explain the findings of Experiment 1. An additional experiment was 
carried out to examine this possibilit}^ 
Experiment 2 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to explore the possibility that the pattern of responding 
exhibited by the adolescents with ASD in Experiment 1 was related to a generalised yes 
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response bias. Adolescents with ASD and t)fpically developing adolescents were given a 
reasoning task with equal numbers of affirmative and negative correct responses. 
Method 
Participants 
As far as possible the participants reflected the same populations as in Experiment 1. The 
adolescents were recruited from the same schools and within the same age range. 20 
adolescents with ASD, 14 of which had taken part in Experiment 1 and 38 t}pically 
developing adolescents were included in the study. The adolescents in both groups were 
between the ages of 11 and 16. There were 16 boys and 4 girls in the group with ASD and 21 
boys and 17 girls in the topical group. All of the adolescents with ASD had a clinical diagnosis 
of autism spectrum disorder meeting either DSM-IV (APA, 1994) or ICD-10 (WHO, 1993) 
criteria. Diagnoses were performed by either a paediatrician or child and adolescent 
psychiatrist following multidisciplinar\r assessment. Adolescents with ASD with either a 
medical diagnosis such as epilepsy or a neurodevelopmental diagnosis other than autism such 
as attention deficit h\peractivity disorder, or who were taking medication, were excluded from 
the study. There were 17 high functioning adolescents diagnosed as having ASD or autism 
and 3 adolescents diagnosed with asperger syndrome. Within the topically developing group 
children were excluded if they had a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder, asperger 
syndrome or were documented as having autistic traits. Children who had a statement of 
special educational needs were also excluded. Recruitment was from mainstream schools in 
lower middle class urban areas within Plymouth and West Devon. All of the teenagers who 
took part in the study were white, predominantiy lived in urban areas and English was the first 
language for all of the participants. 
All participants were given a measure of Working Memory based on that developed by 
Case, Kurland and Goldberg (1982) incorporating a processing and storage component and a 
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subtest of The Wechsler Intelligence Test for Children (WISC—III, Wechsler, 1991) measuring 
expressive vocabular}'. The reasoning task used in this experiment differed from the one 
presented in Experiment 1 in that it did not involve potentially conflicting analjTical and 
empirical responses. For this reason a measure of inhibition was not included in the measures 
of participant characteristics. No significant differences between groups were found (See 
Table 3) for chronological age (/(56) = 0.69 />= .49), age corrected standard vocabular)' scores 
(/(56) = -1.55 p- .13) or working memor)^ span (/(56) = -1.75 p- .09). 
(Put Table 3 here) 
Materials and procedure 
The participants were presented with simple arguments based on a universally quantified 
major premise. The structure of the questions was taken from the Leevers and Harris (2000) 
study which found evidence for a yes response bias in children with ASD. The content 
differed from that used b}^  Leevers and Harris, however, in that the questions were not 
contrar}'-to-fact. The materials used were similar in content to the problems in Experiment 1, 
in so far as the questions referred to familiar everj^day information which did not conflict with 
empirical knowledge. 
Sixteen questions were presented, four of each tj^ pe of inference (MP, MT, AC and DA). 
For each inference there were two questions with standard affirmative conclusions, where 
drawing the inference involves responding 'yes', for example: "AH birds have feathers. Robins 
are birds. Does it follow that robins have feathers?" And 2 questions with opposite 
conclusions, where drawing the inference involves responding 'no', for example: "All fires are 
hot. A bonfire is a fire. Does it foUow that a bonfire is cold?" If the participants with ASD 
exhibit a bias to say 'yes' then this will be manifested in reduced rate of drawing the inference 
on problems with opposite conclusions. The questions were presented in a booklet. AH 
materials were read out loud by the experimenter and participants were required to circle 
either a 'yes' or 'no' response. Participants were tested in small groups of up to 5 individuals. 
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Results 
Table 4 shows rates of inference for the four argument forms under standard and opposite 
conclusions for the two groups. The presence of a bias to respond 'yes' would be indicated by 
lower inference rates amongst the ASD participants on problems with opposite conclusions. 
A 4 X question type (MP, MT, AC and DA) by 2 x conclusion tj^ pe (standard or opposite) 
repeated measures Anova on inference rates, with autism as a between subjects factor, 
revealed a significant main effect of question Vfpe (F(3,168) = 3.30, MSE = 0.13, p= .02 T|'p = 
.06 and a significant two way interaction between question type and conclusion tjpe F(3,168) 
= 3.47, AdS'E = 0.14, p= .02 r|~p = .06, showing higher rates of inference for standard than 
opposite conclusions on the denial inferences, MT and DA. Crucially, however, the two way 
interaction between conclusion tj^ pe and group was not significant F{\ ,56) = 1.04, MSE = 
0.11, p= .31 ri'p = .02. This shows that there was no significant tendency amongst the 
participants with ASD to generate 'yes' responses more often than the tj'pical participants. 
The three-way interaction between question t)'pe, expected response and group was also non-
significant F(3,168) = 034, MSE = 0.05, p= .80 ri'p = .01. 
(Put Table 4 here) 
Follow up t tests revealed no significant differences between groups in inference rates for 
standard or opposite conclusions on any of the argument forms. For MP questions with 
standard conclusions (^56) = -0.49 p= .63), MP questions with opposite conclusions (^56) = 
0.72 p= .47), MT opposite questions (/(56) = 0.34 p= .74), MT standard questions (/(56) = 
0.43 p= .67), AC standard questions (/(56) = 1.20 p= .33), AC opposite questions (/(56) = 
1.39 p= .33), DA opposite questions (/(56) = -0.29 p= .77), DA standard questions (/(56) = 
0.22 p = .83). 
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Discussion 
Experiment 2 shows that the adolescents with ASD do not differ from t}'pically 
developing adolescents in the number of yes responses given to the reasoning problems. The 
pattern of findings shown in Table 4 also demonstrates that the adolescents with ASD are 
engaged in reasoning and do not significantly differ from the t^'pical group in the responses 
given, regardless of whether the standard response is affirmative or not. The adolescents with 
ASD, do not, therefore, show a yes-saying response bias. 
Previous studies of contrarj'-to-fact reasoning among children with audsm present 
conflicting findings (Leevers & Harris, 2000; Scott, Baron-Cohen & Leslie, 1999). These 
differences have been explained by reference to a yes response bias (Leevers & Harris, 2000). 
Our materials, on the other hand, used familiar information which was in line with empirical 
knowledge about the world. The fact that we did not find evidence for a yes response bias 
suggests that the pattern of responding among children with ASD seen in previous studies 
may be particular to reasoning with content that is not empirically true. The tendency for 
children with ASD not to engage in imaginarjj^ play (see Jarrold, 2003 for a review) and to have 
difficulties understanding pretence (Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2001) and non-literal aspects of 
language (Tager-Flusberg, 2000) would also suggest that this might be the case. 
The conditional reasoning data are not explained by a response bias and remain consistent 
with our hypothesis that the reasoning of adolescents with ASD is less likely to be 
contextualized with relevant background knowledge. Our group with ASD appear not to 
integrate available counterexamples during reasoning to the same degree as typically 
developing controls. There remains, however, another possible explanation for our findings. 
Individuals with ASD have been shown to have restricted and obsessive areas of interests 
(Murray, Lesser & Lawson, 2005) and to show impairment in the generation of novel thoughts 
and ideas (e.g. Bishop & Norbury, 2005; Turner, 1999). It may be the case that, for the 
participants with ASD, relevant background information is not available and they are simply 
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less able to generate counterexamples compared to the control group. The materials used in 
Experiment 1 were pretested on a group of topically developing children. It is possible that 
adolescents with ASD do not have access to the same number or t}'pe of counterexamples for 
these materials, it was necessary to conduct a third study to explore this possibilit}', in which 
the two groups were compared on their abilit)' to generate the counterexample cases involved 
in the reasoning problems of Experiment 1. 
Experiment 3 
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to explore the possibilit}' that a lack of contextualized 
reasoning among adolescents with ASD was related to an inabUit}' to generate 
counterexamples. The ability of t)'pically developing adolescents and adolescents with ASD to 
generate disabling conditions and alternative antecedents was measured by performance on a 
generation task, based on that of Cummins et al. (1991). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants for the generation task included 32 topically developing adolescents and 20 
adolescents with ASD. All of the participants had previously taken part in Experiment 1. 
Once again no significant differences were found on measures of chronological age (/(50) = 
0.46 p~ .65), age corrected standard vocabular}' scores (/(50) = -1.22 p- 23), inhibition (/(50) 
= 2.04 /)= .08) or working memory (/(50) = 0.95 p- .35). 
Materials and procedure 
The participants were presented with a booklet containing eight conditionals, four AC and 
four MP statements, taken from each of the four high-low categories identified by the pretest. 
Participants were asked to generate as many counterexamples as possible in one and a half 
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minutes. All materials were read aloud by the experimenter. Participants were presented with 
the 8 statements in the following format: 
Rule: If Marvnn wears wellies, then his feet will stay dr}^ 
Fact: Marvin's feet stay dr)', but he is not wearing wellies. 
Write down as many reasons as you can that could make this possible. 
Results 
A 2 (group) by 2 (high Vs low disablers) Anova was performed on the data for MP 
questions, with autism as a between subjects factor. The analysis revealed a main effect of 
disablers (F(l,50) = 68.16, MSE = 2.34, p=< .001 n'p = -58). The two-way interaction 
between disablers and autism was not found to be significant (F(l,50) = 0.22, MSE = 2.34, p 
= .64 r|"p = .004), such that there was no significant difference in generation performance 
between the two groups. 
An equivalent Anova was performed on the data for AC questions. The analysis revealed a 
main effect of alternatives (F(l,50) = 278.82, MSE = 1.53, p-< .001 ^-p = .85) In Une with 
the previous analysis of disabling conditions the two-way interaction between alternatives and 
autism was not found to be significant (F(l,50) = 0.01, MSE - 1.53, p = .94 r|~p = <.001) 
showing, once again, that there was no significant difference in generation performance 
between the two groups. 
Further analysis was carried out in order to ascertain whether the two groups were 
generating different t}'pes of counterexamples. The counterexamples generated were 
categorized into four t^ fpes based on the taxonomy used by Verschueren et al. (2002). Types 
ranged from those which are strongly related to the content of the premises to those which 
represent more remote situations. T}'pe 1 constituted 'real' counterexamples where either an 
alternative cause, which would lead to the same effect, is generated or an event which would 
254 
stop the effect from occurring. Type 2 referred to answers which state that there are possible 
exceptions, although they are not explicidy stated. Tj'pe 3 referred to answers which state that 
an enabler is not necessary, for example, the given cause is not necessarj' for the effect to 
occur. T)pe 4 included more remote answers referring to generalizations, invalid rules and 
inter\'ening instances. 
Multivariate analysis revealed no significant difference between autistic and t}'pical groups 
in terms of overall numbers of counterexamples generated, F(2,49) = 032p— .73 r\~p — .01. 
Follow up Univariate Anovas revealed no significant differences between groups in terms of 
t}'pes of counterexamples generated. Means for each t)'pe of counterexample are shown in 
Table 5. 
(Put Table 5 here) 
A measure of the influence of counterexamples in the reasoning task across all inferences 
was also derived by calculating the difference between levels of endorsement where many 
counterexamples were available compared to cases where few counterexamples w^ere available. 
This measure was correlated with total numbers of counterexamples generated excluding 
remote or invalid t}'pe 4 examples. Analysis revealed significant correlations between the 
influence of counterexamples during reasoning and numbers of counterexamples generated 
for the t)'pical group r(32) = -0.39,/) =.03 but not for the group with ASD r(20) = -0.16,/) 
=.49. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 demonstrated that there were no significant differences in the numbers or 
type of counterexamples generated between the t}'pical group and the group with ASD. This 
suggests that the both groups have similar background information available for activation. 
These findings also show that the adolescents with ASD are able to retrieve background 
knowledge when instructed to do so. There is still a possibility, however, that they do not 
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spontaneous]}' activate such background knowledge during reasoning. These results appear to 
conflict with previous studies showing an impairment in the generation of novel ideas. The 
fact that our participants with ASD were able to generate counterexamples may be related to 
the fact that they were explicitiy cued to do so. 
Analysis revealed significant correlations for the t}fpical group between the influence of 
counterexamples during reasoning and the generation of counterexamples. For the group with 
ASD the abilit}' to generate counterexamples when instructed to do so was not related to 
reasoning performance suggesting that either they did not tend to spontaneously generate 
counterexamples during reasoning or they did not integrate activated counterexample 
information. 
General discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 support the h}'pothesis that adolescents with ASD would be 
less influenced by available counterexamples in a conditional reasoning task. The adolescents 
with ASD did not differ from t}'pically developing adolescents in judgments concerning the 
beUevabilit}' of the relations described in the premises. Patterns of performance in the 
conditional reasoning task, therefore, do not reflect differences in participants' underlying 
beliefs in the conditional statements. Experiment 2 explored the possibilit}' that the 
conditional reasoning results reflected a yes response bias. The adolescents with ASD were 
not found to differ from t}'picaUy developing adolescents in their willingness to give negative 
responses. The possibilit}' that the reasoning performance of the group with ASD reflected 
differential availability of counterexamples in long term memor}' was ruled out by Experiment 
3, which showed no differences between groups on a counterexample generation task. 
The adolescents with ASD showed no significant effect of background knowledge, in the 
form of disabling conditions, on the valid MP inference. The same group showed a small 
effect of background knowledge, in the form of alternatives, on AC but significantly less 
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contextual influence than the tjpically developing group. Hence, the results strongly support 
our prior h)'pothesis that spontaneous contextualization of reasoning would be reduced in 
adolescents with ASD. 
An important feature of our research design is that the results cannot be interpreted in 
terms of good and bad reasoning, from a normative viewpoint, as is known to relate generaU}' 
to cognitive abiUt}' (Stanovich, 1999). MP is a valid inference, which logically should be drawn. 
The fact that our t\fpically developing adolescents were strongly influenced by prior beliefs in 
their tendency to endorse MP is therefore technically evidence of a cognitive bias - a bias 
which was wholly absent in the group with ASD. However, since AC is an invalid inference, it 
is a logical error to endorse it. Any suppression of AC inferences due to availabiUt}' of 
counterexamples is hence a debiasing effect. Examination of Figure 2 shows that for low 
counterexample cases endorsement rates of AC were similarly high in both groups. However, 
the avaUabilit)' of counterexamples debiased reasoning in the tjpical group much more 
strongly than in the group with ASD. So the effect of context is to decrease logical accurac}'^  
for MP but to increase logical accuracy for AC. The fact that the reasoning of the t\^ical 
group was more belief-based in both cases hence shows that the difference between groups 
has nothing to do with logical reasoning abiUt}' as such. If we take a broader view of rationalit}' 
in reasoning than that provided by logic, however, it becomes apparent that the lack of 
spontaneous contextualization of reasoning will be a major handicap for adolescents with 
ASD in ever)'day thinking and reasoning. As Evans and Over (1996) have pointed out, in real 
life (as opposed to the psychological laborator}^) it is adaptive to reason from all relevant belief. 
In general, even when instructed to do so, only those individuals with high cognitive 
capacity are able to reason logically, where logic and belief are in conflict (e.g. Capon, Handley 
& Dennis, 2003; De Neys, 2006; Klaczynski, 2000). In normal adults this requires a strong 
effort to inhibit prior belief. It was not the case that the group with ASD showed better 
developed inhibitory abilities, the Stop-Signal Task revealed no significant differences in 
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inhibition performance between the two groups. In the case of our participants with ASD, 
therefore, we do not believe that any such effort at decontextualisation was involved. Rather, 
we propose, that the usual contextualisation which normal reasoners struggle to suppress, 
does not occur with the adolescents with ASD. 
Interestingly the group with ASD did not significandy differ in the responses they gave in 
the likelihood judgment task compared to the t}^ical group. Automatic associative belief 
based processes appear to be intact. As a consequence the group with ASD,was able to arrive 
at a degree of belief in the conditional. This suggests that individuals with ASD may be able to 
contextualise inputs when contextualisation relies on implicit associative processes. Such 
implicit processes have been shown to have a distinct influence on reasoning apart from the 
explicit influence of specific counterexamples. (Verschueren, et al. 2005; Weidenfield, et al. 
2005). 
The fact that our participants with ASD were able to generate counterexamples is in 
conflict with previous studies which show impaired generation of novel ideas. Individuals with 
ASD have shown restricted performance relative to controls in response to tasks involving 
word fluency (generation of as many words as possible in a given time span) (e.g. Minshew, 
Goldstein, Muenz & Pa3'^ ton, 1992), ideational fluency (generation of as many uses as possible 
for a given object in a set time span) (e.g. Turner, 1999) and impairment in the spontaneous 
use of pretence in play (farrold et al., 1996). There are, however, other studies which show 
that individuals with ASD show no impairment in similar tasks (e.g. Boucher, 1988; Minshew, 
Goldstein and Seigel, 1995). Boucher demonstrates that individuals with ASD have a specific 
problem with the spontaneous generation of novel ideas when no cues are provided. Our 
generation task involved ver}' specific prompts in the form of rules and facts. Participants did 
not have to devise a generation strategy, they simply had to report the resulting 
counterexamples activated on the basis of the cues given. What is perhaps surprising, 
nonetheless, is that our group with ASD did not differ in terms of the types of 
258 
counterexamples generated. Turner, for example, found that individuals with autism were able 
to report the usual uses, cued by a given object, but were unable to derive more imaginative or 
out of the ordinar)' responses not normally associated with the use of the target. We might 
expect, therefore, that t^jpical groups and groups with ASD might differ in the generation of 
remote or exceptional instances of counterexamples. This was found not to be the case. 
However, our results do show that the responses given by both groups show a marked 
tendency to generate 'real counterexamples' as opposed to generalisations and more remote or 
exceptional examples, where numbers generated by both groups were ver}' low. 
The lack of contextualization exhibited by our group with ASD may be due to the 
tendency not to integrate available background knowledge with presented material. If 
individuals with ASD have a specific problem with the spontaneous generation of novel ideas 
where cues are not provided, however, this suggests a further possibilit}'. It may be that our 
group with ASD were able to generate counterexamples when prompted to do so but did not 
generate background knowledge spontaneously when engaged in online reasoning. This study 
cannot distinguish between these two possibilities. Recent work by Pijnacker et al. (2009) 
suggests, however, that individuals with autism are less influenced by contextual information 
in conditional reasoning even where such information is expHcidy presented. The study by 
Pijnacker et al. would, therefore, support the claim that individuals with ASD tend not to 
integrate background information available to them during everj^da}' conditional reasoning. 
The adolescents with ASD did not show the kind of contextualised reasoning t}^ically 
found in an adolescent population. In some ways the reasoning performance of the group 
with ASD had more in common with reasoning patterns found amongst younger children. 
Young children show less influence of background knowledge compared to adolescents 
(Markovits & Janveau-Brennan, 1999). Implicit probabilistic influences on reasoning are less 
cognitively demanding and children as young as 6 years of age are able to make probabilistic 
judgments about conditional statements (Markovits & Thompson, 2008). This was also found 
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to be the case with our adolescents with ASD. Although they were less affected by the 
availability of counterexample information they showed no impairment in their ability to arrive 
at probabilistic judgments of presented material. Where our adolescents with ASD differ from 
younger, t}^ically developing children is that they show no lack of available background 
knowledge. They also demonstrated similar abilities to t3rpical adolescents in retrieving 
counterexamples, but only when explicitiy instructed to do so. As we have already stated it is 
possible that, like tj'picaUy developing 3'ounger children, their abiUty to spontaneously retrieve 
counterexamples is under developed. 
Although young children have difficulties effectively representing the relationships 
involved in conditional reasoning, t}'pically developing adolescents, on the other hand, have 
the ability to form complex schemas and to activate and incorporate background knowledge in 
order to reason in context (Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002). Weak Central Coherence accounts 
of autism would predict that reasoners on the autistic spectrum, like younger children, would 
tend not to form complex representational models where it is necessaty to integrate presented 
material with other relevant knowledge. 
Our results support Frith's (1989; see also Happe & Frith, 2006) claim that individuals 
with autism have a tendency not to process information in context. But our work also 
highlights difficulties with equating global coherence across many different modalities, 
involving differing types of processing and levels of processing complexity. Our participants 
with ASD were able to use implicit associative processes to arrive at a degree of belief in the 
conditionals presented and were also able to generate specific examples from long term 
memoty when asked to do so. In both of these tasks the performance of the group with ASD 
showed similar performance to the topical group. Our findings suggest, therefore, that 
children with ASD can activate background knowledge and that they can integrate implicit 
knowledge with presented material in order to create coherent models. What they fail to do is 
to show e\'idence of contextualized thinking in an explicit reasoning task. 
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Weak Central Coherence accounts of processing in context have been conceptualised 
across a number of widely differing cognitive and perceptual tasks and results have been 
conflicting (See Happe & Frith, 2006 for a review). Lopez and Leekam (2003) suggest that 
individuals with ASD tend not to show impairments in contextuaUsed processing in visuo-
spatial tasks including Navon tasks or visual illusions tasks (E.g. Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon, 
& Filloux, 1994; Ropar & Mitchell, 1999) but do demonstrate difficulties processing complex 
verbal information in context (e.g. Frith & SnowUng, 1983; JoUiffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). 
Our work would suggest, however, that it is not the verbal nature of these tasks that leads to 
information processing difficulties for groups with ASD but the fact that they involve 
effortful integration of explicit material with given stimuli. Both our likelihood judgment task 
and the conditional reasoning task were verbal in nature and used materials with the same 
content. 
In some ways our findings may be more in line with Minshew's Complex Processing 
Deficit account of autism (Minshew et al., 1997; Williams, Goldstein & Minshew, 2006) which 
proposes that individuals with ASD have a general impairment in processing complex 
information. A difficulty in drawing information together in order to create concepts and 
schemas means that incoming information cannot be processed with the support of a 
contextual framework. This impairment is only apparent in tasks which draw on limited 
cognitive resources. Less complex tasks or those which generally make fewer demands on 
cognitive resources will be unimpaired. Certainly this account would explain why the 
conditional reasoning task, which has been shown to be related to cognitive ability 
(Verschueren et al. 2004), would present difficulties for the group with ASD whilst the 
likelihood task would not. It is important to note, however, that our groups did not 
significandy differ on measures of Working Memory and Minshew is not claiming that 
individuals with ASD have a problem with cognitive capacit)' per se. 
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The findings presented here raise some interesting questions. It is important to stress, 
however, that standardised diagnostic measures such as the Autism Diagnostic Obserx^ation 
Schedule-Generic (ADOS-G) (Lord, Risi, Lambrecht et al., 2000) or the Autism Diagnostic 
Interview-Revised (ADI-R) (Lord, Rutter & LeCouteur, 1994) were not employed in this 
study. While the participants with ASD were rigorously diagnosed, standard measures 
tj'picaU}' used in autism research allow for confidence in generalising across studies. Further 
investigation is, therefore, of particular necessit)^ where our findings are counter to previous 
work. The fact that we did not find a yes response bias amongst the adolescents with ASD, for 
example, contradicts previous studies (Leevers and Harris 2000). The fact that the questions 
we used were ver)' similar to those used in the Leevers and Harris study but differed in that 
they had familiar rather than contrar)'-to-fact content suggests that children with ASD may 
have specific difficulties reasoning with empirically false material. There is comparable 
evidence that individuals with ASD exhibit poor performance on counterfactual reasoning 
tasks involving reasoning about alternative possibilities not reflected in realit)' (Grant, Riggs & 
Boucher, 2004; Peterson & Bowler, 2000). Future work might investigate reasoning in 
populations with ASD with contrar}'-to-fact, counterfactual and empirically true content 
across childhood and adolescence. 
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Appendix 
Conditionals used in the reasoning task 
Low alternatives and low disablers 
If butter is heated, then it will melt 
If iron touches a magnet, then it will stick to it 
If water is frozen, then it will become ice 
If Robert cuts his finger, then it will bleed 
High alternatives and high disablers 
If the brake is pressed, then the car will slow down 
If the window is opened, then the room will become cool 
If a stone is kicked, then it will move 
If a mug is dropped, then it will break 
High disablers and low alternatives 
If the ignition key is mmed, then the car will start 
If the trigger is pulled, then the gun will fire 
If the correct switch is flicked, then the porch light will go on 
If the doorbell is pushed, then it will ring 
High alternatives and low disablers 
If the apple is ripe, then it will fall off the tree 
If Camilla eats an ice-lolly, then her mouth will get cold 
If a towel is dropped in the bath, then it will get wet 
If a balloon is pricked, then it will burst 
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Table 1. Measures of participant characteristics for autistic and tj'pical groups 
Autistic Tj'pical 
Differences 
between groups 
Range Mean SD Range Mean SD P 
Chronological Age 
(Months) 
Standardised 
Vocabular)' scores 
Working Memor)' 
Span 
Inhibition 
133-203 
4-13 
0.5-4.5 
6-62 
168.08 
8.65 
2.19 
38.55 
19.43 
2.98 
1.13 
13.03 
143-188 
4-16 
0.5-4.0 
10-57 
163.61 
9.42 
2.08 
41.21 
14.90 
2.96 
0.91 
10.28 
.29 
.31 
.66 
.42 
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Table 2. Mean numbers of alternative antecedents and disabling conditions generated for 
each high-low categor}'. 
High - low categories Mean counterexamples generated 
Low alternatives — low disablers 
Alternatives Disablers 
0.30 0.55 
Low alternatives — high disablers 0.55 2.15 
High alternatives - low disablers 2.73 0.98 
High alternatives — high disablers 2.35 2.35 
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Table 3. Measures of participant characteristics for autistic and typical groups 
Autistic Tj'pical 
Differences 
bet«'-een groups 
Range Mean SD Range Mean SD 
Chronological Age 
(Months) 
Standardised 
Vocabular)' scores 
Working Memory' 
Span 
141-195 
4-11 
1.0-5.0 
166.45 
6.50 
3.15 
15.79 
2.14 
1.03 
137-194 
4-13 
1.0-5.0 
163.29 
7.37 
3.66 
16.90 
1.96 
1.06 
.49 
.13 
.09 
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Table 4. Mean number of inferences drawn for standard and opposite conclusions for each 
argument from comparing the t}'pical group and the group with ASD 
Inference 
MP 
MT 
AC 
DA 
Response type 
Standard 
Opposite 
Standard 
Opposite 
Standard 
Opposite 
Standard 
Opposite 
ASD 
1.85 
2.00 
1.85 
1.75 
1.90 
1.90 
1.90 
1.75 
T3'pical 
1.89 
1.97 
1.89 
1.79 
1.97 
2.00 
1.92 
1.71 
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Table 5. Mean number of counterexamples generated for each t}'pe by autistic and t^jpical 
groups. 
T\'pe generated 
Real counterexamples 
Possible exceptions 
Missing enablers 
Remote counterexamples 
Mean 
12.10 
0.15 
2.15 
0.40 
Autistic 
SD 
4.89 
0.67 
1.81 
0.68 
Mean 
11.75 
0.13 
2.34 
0.72 
Typical 
SD 
3.16 
0.34 
1.29 
0.99 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Mean number of endorsement responses as a percentage, given for MP questions 
with low and high available disablers by the autistic and t}'pical groups. 
Figure 2. Mean number of endorsement responses as a percentage, given for AC questions 
with high and low available alternatives by autistic and tjjpical groups. 
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